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A b stract
This thesis proposes a political economy analysis of the impact of institu­
tional change on representation, policy making and accountability. Specifically, 
it focuses on the transition from parliamentarism to presidentialism and it ex­
ploits information from a unique database on a natural experiment that took 
place in Italy in the 1990s. We first provide an introduction and critical overview 
of the related political economy literature. Chapter 1 analyses the effect of the 
constitutional transition on the structure of governments and fiscal policy out­
comes. It develops a theoretical framework for the analysis of citizens’ ability to 
hold representatives accountable in a world of multiple policy issues. The model 
predicts that institutional change improves accountability and that it modifies 
the relationship between the executive and legislative preferred policies. These 
changes are reflected in changes in policy decisions on fiscal expenditure. Find­
ings show that differentiation widens between mayors and the leading parties 
in the legislature. Furthermore, political changes (as captured by differenti­
ation) affect the expenditure choices in the three largest categories of public 
expenditure. Chapter 2 analyses the interplay between constitutions and the 
occurrence of political business cycles. The results show that, once the effect of 
elections is allowed to vary across constitutional regimes, we observe tax cuts 
and other policy changes before elections only after the institutional transition 
took place. Finally, Chapter 3 analyses how the introduction of presidentialism 
substantially enhanced the quality of elected representatives that are part of the 
executive. The empirical results show that educational levels of elected repre­
sentatives rose, and that there was a change in the occupational mix due to the 
large number of elected politicians with high opportunity-cost professions that 
joined the local governments. This can be explained by higher self selection of 
good quality politicians in the political competition for executive seats after the 
reform.
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Introduction
Government interventions in economies produce wide ranging impacts. Governments 
engage in public goods provision, regulation, productivity enhancing interventions, 
macroeconomic stabilization, redistribution. Traditional public economics focused 
on the analysis of guiding criteria for optimal government intervention. The govern­
ment was assumed to be a benevolent agent maximizing social welfare through its 
policy choices1. However, policy decisions are not the outcome of an abstract entity 
that acts as a social planner and maximizes the total welfare of a given polity. Policy 
decisions are the outcome of a collective decision making process,and are performed 
by individuals that do not necessarily act benevolently, i.e. in line with citizens’ 
preferences.
The political economy literature analyzes government and other players behav­
ior within an institutional framework, focuses on the incentives faced by agents in 
the policy making process and the role of institutional choices in affecting policy 
outcomes. Its research agenda is to provide better models of political processes that 
will provide a deeper understanding of the forces determining policies. Moreover, 
these models should offer guidance on how institutions of choice could be structured 
in order to improve the policy process. James Buchanan, with his work on public 
finance in the democratic process (1967) and subsequent publications, provided sem­
inal contributions on the analysis of the role of the constitution in the determination
1 The selection of policies would take place after a choice had been made on how to evaluate the 
collective impact of a policy by aggregating the effects that this policy has on each society members’ 
welfare.
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of policies. Inspired by his readings of the Italian school of public finance, he intro­
duced formal analyses of the impact of self-interests and special interests on policy 
making and government behaviour, in juxtaposition to the traditional public eco­
nomics analysis, which was based on the assumption of benevolent governments. The 
so called “new -political economy” (in opposition to the use of “political economy” 
to broadly describe economics since Adam Smith’s contributions to the discipline) 
traces its origins from three distinct strands of literature:
• the developments of formal analysis of political science,
• the public choice tradition of the Virginia School led by Buchanan himself, 
and
• the analyses of macroeconomic policy that initiated in the late seventies.
Prior to the development of these three traditions, the Arrow impossibility the­
orem2 had already delivered the dismal result of collective decision making analysis. 
The essence of collective choice relied on finding a method that allowed a comparison 
of gains and losses in an economy, that stemmed from a certain policy intervention. 
The appealing idea of deriving societal preferences from those of individuals in a 
society according to some agreed principles (rather than adopting a notion of what 
is good for society on grounds of moral reflection of benevolent dictators) was dis­
missed in 1951 with the proof that no method of preferences aggregation could 
satisfy a set of desirable aggregation properties. As William Riker put it “Politics, 
not economics, is the truly dismal science”. Understanding how social decisions are 
taken and what role is played by political institutions thus formed the agenda of 
positive collective choice theory.
A few years after the end of the second world war, Duncan Black (1948) devel­
oped an influential model of (spatial) political competition. Black’s model, which
2 This result, provided in Arrow’s PhD thesis, demonstrated that only a dictatorship can gern- 
erally and simoultaneously satisfy unanimity, independence and transitivity.
INTRODUCTION 15
was similar to an earlier spatial competition model developed by Hotelling in 1929, 
produced the median voter theorem. Anthony Downs (1957) extended Black’s results 
to representative democracy, providing a very influential model of policy selection 
in an election with two competing candidates. The key finding of Downs’ study is 
that when candidates that only care about winning the elections (rather than caring 
about the actual policy implemented), are able to commit to the announced political 
platform and to compete on a single political issue, the political equilibrium that 
prevails is one where both candidates will offer the policy that is preferred by the 
median voter.3
This median voter theorem has proven to be a very popular result and is often 
used as the simplest way of endogenizing the political process in economics models. 
However, it substantially lacks empirical support on two grounds:
• policy platforms of two contending candidates do not necessarily converge, and
• the preferences of the median voter do not seem to determine implemented 
policies.
The political economic literature has addressed this issues by acknowledging the 
importance of the ability to commit credibly to policies ex ante and the importance 
of candidates’ policy preferences.
Seminal contributions were made three decades ago by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn 
(1986). In their framework, candidates’ policy preferences are irrelevant to the 
analysis, however the analysis departs from a world of commitment to political 
platforms and instead focuses on politicians’ performance after the elections have 
been held. An agency problem between the electorate and the incumbent thus lies 
at the heart of these models. Rather than focusing on spatial competition, these
3 A key assumption of this result is single peakedness of preferences. This model has then been 
extended in the quest of political equilibria that predict convergence to the median outcome with 
multidimensional policies and to allow for other generalizations, see Grandmont (1978) and Gans 
and Smart (1996) among others.
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studies are germane to the vision of liberal democracy eloquently stated by William 
Riker in “Populism against Liberalism” . Elections are the citizens’ tool to discipline 
politicians and curb opportunistic behavior. In economic terms these models rest on 
the premise of private information on the incumbent type or uncertainty about the 
state of the economy (or other elements beyond politicians control which can affect 
public finance outcomes and the incumbent performance).
Alberto Alesina in 1988 developed a model that analyzed the dynamic incon­
sistencies arising from policy motivated parties. In his theoretical framework the 
pressure of the electoral competition induces parties to announce converging plat­
forms. However, after the elections the elected party has an incentive to follow its 
most preferred policy. Rational voters anticipate this behaviour and, as a conse­
quence, in a one shot game, policy convergence can only happen if parties have no 
policy preference. Alesina further showed that complete and partial policy conver­
gence in an infinitely repeated game between the electorate and parties depends on 
specific values of the parties discount rates, the degree of polarization of preferences 
and the relative popularity of parties.
Another strand of the literature has modeled politicians preferences on the ba­
sis of the existence of pure rents that can accrue to the incumbents while in office. 
The existence of such rents provides incentives to depart from the electoral mandate. 
More generally, a number of models have imposed differences between the politicians’ 
preferences and the electorate preferences in the modelling of the political processes. 
The work of Grossman and Helpman (1996) on electoral competition and special 
interest politics can be ascribed to this approach, together with earlier studies by 
Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit and Londregan (1994). An alternative ap­
proach has been developed by the work of Osborne and Slivinsky (1996) and Besley 
and Coate (1997). Osborne and Slivinsky coined the term “citizen-candidates” to 
describe this approach. This explicitly introduced in the political economy theory 
of representative democracies the participation of citizens in the political process
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as candidates. Osborne and Slivinsky developed a model of democracy which is 
essentially the same as that of Besley and Coate, though there are important differ­
ences on the number of policy dimensions (being the policy space multidimensional 
in Besley and Coate) and on the assumptions of voters’ sincerity. In the Besley and 
Coate’s citizens-candidates models of representative democracy, politicians are cit­
izens who have chosen to become candidates for public office. The candidates who 
win implement their preferred policies and cannot credibly commit to do otherwise. 
Rational voters, anticipating this, vote for candidates on the basis of their policy 
preferences (and if the candidates are heterogenous in terms of competence also on 
the basis of candidates abilities).
In fact, the theoretical analysis provided in chapter two makes use of the citizen 
candidate framework. However, the chapter does not analyze the entry stage of 
citizens as candidates; instead, it focuses on the party’s choice of candidates for 
given polity preferences in multidimensional settings.
In our fourth chapter, we investigate the identity of the elected politicians and 
argue that changing institutions can affect the political career self selection mecha­
nisms. The work in this thesis is related to the very recent literature that scrutinizes 
the impact of politicians’ wages on incumbents’ performance and studies the type 
and quality of elected representatives. These models develop an analysis of moral 
hazard and selection effects affecting the pool of possible candidates in the pres­
ence of politicians heterogeneity. In the political science literature, scholars have 
analyzed issues such as the impact of legislative professionalization on legislative 
diversity (Squires 1992) or the profile of members of the US congress and their po­
litical affiliation (Fiorina 1994, 1997 and 1999)). A basic argument underlining the 
conclusions of Fiorina’s studies is that richer people with good remunerative career 
prospects outside the government are reluctant to leave their posts to compete in 
elections because of a higher opportunity cost.
Recent economists’ investigations have focused on related issues by analyzing
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the relationship between wages and candidate quality. Poutvarra and Takalo (2003) 
show that the value of holding office has a non monotonic relationship with candidate 
quality. Similarly, Caselli and Morelli (2004) find that increasing the reward to hold 
political offices provides a tool to balance the perverse incentives (of the least capable 
citizens to self select themselves into the political career in order to extract rents) and 
to increase the quality of the political class. Recent work by Besley (2003) combines 
moral hazard and adverse selection in analyzing the effect of paying politicians more 
on performance. The analysis is developed in the presence of heterogeneity in the 
degree of congruence between politicians preferences and voter preferences. Besley, 
in examining the role of wages on individuals’ decisions to participate in political 
life, finds that paying higher wages improves the pool of politicians thus ensuring 
that there are more good politicians4.
Instead of looking at politicians’ wages we consider constitutional engineering 
as an alternative mechanism to affect individuals’ political career choices and, as a 
consequence, the characteristics of the pool of politicians elected. Our analysis sug­
gests that the introduction of the direct election of the head of the executive altered 
the elected politicians’ value to be in office in the reformed executive power. This 
is confirmed from our empirical analysis which shows that the institutional change 
acted as a catalyst to attract a large number of high outside option/opportunity 
cost citizens.
In the discussion so far, the role of institutions has been in the background, how­
ever, as the title itself suggest, institutions are crucial in the analysis we developed, 
and more importantly institutions are crucial in the functioning of representative 
democracies and the policy formation process. While the efficient functioning of a 
democracy relies on more elements than the constitutional rules that dictate the type 
of electoral procedures in place and the structure of the legislature, this thesis and
4 This holds under some conditions which are discussed in chapter four. More generally, this 
literature is presented in more details in the same chapter.
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this selective review focuses on these two constitutional features. Myerson (1995) 
reviews earlier studies in the collective decision theory literature, which provided 
normative analysis of institutions, with a particular focus on votes aggregation and 
representation of different groups of citizens under alternative institutions. In this 
introduction, we focus on the political economy literature germane to our analysis. 
This literature has addressed explicitly the fundamental question of how democratic 
institutions affect policy choices and democratic representation. Recent books by 
Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Allan Drazen (2000) review this literature exten­
sively. The latter focuses on applications for macroeconomic policy. Macroeconomics 
provided a fertile ground for the analysis of the role of institutions on policy in the 
late seventies (Nordhaus (1975), Kydland and Prescott (1997)) and eighties (see 
for example Barro and Gordon (1983), Alesina (1987), Rogoff and Sibert (1988)). 
The research analyzed governments career concerns, economic manipulation, polit­
ical cycles, inflation biases and the role of institutions. The book by Persson and 
Tabellini provides a review and analysis of what the authors labelled comparative 
politics. Their works belongs to a strand of the literature that used microeconomic 
foundations to contrast different political regimes and their impact on policies imple­
mented. Theoretical frameworks have been developed to analyze how the choice of 
legislature (for example the work by Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000)) affects 
fiscal outcomes such as the size of deficits and public spending, or the impact of 
electoral mechanisms on public good provisions (e.g. Lizzeri and Persico 2001). The 
importance of institutional differences in explaining policy outcomes has been tested 
empirically by relying on cross country analysis (see for example Milesi, Ferretti and 
Rostagno (2001) or Persson and Tabellini (2003)) or exploiting institutional vari­
ability within a country (an obvious example is given by the literature based on US 
data which is reviewed by Besley and Case (2003), but institutional variability ha 
been exploited elsewhere (for example in India). It is rare that institutions change 
over time and little time series variability is observed on fundamental constitutional
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features such as the type of constitutional regime and the electoral law adopted. 
The classic drawbacks of relying on cross sectional analysis (even when data are 
structured in longitudinal form, but there is no time variability) is the problem of 
simultaneous determination of the observed institutions and other economic and 
policy-making factors. The problem is particularly acute when the comparisons rely 
on separate state entities, that may well differ in underlying characteristics that 
cannot be controlled by exploiting the available data. Though the empirical agenda 
in political economy has adopted refined econometric techniques to cope with these 
issues, ideally we would like to analyze the impact of alternative institutions on the 
composition of legislatures and on policy making in homogenous environments that 
display variability over time and across polities analyzed.
This thesis contributes to the recently developed political economy literature by 
analyzing the impact of constitutional design on policy outcomes and government 
structure. The empirical analysis in each chapter is based on new data from a nat­
ural experiment that took place in Italy in 1993 when the direct election of a town 
mayor was introduced. As mentioned above, such cases of institutional transitions 
are rarely observed at the national level. However, in this thesis we are able to 
exploit the institutional change (or “natural experiment”) that Italian local govern­
ments experienced over time (given the existence of both pre- and post-reform data 
on electoral results and public finance). In addition to time variability, given the 
longitudinal structure of our data, the analysis is developed relying on municipal 
and regional variation within the same country. This homogeneous background is 
an important feature of the data, and so allows us to analyze data that have been 
produced using consistent methodologies. Within this data framework, our esti­
mates of the impact of constitutional change on political and fiscal policy outcomes 
are, therefore, less likely to be biased because of individual unobserved heterogeneity 
than would be the case if we were to rely on cross country institutional variability. 
In chapter two, we develop a theoretical application for the citizen candidate model
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in order to analyze the impact of this constitutional reform on accountability and 
government structure. In the same chapter we then investigate the impact of the role 
of political change in local governments in shaping fiscal expenditure decisions. The 
third chapter considers how constitutional reform affects the well know phenomenon 
of political business cycles. The chapter provides an empirical contribution to the 
literature on the role of incumbents strategic behavior due to career concerns un­
der alternative regimes by examining compositional changes in fiscal revenues and 
taxation policies. Finally, the fourth chapter contributes to the research area on 
political class career incentives and to the little developed literature that studies the 
characteristics of the political class. The chapter analyzes changes in political class 
composition in terms of occupational and educational characteristics generated by 
institutional reform.
Before providing a more detailed description of the contribution of each chapter 
and its findings in the conclusion of this introductory chapter, the next section 
provides a brief description of the reform that affected Italian local governments, 
and the background and the main characteristics and functions of town governments 
in Italy.
Institu tional background
In March 1993, the Italian Parliament approved an electoral reform bill that 
introduced the direct election of mayors.5 This reform was perceived as an important 
change in local politics and formed part of a broader reform process that took place in 
the first half of the nineties, which modified the electoral procedures at the national, 
regional and local level. The electoral reform bill transformed the regime from 
one characterized by a parliamentarism to a presidentialism. At the local level, in 
the old regime the council board was elected with a proportional electoral scheme.
5The electoral law referenece is “Legge Elettorale del 25 marzo 1993 n. 81”. Elezione diretta del 
sindaco, del presidente della provincia, del consiglio comunale e del consiglio provinciale.”
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Each party proposed a list of candidates. In such an environment, the electoral 
competition focussed exclusively on party lists, often decided at the national level 
by parties’ executive committees. The majority coalition on the board, formed after 
the elections, appointed the mayor. In between elections (generally held every 5 
years), councils’ majorities and mayors could and would change quite frequently. 
For the governments in our sample, we observe that, before the reform, roughly 
40% of the incumbent mayors were substitutes of the mayor that was appointed 
immediately after the elections. In such a contest, identifying the likely executive 
that would form after the election and the policy choices that would emerge was a 
hard task6.
In contrast, the reformed regime is characterized by the direct election of the 
mayor by plurality (with a run-off for the two most voted candidates in towns of 
15000 inhabitants or more when no candidate obtains absolute majority in the first 
round). The reform established a 4-year term for the mayor and it’s government, 
six years later, the law n. 265, 3-8-1999, increased the length of the legislature to 5 
years. A new proviso on term limits was introduced by the 1993 bill. New elected 
mayors could only serve for two consecutive terms.
In the reformed scenario, parties or coalitions propose a candidate mayor and 
a list or several lists associated with the candidates. The directly elected mayor 
appoints the executive board (a novelty introduced by the reform bill). In contrast 
with the previous regime, directly elected mayors cannot be removed from their office 
without dissolving the government and incurring in new elections. This proviso was 
introduced into the constitution to stabilize local public administrations, which often 
reshuffled majority coalitions and replaced mayors during term. Since the reform 
implementation, citizens vote separately and simultaneously for mayoral candidates 
and for a list of potential members of the council board. The lists in most cases
6Strom (1990) has constructed an index of “identifiability” based on national institutions. Until 
the majoritarian reform of national elections, the electoral mechanism at the local and national level 
were similar. The regime was a parliamentarist one characterized by multipartitism. Interestingly, 
the Italian system was ranked at the bottom of the distribution.
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correspond to a political party and their support for a candidate mayor is declared 
up front. For the board elections voters can choose to vote for a list that does 
not support the mayor they voted for (stylized sample ballots can be found in the 
appendix).
The aim of the reform was twofold. First, the reform would improve accountabil­
ity - limiting discretion in parties’ choices by enhancing citizens ability to see their 
preferences reflected in the type of candidates proposed. Second, the reform aimed 
at ensuring the stability of local governments7. An analogous institutional change 
has been introduced in England in May 2002, when for the first time seven councils 
elected “Executive Mayors” , with the similar aim of stimulating local democracy. 
Italian commentators and political scientists welcomed the reform. Bettin-Lattes 
and Magnier (1995) emphasize how the reform weakened the importance of parties’ 
executives in candidate selections. Baldini and Legnante 2000 assess the impact 
of the reform as’’revolutionary". Their interpretation stresses the importance of 
strengthened political competition induced by the reform and the possibility of a 
split vote by the electorate. The authors conclude that this induced parties to se­
lect candidates "with a tighter bond to the electorate". The. the visibility of the 
candidature of the mayor and the possibility of casting two votes induced a more 
accurate choice of candidates. After the reform, assigning the role of candidate 
leader of the executive to a candidate (often a politician) with no links with the 
local constituency and generally without strong electoral appeal, became a risky 
political strategy, whereas in the past, the ability to select a mayor by securing the 
majority of votes of the council members allowed parties to use greater discretion in
7For a discussion of the reform in the political science literature see Baldini and Legnante (2000). 
The authors share the view that the primary target of the reform was to “tighten the link between 
voters and parties’ offers” (my translation, ibidem, paragraph 1.4). They characterize the conse­
quences of the reform as follows: “The split vote option not only gives greater freedom in choice 
but contributes to the separation of the offer in the two ballots. The option of vote splitting centers 
the electoral competition on the comparisons of the offers that parties present at the executive 
and council board level.” They also remark that “in the past the object of competition was exclu­
sively the municipal board [...while] the contemporaneous election of the board and the mayor is a 
revolution,” (my translation, ibidem, page: 84).
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the choice of the executive leader.
The Italian legislators ruled out the possibility of having a mayor that faces a 
hostile majority in the legislative board. This was achieved by imposing the rule that 
the majority of the seats on the board had to be allocated to the lists that declared 
support for the winning mayor before the elections. This is a crucial feature of 
the institutional structure, which imposes a limit to the ability of the citizens to 
exert pressure on the non salient political issues. This issue is examined in more 
detail in Chapter 1, where we outline a theoretical framework for the analysis of the 
institutional change.
Institutional reform was implemented gradually to allow for completion of the 
last legislature under the old rules. As we can see from Table 1, in 1993, one fifth 
of the elections was held with the new electoral law, the following year 60% of the 
mayors in the sample had been directly elected. By 1995 only a handful of towns 
had a government that was elected according to the old system.
To provide a synopsis of how the political situation change during the period 
1988-1996 (the time span covered by public finance data), we note that there is 
a positive correlation (0.4) between the new electoral procedure and the number 
of left wing local governments appointed, which reflects the increasing number of 
elected left wing local governments over time. At the national level, where electoral 
reform was implemented in 1993 in order to introduce majoritarian voting for the 
assignment of most of the parliaments’ seats, the 1994 general election witnessed 
the victory of the right wing coalition8. This election is the chronologically closest 
election to most of the local elections held with the new electoral scheme. In May 
1996 the center left coalition won the general elections, and the political scenario at 
the national level changed once again in 2001 when the center right coalition won the 
general elections. In the econometric analysis, where appropriate, we will address 
the concern that overlapping changes in Italian national politics may explain most
8Hence, the 1994 election was the first general election held with the new majoritarian electoral 
rule.
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of the variability in electoral outcomes we observe at the local level.
The basic role of local governments is to provide a large number of services to 
their communities. While the main ones: education, welfare state provisions, and 
health care tasks are administered at higher level of government, municipalities are 
active in providing social services (care takers for the elderly, affordable housing), 
leisure activities (from cultural exhibitions to sport facilities), registry and urban 
planning services, help for local businesses and other essential services (waste col­
lection, streetlights, local road systems) and so on. Providing good management 
of these services has a first order impact on the quality of life in Italian towns. 
The extent to which local governments are accountable to their jurisdictions is an 
important component of the democratic process and day-to-day life in the country.
These activities are mainly9 funded by transfers from higher tiers of government 
(and in particular by the state10). On average only 19 per cent of total revenues is 
generated by taxes. Most income is generated by national and regional transfers. 
However, municipalities also charge for some of the services provided and collect 
revenues (roughly one tenth of a town’s income is raised in this way) from other 
sources (like fines for violations of the highway code). To a limited extent, local 
government can also levy some taxes, especially on properties. The marginal rate 
applied is, however, tightly constrained by the law to be within a certain range. Only 
recently - i.e. in the years not covered by our sample of fiscal data- the freedom to 
tax has been increased, at the expense of transfers, which have been reduced. Local 
governments can also borrow to finance projects and run activities. However, this 
source of income is of a considerably smaller scale than of the previously quoted 
categories.
The fiscal data used in this thesis covers roughly 120 towns for the period from 
1986 until 1996. It includes towns that are head of a province and/or have more 
than sixty thousands inhabitants. The data has been provided by the Italian na­
9The figure is around 40% of the overall revenues.
10These transfers are not determined by a formula, as it happens, e.g., in the UK.
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tional institute of statistics ISTAT11. This database allows us to study the evolution 
of tax revenues, transfers from higher tiers of government, borrowing behavior and 
non-tax revenues over the years. In principle, local administrations can also incur 
deficits. However the data shows that this rarely happened. It also contains infor­
mation on local governments expenditures and the figures disaggregated according 
to destination into five categories.
The relative size of the main expenditure categories is described in Table 2 (in 
shares over total current expenditure)12. Average General Administration average 
expenditure roughly amounts to one fifth of total expenditures. Local Security 
spending (mainly for local police forces) accounts for just under 5 per cent of total 
expenditure. Education and culture activity expenditure accounts for 17.7 per cent 
of total expenditures in the last year of available data. Regarding the other two 
categories, Social Intervention expenditure accounts for more than a third of overall 
expenditures, while transport and telecommunication accounts for 8  per cent of total 
expenditure in the most recent year of available data.
A broad political database provides information for all incumbents in Italian local 
governments from 1989 to 2001 on: election dates, termination of appointments and 
politicians’ characteristics (such as age, education, profession, gender and so on).
The theme of this thesis is the role of institutions in shaping the incentives and 
policy decisions of politicians, the structure of governments and the composition 
of the political class. To conclude this introduction we now summarize the main 
findings of each of the thesis chapters. In Chapter 1, we study the effects of the 
transition from a parliamentary to a presidential system on electoral outcomes and 
fiscal policy expenditures. The chapter focuses on the accountability of policy moti­
vated representatives under alternative institutions. When there are multiple policy 
issues, we assume that voters try to influence the outcome of the elections so as to
11 The accounting criteria underlying the ISTAT information are set at the national level and are 
applied homogeneously in all towns.
12 On average, these shares exhibit little variation over time, see Table 3bis.
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affect the policy choice that matters most to them. Hence, policy outcomes on issues 
that are not salient for most voters may stray far from the popular will13. Allowing 
citizens to directly elect the head of the executive provides political parties with 
stronger incentives to generate policy choices that better suit voters’ preferences. 
We provide a theoretical framework designed to capture these ideas. Our model 
predicts that this institutional change can lead to increased differentiation between 
the executive and the legislative power policy preferences. As a result of changes of 
preferences within a government, different policy platforms are implemented and so 
modify the composition of public spending. Panel data estimation on the change of 
political outcomes and spending patterns of Italian municipal governments provides 
supporting evidence that such reform modifies political outcomes and that it makes 
institutions more accountable. These changes are reflected on empirically observed 
fiscal policy choices. The proxy used in the analysis to describe political differenti­
ation is an indicator of whether or not the elected mayor is a member of the largest 
party in the legislative board. Our findings suggest that reform has a significant im­
pact on increasing political differentiation as measured by our proxy and the results 
on the determination of fiscal expenditure decisions show that increased political dif­
ferentiation is associated with higher expenditures in General Administration and 
Social Action. The estimates also suggest a negative relationship between the de­
gree of differentiation and the amount of resources spent in Education and Culture. 
These three categories are the three largest fields of public expenditure intervention 
and they amount to 70% of total current expenditure in our sample.
In chapter three we analyze the relationship between democratic institutions and 
the incidence of political business cycles. Three decades ago the early literature in 
political economy proposed the first models of political fiscal cycles. In the subse­
quent literature empirical support of these models was found from cross-sectional
13 As an example, in an election where foreign policy is the hottest issue in the political arena (e.g. 
being actively involved in a war or not), candidates could choose unpopular fiscal policy platforms 
relying on the fact that the verdict of the elections will be determined by their stance on foreign 
policy.
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and longitudinal analysis: fiscal policies display systematic variations in the presence 
of election. Chapter three contributes to this literature by analyzing the relation­
ship between the intensity/occurrence of political cycles and different constitutions. 
Using our new panel data on local governments and exploiting the regime shift from 
the introduction of the direct election of mayors in Italy, the chapter shows that 
alternative regimes affect the occurrence of fiscal electoral cycles. The empirical ev­
idence shows that once we allow for a differential effect of elections according to the 
constitutional regime, we observe tax revenues declining (and other policy changes) 
before elections in the presidential setup. It is worth noting however that these tax: 
cuts are concurrent with a fall in non-tax revenues and transfers from higher tiers 
of government. Hence the evidence strongly suggests that tax reductions are not 
compensated by more generous transfers from the national government. 14
After having discussed in chapters 1 and 2 the link between policy making, ac­
countability and political regimes, the last chapter considers the characteristics of 
political representatives. In particular, it analyses how constitutional engineering 
alters the composition of the political class due to the presence of selection effects. 
Analyzing the large panel provided by the ministry of internal affairs, which con­
tains information on the political class in all Italian towns from 1989 until 2002, we 
study the impact of constitutional reform on incumbents’ selection by investigat­
ing changes in composition of the political class due to the introduction of the 1993 
reform. The empirical results show that the average educational levels of elected rep­
resentatives rose (due to a massive increase in the number of graduates), and that 
there was a change in the occupational mix produced by lager numbers of politicians 
with high opportunity-cost professions. The identifying hypothesis is that changes 
accrued primarily to the reformed executive power (due to higher self selection of 
good quality politicians in the political competition for seats in the executive after
14Local governments borrowing increases before elections in the presidential regime. However 
back of the envelope calculations show that this increased borrowing did not compensate entirely 
the decrease in taxes and non-tax revenues (and the falling transfers).
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the reform). Empirically, we confirmed that the compositional changes were not 
a common development for both the legislative and the executive power. The vis­
ible intake of graduate and professionals (and fall in the number of workers with 
bureaucratic and administrative functions) occurred in the executive.
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Table 1
Share of Governments Elected With The New Electoral Mechanism
Year 1988-1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Share of reformed 0 .2 .59 .94 .95governments
Notes. These figures are an elaboration of the electoral data of the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics of Public Fiscal Expenditure in Shares
Mean Std.
General Administration 20.90 5.00
Local Security 4.80 1.40
Education and Culture 18.62 4.25
Social Intervention 35.52 6.20
Transports and Telecommunication 8.22 4.48
Notes: The source of the data on fiscal expenditures is the ISTAT database.
The size of the overall average changes for each the five categories according to the differentiation indicator, amounts respectively to: 0.17, 0.21, 0.83, 
0.12, 0.29. The average overall variation induced by the reform in each category amounts respectively to 1.14, 0.12, -1.79, 0.85, 0.15.
Chapter 1
C onstitutional Transition and  
Fiscal Policy
1.1 Introduction
Democratic societies delegate to elected representatives the power to make policy 
choices on their behalf in various ways. One of the most important features of 
a constitution rests on the adoption of a parliamentary or a presidential system. 
The regime choice deeply influences the relationship between the executive and the 
legislative power. Moreover, only in presidential democracies voters are granted the 
right to elect directly the head of the executive, which is then directly accountable 
to the electorate. It is therefore a key issue to understand how these alternative 
arrangements affect political outcomes and policy making.
In the Federalist papers James Madison argued in favor of the adoption of pres- 
identialism by claiming that this system provides the best protection against the
31
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tyranny of a faction1. Madison advocated that the executive and the legislative 
power had “as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the 
other [s]”. The source of the appointment should have been the electorate “through 
channels having no communication whatever with one another. ” 2
In the recent political science debate Shugart and Carey (1992) have identified the 
potential advantages of presidentialism over parliamentarism in a better provision 
of accountability and checks and balances. Direct accountability is improved since 
voters cast their vote directly for an executive that cannot be removed by shifting 
coalitions in the assembly. Also, voters would be able to identify before the elections 
the likely alternative governments that could form (after the elections) and make a 
clear prospective choice.3
There exists a rich theoretical literature on the impact of electoral rules and 
political regimes on fiscal policy outcomes (see Persson and Tabellini (2000) for 
an extended survey of the literature on the topic). The evidence, however, has 
been developing only recently and is always based on cross-country comparisons of 
democracies that have adopted alternative regimes and electoral procedures, since 
cases of transition from one system to another are rarely observed.
The novelty of the present study relies on the analysis of the transition from a 
parliamentary to a presidential system, which occurred in Italian local governments
during the early nineties. The Italian electoral reform provides us with a natural
federalist N.10.
2Federalist N.51.
3 The relative merits of presidentialism versus parliamentarism (in the various versions of these 
systems we observe in the world) have been the object of an intense debate in the political science 
literature. Among the most relevant contributions, besides Shugart and Carey (1992), we find 
Lijphart (1999) and Linz (1990).
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experiment in that it has introduced the direct election of the mayor in all Italian 
cities. In contrast to existing estimates that rely on cross country variation to iden­
tify the effect of political regimes on fiscal policies, the estimates presented in this 
chapter are based on regional variation within the same country and are, therefore, 
less likely to be biased because of individual unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, 
we are able to exploit institutional change that the Italian local governments expe­
rienced over time, given that we have pre- and post-reform data both on electoral 
results and public finance.
We develop a theoretical framework to analyze the regime shift and its impact 
on fiscal policy making, by focusing on the impact of the reform on accountability.
In our choice of modeling, we focus on the main feature identified by Shugart 
in discussing the relative merits of parliamentary and presidential systems, namely 
that in a presidential system the process of forming the executive is institutionally 
distinct form the process of filling the seats in the assembly as both branches are 
popularly elected. Hence we focus on this ability of casting a vote for the executive 
and a vote for the council board, and we model the executive and the legislative as a 
single agent, rather than attempting at modelling politics within the legislative board 
and taking in account the multiplicity of agents in the two government branches. In 
this respect, this is the same modelling framework of Alesina and Rosenthal (1996), 
where the focus is on the political orientation of the president and the congress 
considered as one.
Our model also explicitly acknowledges that in representative democracies policy 
issues are bundled together. When a voter has only one vote and issues are bundled,
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we expect that this vote would be used to influence the outcome on her most relevant 
policy dimension. If this is the case, then policy choices on non salient issues are not 
subject to electoral discipline. The introduction of the direct election of the executive 
increases the ability of the voters to discipline democratic representatives on an 
issue that is not salient. This is done by separating, or “unbundling” it, from the 
salient policy issue. To the extent that on some issues representatives wish to adopt 
policies that are in contrast with the electorate preferences, this kind of institutional 
reform increases accountability by narrowing the gap between policies preferred by 
voters and the ones being actually implemented by the representatives. We suggest a 
mechanism that links electoral reforms to policy choices through the changes induced 
in electoral outcomes. Our claim is that the adoption of presidentialism increases 
the difference in policy preferences between the executive and the legislative branch 
on non salient issues. The diverging pattern of the two branches on these policy 
issues generates a different allocation of public resources.
We test the prediction of the model on political differentiation and measure 
the reform impact on fiscal policies, building the empirical analysis a unique panel 
database of political data and public finance data from 1988 to 1996 for roughly 120 
towns (including all major Italian cities and head of province towns).
Our results support the prediction that the reform fosters differentiation (as spec­
ified in more details in the theory section) between the executive, which we identify 
in the mayor, and the legislative major party. We also find empirical evidence that 
political changes of this nature is correlated fiscal policy changes. Our findings are 
robust to a number of alternative specifications. However, once we include in our
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specification a set of yearly time dummies, the impact of the reform on political 
differentiation is not statistically significant. 4
1.1.1 Basic setup  and related literature
In this work we develop a two parties framework with candidates that are policy mo­
tivated. Their preferences determine the policy implemented once they are elected, 
as in Osborne and Slivinsky (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997), given that politi­
cians cannot credibly pre-commit to pursue policies other than their optimal ones. 
The political platforms in the model are fixed and polarized on a policy space that is 
bidimensional. Throughout we assume that one issue is salient and that on this issue 
all the members of each party share the same ideal policy. Preferences of voters and 
candidates are defined also on a second dimension which is likewise characterized by 
fixed platforms. As an example, we will think of the salient issue as ideology and 
the non salient issue as the choice of how many resources should be spent on social 
care services.
In this framework, if the preferences of the members of a party differ from those
of the majority of their voters on the non salient issue, the sanction for presenting
candidates that adopt policies unwelcome by the electorate will be negligible given
that voters mostly vote according to the dominant policy issue at stake. Hence,
the source of non majoritarian outcomes is the fact that the voters who share the
majoritarian position on a policy issue choose to vote for a candidate on the basis of
other more salient issues. This insight is central to the analysis of direct democracy
4The 1995 and 1996 yearly dummies are significant to the 5 per cent level.
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by citizens’ initiative in Besley and Coate (2000) and to their analysis of direct 
election versus appointment of regulators in the United States (Besley and Coate 
(2001)).
We adopt a model which is closely related to the above mentioned papers, in 
order to study how the introduction of the direct appointment of the head of the 
executive alters policy bundling. Under presidentialism voters can use an additional 
vote to discipline parties’ candidate selection. This vote and the institutional setup 
of the local government generates the possibility of disentangling the political offer 
into separate dimensions; hence, it opens the way to provide the right incentives on 
more than a single policy issue.
The improvement in accountability stems from the ability of prospective voters 
to identify the type of candidates that enter the political competition and anticipate 
that, if elected, these candidates will implement their favored policy. We maintain 
that in the mayoral competition voters will cast their ballot by focusing on the salient 
issues and will use the vote for the local parliament to discipline policy making on 
the non salient issue. The political parties who are responsible for the selection of 
candidates, vis a vis this mutation in the institutional setup, respond to the enhanced 
electoral pressure with different choices of candidates. As a result, we predict that 
there will be frequent differences in preferences on the non salient issues between 
the executive and the legislative.
There are numerous recent contributions to the political economy literature on 
constitution design, both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective. In what 
follows we discuss some of the papers that have closer links with our study.
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Alesina and Rosenthal (1996) examine the institutional structure of the United 
States, which at the federal level features separate elections of the congress and the 
president. They focus on the interplay of both congress and presidential elections 
as the determinants of the policies adopted at the national level. As in our model, 
parties cannot commit to policy choices other than those they prefer and adopt fixed 
and polarized political platforms.
In their work, however, preferences are unidimensional and moderate voters 
choose to adopt a split ticket (namely to vote for different parties in the congress 
and presidential elections) to impose a constraint on left wing and right wing politi­
cians and “hedge” their position. Based on this assumption, the model provides a 
rationale for the occurrence of divided government, namely that the party that holds 
the presidency does not have a majority in the legislature. Given recent events in 
the United States, as well as the case under study here, this may not be the case. 
The electoral law approved in Italy, due to an explicit proviso introduced to en­
hance government stability, does not permit a government divided on ideological 
grounds, namely it is not possible that a right wing mayor faces a majority which 
is left wing5. However, governments can be divided on the non ideological issue. 
Our model predicts that the transition to presidentialism more frequently generates 
this division on the non salient policy issue because parties will have to respond to 
electoral pressure.
As in Alesina and Rosenthal, our framework allows for the possibility of split
5 The actual political configuration in Italy is made of several parties on each side of the political 
spectrum for each local government. The discussion of the reform can be easily translated in terms 
of aggregates of parties that share the ideological dimension but differ on others.
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ticket choices, but the source of this electoral behavior is a distinct one. Voters try 
to make their representatives accountable on more than a single policy issue; hence, 
if the preferred ideological platform is bundled with undesirable policy choices in 
other issues, the electorate tries to secure a better policy on a second dimension by 
making use of a second vote which would be cast according to the non ideological 
issue.
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997; 2000) have discussed the different impli­
cations on public finance of presidential and parliamentary regimes. Their models 
focus on the separation of powers and the legislative bargaining process among legis­
lators. They predict that a higher concentration of powers in parliamentary regimes 
makes it easier for politicians to collude with each other at the voters’ expense and 
generates higher rents and taxes. Other predictions, instead, build on the idea that 
different regimes have an impact on legislative cohesion, as modeled by Diermeier 
and Feddersen (1998). In particular, they discuss the constitutional feature of the 
“vote of confidence” procedure, which implies that if the executive fails to receive 
support from the parliament, new elections must be held. The vote of confidence 
strengthens the link between the fate of the two government’s powers and the in­
centives to form a stable coalition that supports the executive. According to the 
insights on legislative cohesion, the authors predict that in parliamentary regimes 
we should observe a stable majority of legislators that tends to pursue the joint 
interest of its voters. This majority directs spending towards broad programs and 
generates larger governments. Finally, their work predicts that presidential regimes 
target smaller groups and spend on specific issues producing overall lower levels of
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expenditure than parliamentary democracies.
Persson and Tabellini (2002) empirically examine the impact of constitutions 
of the size of the government. They adopt non parametric matching according to 
propensity scores. This is done in order to compare the impact of different political 
regimes across countries that share similar characteristics. By matching observations 
that are similar with respect to the observables, but differ in the relevant constitu­
tional variables, the authors address the concerns raised by the underlying hetero­
geneity among different countries. They obtain results that are broadly consistent 
with their previous analysis, finding a negative relationship between the adoption 
of a presidential regime and the size of the government. Finally, Persson’s (2002) 
survey on empirical evidence based on cross-country comparison acknowledges as a 
stylized effect the association of presidential regimes with smaller governments.
Our analysis is based on an alternative approach that focuses on the bundling of 
policy issues. This approach generates the predictions both on political and fiscal 
policy outcomes, which we then take to the data. Looking at electoral results, we 
expect to observe more differentiation after the transition to presidentialism occurs. 
Also, we predict that differentiation should generate changes in fiscal policy making 
on different issues. Assuming that institutional changes map into the adoption of 
different political platforms on the non salient issues, we look for evidence that this 
alters the composition of expenditure changes .
The empirical tests are based on data on Italian local governments, whose overall 
size is largely determined by the transfers from higher tiers of government. Given 
that for the purpose of this chapter analysis we take fiscal revenues as exogenous, our
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work is not informative on the impact of the institutional transition on the total size 
of the government or the overall level of public good provision. We also believe that 
there are no objective criteria to partition the type of public expenditure we analyze 
into broad and targeted fiscal policies. Hence, our different set of predictions and 
results does not allow for direct comparison with the existing empirical literature On 
the other hand, the originality of this study lies in the idea of complementing the ex­
isting political economy literature on the presidentialism-parliamentarism dichotomy 
with the analysis of a natural experiment on the introduction of presidentialism for 
a panel of governments.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next Section presents 
the theoretical model. Section 3 and 4 describe, respectively, the data and the 
empirical test. Finally, Section 5 concludes. The Appendix of the chapter contains 
the proof of the main propositions, as well as a detailed description of the data and 
sources used, and stylized diagrams of the actual ballots.
1.2 Theory
We described in the introduction the institutional reform approved in March 1993. 
As we have seen, a very important detail of the reform bill ruled out the possibility of 
having a mayor that faces a hostile majority in the legislative board. We address this 
issue in the this section, where we outline a theoretical framework for the analysis 
of the institutional change.
In our models of parliamentarism and presidentialism we adopt two basic as­
sumptions. Given two policy issues, we define ideology to be the salient issue. We
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also assume that the lists that support a candidate mayor and this candidate in 
the new regime always share the same ideological position, which we interpret as 
the broad political affiliation. This is an assumption that is well corroborated by 
empirical observation. A candidate mayor and her supporting lists differ, however, 
on some other policy dimension. In what follows, lists and mayors will each be fully 
characterized by a type which is defined by the preferences over the two issues.
On the salient issue, we assume that here are two fixed ideological platforms 
K  G (L ,R ). There are two parties, each of which is composed of members that 
share the same ideology. On the second issue, similarly, there are only two fixed 
platforms m  € {a, b}. This issue can be interpreted as the choice of expenditure on 
non ideological issues at stake, be it urban design or roads maintenance. Candidates’ 
and citizens’ preferences are defined over both issues. It is assumed throughout that 
politicians are policy motivated and that candidates cannot credibly commit to 
policies other than their personal policy preferences prior to the election (as, for 
example, in Alesina, 1988).
The electorate is composed of two kinds of voters as in the approach first sug­
gested by Baron (1994) in his work on electoral competition. Rational voters, given 
candidates types, anticipate the policies each candidate favors and cast their vote 
accordingly, in order to maximize their utility from the policy that will be imple­
mented. Rational voters are only a fraction fj, of the population. Some voters are 
not rational. These voters choose to cast their vote for a candidate according to 
non-policy motivations and are labelled as noise voters. Their presence produces 
probabilistic election outcomes, as we exemplify in what follows.
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Candidates, lists and voters can be partitioned in groups according to their 
preferred point on each dimension. The share of voters that prefer L  or R  is and 
7 ^ respectively, while the shares of those who prefer a or b is 7 0 and 7 b. We will use 
the notation —K  to label the alternative to the preferred point of an individual of 
type (K ,.), and do the same for — m and an individual of type (., m).
The share of noise voters (overall 1 — /i) that will vote for a candidate or for a 
list is given by 7 7 , a random variable with support [0,1 ] and cumulative distribution 
H(r)). When both elections are held, draws are separate and uncorrelated (one for 
each election). Symmetry in noise is assumed, i.e., for any 7 7 , H(r}) =  1 — H ( 1— 7 7). 
This implies that noise is unbiased with respect to parties. The electoral outcomes 
depend on the rational voters decisions and 7 7 . Let us consider briefly the case of an 
election where there is a single issue at stake, for example ideology. Defining £ as the 
difference between the share of rational voters that prefer L and the share of rational 
voters that prefer R, the candidate of the left wing party wins if +  ( 1  — [T)r) > 
(1 —/i)(l—7 7), i.e. if 77 > J ~ \  • Hence> the probability associated with this event is 
*(£) where * (f) =  0 if £ <  *(£) =  1 if?  > ^  and $ ( 0  =  1
otherwise. Assuming that Y)L — 7 ^| < then the probability that L  wins is 
^ { l L ~ 1 R) e  (0 , 1).
Two scenarios describe the incentives given to parties’ choices of candidates (and 
hence policies) in the two regimes. The first scenario models a parliamentary system. 
Parties choose some candidate types (we identify lists with types to model the lists 
put forward in the actual elections) and voters vote for the one they wish to support. 
The second scenario refers to a system where the head of the executive is directly
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elected. In this case each party’s political offer to the voters is composed of lists 
for board of representatives and a candidate to lead the executive. Voters have 
two votes (which they use simultaneously) to express preference for a list and a 
candidate. Split-voting is allowed and it is a key ingredient in our model to drive 
changes in political outcomes.
1.2.1 A  m odel o f parliam entarism
The basic notation reflects the fact that preferences are defined over two dimensions 
and that ideology is the salient issue. Let 7 ^  be the share of voters that favor 
party K  and have m  as preferred option with respect to the non salient issue, but 
would not vote for a party that offers (—K ,m ). In contrast, let 7 ^ ,  with the upper 
case subscript, indicate the share of voters that would vote for the party of ideology 
K only if the option for the non salient issue is the one they favor (m). These 
voters are willing to vote for a candidate of the opposite ideology since they place 
enough value on the other policy dimension. Namely, they would rank lists as follows 
l(K ,m ) > l(—K ,m ) > l(K ,—m ) > l(—K ,—m). Salience is captured by assuming 
that the share of voters that are ready to “sacrifice” the vote for the preferred party 
is relatively “small” (more detail in what follows).
Let us define lj(K , m) as the utility derived from policies of a winning list (if, m). 
In the analysis we will adopt utility function additive in K  and m, say 6J i(if)+ aj2 (m).
(if) and 6^ 2 (m) are non increasing the distance between the proposed platform 
and the preferred point of the agent. We will define the benefit deriving from having 
one’s bliss platform winning the elections Afc(if) =  u i(K ) — u \ ( —K ). Similarly for
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the other issue Am(m) =  cj2 (m) — CJ2 (—m).
The strategy of a party is the choice of what kind of list should be presented to 
the electorate. In each party a majority of voters prefers a to b or vice versa. An 
equilibrium is a choice of lists that is mutually a best response for each party. Our 
first result is that in the parliamentary scenario choosing for the electoral competition 
a type that shares preferences on both issues with the majority of the party is an 
equilibrium for both parties, provided one issue is salient. The following proposition 
lays the parametric conditions necessary to ensure that fielding candidates without 
compromises on ideology is a best response..
A ssum ption  1 For k 6 (L , R ), and m  G (a, 6),
[(1 -  ^ [ (7 * + 7 _* -2 (7 * -7 l^ ) ]A ( fc )  > { W ( 7 * + 7 _K- 2 ( 7 ^ - 7 I m ) ]  ”  ^ (7 _ m- 7 j } A ( m ) ,  
and
[(1 -  [(7*+7_* -2(-7 -* )]A (fc) > ~  ^ (7 _ m~ 7 m)}A(m).
The first part of assumption one is necessary to insure that choosing K is a dominant 
strategy when the opponent fields (K , — m). The second part, instead, ensures that 
it is a best response to choose (K , m) instead of (—K , m) when the competing list is 
(—AT, —m). To interpret this assumption, let us recall that parties, like voters, care 
mostly about the salient issue. Then, it is sufficient that salience is strong enough, 
with A (k) large enough with respect to A(m) to compensate for the changes in
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probability of victory and satisfy the conditions outlined in the previous assumption. 
In other words, the gap in benefit that is originated by a victory on the salient 
issue with respect to the non salient one has to be large enough to compensate the 
shifting of voters to the other party. Assuming salience implies simultaneously that 
the mobile voters (across ideology) are few and that party members care relatively 
more about what happens on the salient dimension.
P roposition  1.1 Under Assumption 1, each party will choose a candidate that 
shares the ideology platform with the majority of the party itself.
This proposition simply states that given our assumption on the salience of a 
policy issue, parties will never compromise on that policy dimension. Next, we 
identify the conditions under which fielding candidates of the same type as the 
majority of the party along both dimensions is a dominant strategy.
A ssum ption 2 For k e (T,.R),and m  G (a, b),
{ $ [ ( 7 *  _  y t f  _  2 ( 7 *  _  j Z m ) ]  ~ V ( l / K  ~  7 ~ K ) A ( k )  <  ¥ [ ( 7 *  -  j ~ K  -  2 ( 7 ^  -  
7l&)]A(m) and
{ $ ( 7 * — 7 - * ) _ t f [ ( 7 * +  7 - *  — 2 ( 7 ^ m - 7 ^ r : ) ]} A (* )  <  ^ [ ( 7 i f - 7 “ i i : - 2 ( 7 - M -  
7MAr)lA (m)
Once we have restricted the choice of the candidates to those of the same ideology 
of the party itself, these conditions ensure that it is not worthwhile giving up one’s 
preferred platform in the non salient policy dimension. The trade off involved is 
between a difference in the probability of winning and the expected value of achieving
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the ideal platform in the non salient issue. The difference in probability is due to 
the difference in size of the groups of voters in each party that are willing to vote for 
the wrong ideology, provided that the platform in the other issue is their favored. If 
the size of these two groups is similar, then the left hand term is close to zero and 
the conditions will always be met. Even if there is some asymmetry in the share of 
mobile voters in the two parties, imposing salience is equivalent to imposing that 
the electoral penalty captured by the difference in probabilities will be negligible.
P roposition  1.2 When assumptions 1 and 2 hold, each party chooses a candidate 
that has preferences aligned to the majority of the party in both dimensions.
In this characterization of parliamentarism, the crucial assumption on salience 
allows us to show how parties simply choose to candidate agents policies that cor­
respond to the bliss point of its majority. Hence, each party “ideological identity” 
bundled with the party majority preferred outcome is on the non salient issue.
According to the model, the policy implemented on the non salient issue will 
simply be determined by the type of the winner of the elections. The model, hence, 
is silent about the choice of the mayor and policy determination. The prediction of 
the model on policy outcomes is coherent with an interpretation that maintains that 
the policy choices made in the local government will reflect the preferences of the 
winning party on the non salient issue, given its dominant position on the board.
Theoretically, Propositions 1 and 2, are simply the outcome of a Nash equilibrium 
in dominant strategies following from the structure imposed on players’ preferences. 
These assumptions on players’ preferences are translating into algebra the idea that
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voters’ and parties’ priority is to insure that the winning government shares their 
ideology. The historical prevalence of left wing or right wing governments in so 
many of the Italians regions and towns indicates the importance of ideology for 
local government elections in Italy. Even when the reform was implemented, mayors 
that promoted themselves as "independent" and as "civil society" representatives, 
were clearly associated either with the left or the right wing coalition. There has 
been no evidence in the political science literature and in the media following these 
elections suggesting that voters were prepared to vote for a candidate mayor that did 
not share their broad ideological platform. Voters’ mobility has been higher only for 
a very small part of the electorate, that could be identified as the center. In the large 
majority of cases, commentators only analyzed some evidence of voter movements 
within coalitions (i.e. for a given broad ideological platform) between parties in 
that same coalition. Salience of ideology summarizes these issues in our simplified 
theoretical framework. We provide further comments on ideology, coalitions and 
parties below.
1.2.2 A  m odel o f presidentialism
In our model of presidentialism each party proposes as mayor a candidate whose 
characteristics are ideologically aligned with the party members. A decision is also 
taken with respect to the number of lists (one or two) that support this candidate. 
The lists share the same ideological platform of the mayor, but differ in the secondary 
issue.
Voters have two votes to express their preferences. They can vote a candidate
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for the mayoral office and separately vote for a list (and these choices are made 
simultaneously).
We posit that ideology is salient in the competition for the main office. With 
respect to this election, keeping the same assumptions of the previous section, the 
electoral incentives in place are basically unchanged. Except for a small group of 
mobile voters, the vote is cast in favor of the candidate with the preferred ideological 
platform. Possibly, the case for switching ideological sides in the hope of ensuring 
the victory of the prevailing option in the other issue could be further weakened by 
the second vote.
In this setup the preferences of the mayor, who chooses the lists, need to be 
modeled. The interpretation of the result would not change if similar assumptions 
were made on the preferences of the majority of the party as the relevant body 
that picks up lists. We assume that the candidate mayor has preferences on the 
administrative dimension but also on the number of seats allocated to his party on 
the board (namely, increasing on the seats share of his party). The assumption 
made in the previous section on additive utility is maintained (i.e. mayors value 
the administrative outcome according to u>2 and according to uj$ the number of won 
seats). There are several reasons why this should be the case. We can imagine 
that having a larger majority on the board is a source of prestige and stability 
although this is not modeled explicitly. For instance, a large majority could insure 
from political shocks, like the withdrawal of support by some of the members of the 
board. Alternatively, another way of interpreting this assumption is related to what 
may happen after the legislature is completed. The members of the coalition may
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be more likely to reappoint her as a candidate to the extent that success in securing 
seats on the board has been hefty. For these reasons, we believe it is reasonable 
to acknowledge the interest of the mayor in achieving a large success by carefully 
selecting the lists. If this is true, then the utility of the mayor is increasing in the 
votes for the members of his lists on the board elections.6 Hence, candidates face 
a trade-off in devising what lists should be presented to the voters. Presenting two 
lists comes at the cost of increasing the probability of having to agree on the least 
liked administrative option. However, a second list captures the voters that would 
be ready to vote for the other party list if the favorite platform is offered in the 
secondary issue. Allowing voters to choose between both platforms increases the 
chances of securing more seats on the board.
For given preferences 7 ^  and 7 ^ ,  the fraction of voters mobile across parties is 
now larger than before, since the main ideological imprint can be secured by the 
election of the unremovable mayor. Given that voters can vote “separately” for 
the non salient issue in the list competition, this dimension can be the salient one 
in this election. The separation of the non salient issue on the board election is a 
crucial assumption. We maintain that the ideological issue is resolved in the mayoral 
competition, given that a mayor will not face an adverse majority on the board on 
the salient issue. This feature allows voters to focus on non ideological issues. The 
threat to parties generated by this possibility strengthens incentives to present a
second list, ensuring that both options are available. In this case we would not
6There is another approximation involved in this statement. Votes, which affect the probability 
of winning, and seats won are not in a one-to-one relationship. However, since the votes proportion­
ally determine seats, this approximation is not too harmful, it keeps the model simple and, more 
importantly, very easily comparable to the pre-reform scenario.
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observe “split voting” because voters would be given the chance to vote a member 
of their preferred party with the right policy platform on the other issue. We will 
discuss the interpretation of this model at the end of this section.
In the analysis of the choice of candidates in this scenario let us distinguish two 
cases.
Case A. B o th  p a rtie s  offer tw o lists. Suppose both parties are fielding two 
lists. We have to check whether the mayor would profit by withdrawing the least 
preferred list. Let 7 ^ (=  7m+7M i*1 the previous scenario) be the share of voters that 
prefer (k , m ) to anything else, the subscript is now m. Withdrawing the least liked 
list implies a loss of 7 ^  votes that would shift in favor of the list of opposing party 
without altering the chances to see the preferred administrative option winning. 
This would imply that a number of seats would be given to the opponents, which 
is an undesired outcome for the party. However, now the voters are able to express 
their preferences separately on both policy dimensions and have voted to secure their 
favorite ideological platform in the mayoral election.
Case B. T he o th e r  p a r ty  offers one list. Suppose that in the left wing party 
the majority prefers a to b, when would it be the case that the list (L, b) is offered 
due to the electoral pressure? The interesting case is when the other party offers only 
what the majority of the party prefers. When the other party fields (R, 6 ), offering 
two lists dominates offering one, since the total number of voters for b would not 
change and the number of voters of left wing lists would decrease. The list choice 
is now determined by the mobility of all the voters that prefer a specific platform
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of the secondary issue and are left wing. Given that this set of voters is larger than 
the set of voters that are prepared to swap ideological side to achieve the desired 
policy in the non salient issue, electoral incentives are now stronger.
The following condition ensures that the electoral incentives are sufficient to 
induce a party to field a candidate with minoritarian preferences on the non salient 
issue.
A ssum ption  3
~ 1 ' K ~ l ~ K ) ]}&( k)  >  { 1  -  ^ ( 7 m - 7 —m ) ] } A ( m )
The gain obtained by presenting a single list is a function of the distribution of 
preferences on the administrative option, while the loss depends on the preferences 
within the opposing party for the “withdrawable” option. Presenting both lists 
allows the party to gain the votes of the share of the other party’s electorate that 
prefers a policy platform on the non salient issue which is not offered by that party. 
This vote gain coupled with a sufficient interest in securing seats on the board 
ensures that fielding both platforms in the secondary issue is a best response. We 
can summarize the discussion of scenario two in a proposition.
P roposition  1.3 Given the assumptions 1,2,3, for each party choosing to field both 
platforms in the non salient issue is a weakly dominant strategy.
A  party will always field lists for both platforms for the non salient issue when 
the opponent party is fielding two lists. When the opponent party fields a single list
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the same will happen, given assumption 3. Provided parties care about the share 
of their seats on the board or given broad enough support for the administrative 
option which is not favored by the party itself, even when the opponents field a 
single list, parties increase their probability of winning by offering two options to 
their electorate.
The previous proposition implies that in most cases, the electorate will have 
a choice on the administrative dimension. More importantly, with respect to the 
previous scenario, for given preferences, this will happen more frequently. 
Proposition 1-3 can be summarized in the following final proposition:
P roposition  1.4 Given the distribution of preferences of the electorate, 7 ^  and 
7 ^ ,  and assumptions 1,2,3, non majoritarian outcomes on the non salient issue are 
less frequent in the presidential regime .
When parties preferences are not aligned with the electorate, the comparison 
of proposition 2 and 3 yields an interesting result. In a parliamentary system it is 
more likely that the candidates presented in the electoral competition have minority 
positions in non salient dimensions, keeping the preferences of the electorate fixed.
1.2.3 Discussion
In the parliamentary scenario, provided voters mostly care about the ideological 
dimension, parties will be able to ignore the electorate preferences with respect to 
the other issue, due to the fact that swing voters do not represent a significative 
share of the electorate.
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In the second scenario, the set of voters that are “mobile” is larger, hence parties 
incentives are altered and each coalition is more prone to offer its voters both options.
The reform effects in each town a transition from parliamentarism to presiden- 
tialism. In order to have a meaningful comparison of the political outcomes in each 
town, we have to assume that the underlying preferences of the electorate are not 
changing in the period we analyze.
The model focuses the analysis on the bundling of issues. The institutional 
change allows the electorate to disentangle the non salient issue from ideology given 
that they can secure the ideological issue by winning the mayoral election. If par­
ties respond to the change in electoral pressure on the non salient dimension, then 
we expect that the policy platform which dominates the board election to diverge 
frequently from the ideal platform of the mayor on this dimension. Since it is on 
the board election that the secondary policy is unbundled from ideology, while the 
mayoral competition is centered on the salient issue, if the preferences of a party 
are not aligned with those of the majority of their voters, the gap between the elite 
preferences (the member of the party) and the voters preferences will show up in 
the differences between the legislative board and the executive.
From our discussion it should be clear that the threat of split voting in the two 
elections induces choices of candidates that better suit one party electorate. Unlike 
in the Alesina and Rosenthal paper, voters are not trying to hedge their position 
and achieve moderate policies. Our rational voters face bundles of policies and vote 
for the bundle that includes the best platform in the salient issue. When the reform 
is introduced there is room to discipline the party on both components of the bundle
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by mean of electoral pressure. In light of this result, we claim that the increased 
accountability, as long as the party preferences are idiosyncratic with respect to the 
electorate, generates governments that are divided over the non salient issue.
The impossibility of a fully divided government, as it is the case for the institu­
tions we study, imposes an upper bound on the efficacy of the vote for the board 
elections as a disciplining tool. This constraint could bias the empirical test by 
reducing the evidence that differentiation matters.
In the background, there is also an implicit assumption that this differentiation 
between the two branches will translate into the implementation of different policies 
with respect to the “homogeneous” governments that form before the reform. This 
translates in a second prediction. The differentiation brought about by the reform 
generates changes in policy making.
To take these predictions to the data we have to take in account the features of 
Italian politics and the nature of the public finance data we dispose of.
The Italian system is characterized by multipartitism. This is not a source of 
major concern in the mayoral election, since in most cases two candidates dominate 
the campaign (each backed by a large coalition). Even when the situation is un­
certain ultimately the run off is the decisive stage of the electoral race between two 
candidates. With respect to the board elections, we assume that the parties that 
back one candidate share with this candidate the broad ideological platform, e.g. 
if there are multiple right parties they are all supporting the right wing candidate. 
What distinguishes candidates of different parties is the non salient issue. Hence, 
if the Socialist and the Communist party are supporting a left wing candidate, we
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assume that the Socialist and Communist party have different views on the second 
policy issue. Our model has imposed a restriction on the number of non salient poli­
cies. This has been made to convey our claim in a way that is much simpler than if 
we were to allow for three or more platforms on the non salient issue. This assump­
tion, translated into the Italian multiparty system, is equivalent to imposing that 
there are only two parties within each coalition. In many towns, this assumption 
is not particularly restrictive, as both before and after the reform, many coalitions 
are clearly dominated by two parties. This is however not always the case, and our 
modelling is imposing some additional constraints to the empirical analysis. These 
constraints are equivalent to pooling a number of parties within a coalition in a 
single one.
The assumption of only two non salient platforms also has an impact on our 
differentiation analysis. However, the assumption here, does not seem particularly 
harmful. There is only one large dominant party in each coalition, hence it seems 
natural to test whether this party is able of securing the post of mayor for one of his 
members. In the robustness checks section of the empirical analysis we discuss how 
we might try to capture empirically the effect of multipartitism on the differentiation 
analysis.
The political data available provides information on the composition of the board, 
but does not include information on the vote shares of each party. Our proxy for 
the political differentiation is an indicator of whether or not the mayor elected is a 
member of the largest party in the legislative board.
In our model there is a unique non salient issue. This is an assumption that
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we made to deliver in a simple context the idea of the relevance of bundling and 
unbundling issues. There is however a multiplicity of issues that may be relevant to 
citizens and our database actually provides information on fiscal policy with respect 
to different issues (education, public security, social action and so on).
What is the predictive content of our simple model for a complex world of policy 
issues? Our intuition is that the differentiation captures citizens dissatisfaction with 
policy making on some issues. For instance, if there was a general tendency of the 
incumbents to spend too little money on social actions, e.g. subsidizing care takers, 
the reform would generate larger expenditure on this field when we observe differ­
entiation. On the other hand, if the choices made with respect to public transport 
are of subordinate importance with respect to other issues or if these choices match 
the electorate preferences, the differentiation index should not have any explanatory 
power with respect to the level of expenditure on transports.
These observations, coupled with the notion that the size of the local government 
is roughly fixed (more on the topic in the next section), are summarized in the 
prediction that the allocation of the share of resources in different public finance 
sectors changes due to the increased differentiation.
Competing explanations of our empirical result arise from considerations on 
changes in the Italian political structure that occurred in the early nineties in 
national politics (changing the number and structure of the political parties) and 
changes in bargaining power within the government. If the reform and our differenti­
ation indicator are correlated with these events, then we would be making incorrect 
inference. In the empirical section we discuss further these competing arguments
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and explore the related evidence.
The work of Persson et al. (1997; 2000) on the effect of the regime adopted 
on public finance focuses on legislative bargaining and backward looking voters. 
The authors stress how different electoral competition shapes policy making, but 
the central mechanism which determines policy choices is shaped by the trade-offs 
between taxation, the provision of public goods, and the possibility of extracting 
rents. In their setup the provision of public goods decreases with the introduction of 
presidentialism because the benefits of fewer voters are internalized. In our model, 
increased electoral competition on the non salient issues generates policies that suit 
better the electorate preferences.
Stretching the message of our model a bit we find an analogy to some theoretical 
results in the literature on bundling. In a recent work, Nalebuff (2000) develops a 
model on competition and bundles in a duopoly. In our second scenario, offering 
two lists is like competing against the bundle on one of the two components, namely 
the list for the board elections. Nalebuff’s paper discusses the case of two firms 
competing against each other using bundles of products or single components. One 
of the interesting outcomes in his work, in the case of two components, states that 
when there are only two components in the bundle, it pays to give consumers the 
components in an uncoordinated fashion instead of bundling them.
1.3 D ata
The sample used in this chapter includes the towns that are head of province or have 
more than sixty thousands inhabitants '(from 1988-1996). The political database
CHAPTER 1. CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSITION AND FISCAL POLICY  58
comes from the Minister of Internal affairs in Italy7 and contains information on 
mayors’ identity and the composition of the towns’ boards.
As previously discussed, we build a proxy of differentiation (labelled Match) 
using an indicator variable that takes value 1 when the mayor is affiliated with the 
largest party on the board. We expect that the mean of this indicator should be 
lower for the governments elected with the new electoral law and we find statistically 
significant evidence that this is the case. In Table 1.1, we report the frequency of 
differentiation disaggregated with respect to the implementation of the reform and 
the statistical test. We test the null hypothesis of equality versus two alternative 
maintained hypothesis.
The test strongly rejects equality, consistently with our theory that predicts non 
trivial changes in the figures after the reform is implemented.
We complement this with fiscal policy data set gathered by the Italian Insti­
tute of Statistics (ISTAT). The data on fiscal policy contains information on local 
governments balance sheets. The accounting criteria are set at the national level ho­
mogeneously and are hence common to all towns. The data on public expenditure 
is disaggregated according to destination into five categories.
The relative size of the main expenditure categories is described in Table 2 (in 
shares over total current expenditure)8, while the expenditure trends over time are 
shown in Table 1.2.. General Administration changes on average from 19.5% share
to 21.5% from 1988 to 1996. Local Security spending (mainly for local police forces)
7 A secondary source of information to complement missing data is the collection of the “Guida 
alle regioni d’ltalia”.
8 On average, these shares exhibit little variation over time, see Table 3bis.
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is roughly stable around 4.8%. There is, however, more variation in Education and 
Culture expenditure, which drops from 21.4% to 17.7%, and Social Intervention 
which ranges between 34.4% and 36.3% without a monotonic trend. Fiscal expen­
diture in Transports and Telecommunication finally declines from 9% to 8 %.
As basics controls for the socioeconomic characteristics of the towns in the sam­
ple we use the share of the population above the age of sixty five, and the local 
value added9. These factors display significant correlation with certain types of 
public expenditure (both controls are positively correlated with current and total 
expenditures). Taking a look at the raw data in Table 1.3, we see that richer towns 
tend to be older (correlation of 0.41) and in these towns the expenditure is higher in 
Education and Culture and Social Intervention, while it is lower in General Admin­
istration and Public Security. We also controlled for the total population, in order to 
capture a potential effect “size effects” which could arise from heterogeneity among 
small and big towns.
The model predicts that the differentiation between the executive and the legisla­
tive will affect the way in which spending is allocated. In contrast with the existing 
literature, that deals with aggregate public finance measures as the total size of the 
government, or the overall size of welfare expenditures, our prediction focuses on 
the composition of expenditure.
We do not discuss issues related to taxation because there is little freedom to
raise revenues by imposing taxes at the local level during our sample period. On
average only 19% of total revenues is generated by taxes, while the most substantial
9Source: ISTAT Census Data and the Tagliacarne Institute.
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streams of income are generated by national and regional transfers. Moreover, local 
governments where constrained in the choice of the rate of taxation they could apply. 
This changed in the late nineties, when the property tax was increased and local 
governments had greater freedom in choosing tax rates. Hence, for the time horizon 
we analyze, what each administration effectively controls is the share of available 
resources to devote to different fields.
Simple descriptive statistics, however, display limited fiscal policy changes due 
to the political differentiation indicator. By comparing administration where the 
new electoral procedure has already been used with the others where elections were 
held with the original electoral law, we see that the largest changes occur in general 
expenditure (1 .1 %), education and cultural spending (-1 .8 %) and in social actions 
(0.9%), which are the largest categories of expenditure.
1.4 Empirical Test
The theoretical model suggests that the link between institutional changes and policy 
outcome relies on the more diverse political offering after the reform. We will look for 
empirical evidence that the two predictions of the model are supported using both 
political data and local public finance data as right hand side variables. First we need 
to test the hypothesis that the electoral reform changes political outcomes by making 
the party of the mayor less often aligned with the largest party in the legislative. 
The econometric test will hence focus on an equation where the dependent variable 
is the differentiation indicator (Match). We expect the coefficient on the reform 
dummy in this equation to be negative and significant.
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Our second hypothesis is that the fiscal policy changes tend to parallel political 
changes. The increased differentiation should lead to changes in the allocation of 
resources. We are going to estimate a system of equations to measure the impact of 
institutional change on policy making and analyze the determinants of the share of 
resources employed in each category of expenditure. If one is willing to assume 
that preferences on non salient issues are evenly distributed across towns, then 
the prediction is that the coefficient of the differentiation dummy Match should be 
significant (at least for some categories) in the equations that estimate fiscal policy 
making. If this were not the case, and preferences on the non salient dimension were 
idiosyncratic across towns, then no general prediction can be made a priori on the 
effect of institutional change on policy expenditure.
1.4.1 Changes in electoral outcom es
In this section, we focus on the evidence that the reform is generating political
changes. The differentiation variable Match is a binary indicator that takes value
one or zero. We choose to estimate it using the linear OLS. This model, however,
does not recognize that the dependent variable is constrained to be either one or
zero and can generate predictions outside the interval between zero and unity. There
are very few cases in which the predicted values lie outside this interval, which is
not surprising given that the mean of the dependent variable is not too close to
zero or one10. The reason why we do not use standard non linear binary choice
models like probit or logit models is that we will include the political process in
10See Maddala (1983) for this latter consideration.
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system of equations that describe fiscal policy making in order to instrument for the 
endogeneity of the matching indicator in the analysis that will follow11.
A straightforward way to test the first prediction of the model is to estimate the 
following equation:
A/it = K +  Rita +  Zjt7+c7l -f (£P +  e™, (1)
where Mu is the matching indicator which assumes a value of one if the elected 
mayor is a member of the largest party in town i and year t. The indicator vari­
able Ru is equal to one when the elections are held with the new procedure, 
are the socioeconomic controls, c™ is a town fixed effect to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity, d^1 is a time component in the fixed effect, and e™ is a non systematic 
error that reflects unmeasured determinants that vary over towns and time such 
that c[",dj") =  0 .
The reform indicator has positive variance for all but 11 towns. This implies 
that we can use fixed effects at the individual town level for this part of the analysis, 
provided we exclude from the sample the towns where the reform indicator never 
changes, since for these observations the reform indicator is indistinguishable from 
the fixed effect component.
According to the theory the estimates of these equations should yield a negative 
significant coefficient on the reform indicator. We report the results in Table 1.4. The
reform dummy coefficient is significant and negative. In the last column we show the
11 We have, however, estimated separately the political process equation with a probit model and 
found again a negative and significant coefficient on the reform dummy.
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results once time effects are included. The inclusion of common time effects is often 
advocated to control for macro shocks that may affect all towns simultaneously . The 
two-way fixed effects estimates in the last column show that the reform coefficient 
becomes insignificant., we find instead that the time effects dummies for 1995 and 
1996 are significant. In our data there is not enough institutional variability to pin 
down a significant effect of the reform dummy on the matching indicator once we 
include time effects.
1.4.2 A  structural approach on fiscal expenditure estim ates
In this section we look for evidence of the impact of political changes on fiscal policy 
making by assessing how changes in our differentiation proxy affect the allocation 
of resources to different categories. Informed by our theoretical framework, we 
estimate a system of equations. The first equation models the political process 
and the following ones estimate the changes in the share of resources allocated to 
each category of expenditure. Our prior is that the political changes should be a 
significant determinant in changes in public finance, hence we expect the coefficient 
on the matching indicator to be significant in the five expenditure equations.
Around 28% of the observation in our sample come from towns where the match­
ing indicator is constant throughout the period. In order to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity across different local governments and to keep the focus of the analy­
sis on the role of the political outcomes in determining fiscal policy, we opt for the 
inclusion of fixed effects at the regional level. If we used fixed effects at the town 
level, in all towns where the matching indicator is constant over time the effect of
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this variable on fiscal expenditures would be indistinguishable from the individual 
effects.
Italy is composed of 20 regions which are very diverse in political and socioe­
conomic terms. Interregional disparities in term of macroeconomic factors, such 
as growth, unemployment, economic development are strong. There is a deep eco­
nomic gap between the south and the north of the country: the latter being much 
richer and industrialized. However, also within macro-regions, like the north of the 
country, there are considerable economic differences that are well captured at the 
regional level. The demographic characteristics of the population also vary consid­
erably across regions, since the population is younger and fertility rates are much 
higher in the south of the country. Italian regions are also marked by very different 
historical features, given that the country was unified only in the second half of the 
19th century. This feature is an important determinant of the socioeconomic differ­
ences mentioned above, but also of some political regularities. History is frequently 
invoked, for example, to explain the clear prevalence of left wing parties in the local 
governments of many regions in the centre of the country. Within regions socioeco­
nomic disparities among towns are much less pronounced. Hence, we believe that 
controlling at the regional level allows us to suitably control for potential biases due 
to the heterogeneity of the towns in our sample.
Similarly to equation (1 ), the political process is modeled as follows;
M it — K +  R ita  +  Ziith+Creg  +  e™ (2)
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While for each type of expenditure y , where y  G {1,2,3,4,5}, we estimate the 
following equation:
Hyit =  K +  d* Z “f" Creg "t" £if> (3)
Rit is the reform dummy (equal to one once the reform is implemented), Zu is 
the set of socioeconomic controls, Mu is the matching indicator (equals one when 
the mayor belongs to the largest party), creg are the regional fixed effects.
Endogeneity concerns arise from the possible correlation between e™ with If 
indeed the errors are correlated, estimations that do not deal with this correlation 
can yield biased estimates due to the endogeneity of Mu. This would be the case when 
some unobserved shock affects both the fiscal choices and the political process. To 
address the concerns associated to possible correlation in disturbances, we estimate 
the system using the 3SLS procedure12.
We have chosen to estimate the whole system at once, instead of following the 
alternative choice of estimating with 2SLS each expenditure equation (using the 
political process as a first stage). By so doing, we can control for the possibility that 
the shock that affects different expenditures could be correlated. Given that the five 
categories of expenditure we analyze almost exhaust the total revenues available to 
each local government, we believe the 3SLS approach to be the preferable estimation
procedure to be adopted in this case.
12 We estimate the set of equations by 3SLS as implemented by the package STATA7.
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The matching indicator that describes political process is instrumented by the 
reform variable, which is exogenous.
The system of equations we estimate satisfies the necessary identification condi­
tion that the number of excluded predetermined variables from each equation must 
be at least as great as the number of the included number of endogenous variables 
less one. 13
In Table 1.5 we present the results of the 3SLS estimation with fixed effects
at the regional level. In the first column we report the coefficients of the political
process equation. The reform dummy coefficient is significant (at 5% confidence
level) and negative. Its size is basically unchanged if we compare it with the results
in Table 1.4. This is reassuring, since we obtain the same results now that we
have included fixed effect at the regional level, instead of town effects, to cope with
potential unobserved heterogeneity. The coefficient of the matching indicator is
significant at the 10% level in General Administration, Education and Culture and
Social Action. These three categories are the three largest fields of intervention
and they amount to 70% of total current expenditure in our sample. Hence, we find
significant evidence that political changes drive fiscal policy changes in the items that
arguably matter most to the citizens in Italian towns. The matching indicator has a
negative sign in Social Intervention and General Administration. This implies that
when we observe more differentiation (Match=0) the expenditure in these categories
increases, albeit more in social expenditures than in General Administration. In
column four we see, instead, that the coefficient of the matching indicator is positive
13 See for example Johnston (1991).
CHAPTER 1. CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSITION AND FISCAL POLICY  67
and significant, which has to be interpreted as a negative relationship between the 
degree of differentiation and the amount of resources spent in Education and Culture.
1.4.3 R obustness checks
We have argued that the main generator of changes in fiscal policy is given by 
the increased differentiation between the two branches of the local governments in 
Italy. A competing explanation focuses on changes in the relative bargaining power 
between the executive, the mayor, and the legislative power. Taking in account that 
after the reform is introduced the mayor cannot be replaced without incurring a new 
election, this hypothesis seems reasonable. The effect of such a bargaining power 
reallocation should be picked up by the reform indicator and may be an explanation 
of what is driving the variability in policy making.
To have some sense of the empirical evidence on this idea we have run our 
analysis in the subsample where the matching indicator is constant. These adminis­
trations can be considered “politically stable” from the point of view of our analysis. 
However, if what matters is the allocation of bargaining power, the reform indica­
tor should be expected to drive changes in spending. With the caveat of a much 
reduced sample size (230 observations), we ran SURE estimates for the five expendi­
ture equations controlling for individual heterogeneity, and we found that the reform 
dummy is nowhere close to becoming significant14.
We have also controlled for the robustness of these results to the phenomenon
of political cycles. The political business cycle argument relies on the intuition
14The results are available on request.
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that changes in fiscal policy making may occur in an electoral campaign in order 
to please the electors at the eve of elections. If this was the case, then we would 
observe changes in expenditures being driven by the distance from the forthcoming 
elections. This may be a source of systematic bias in our analysis, since reformed 
governments are on average “younger”. The results of the instrumented estimation, 
in Table 1.6, are robust to the inclusion of political cycle dummies, except for the 
coefficient in Social Action spending which is now significant at the 12.5% level. We 
have chosen to include a full set of electoral cycles dummies to control for other 
factors that have been suggested as a potential determinant of expenditure choices, 
e.g. the inexperience of newly formed governments. However, the political cycle 
dummies included in this equation do not seem to be a crucial determinant of the 
dynamics of expenditure.
The last decade of the past century has been a time of intense political turbulence 
and institutional reformism in Italy. Due to political scandals and to the fall of the 
Berlin wall in 1989, the political, geography of Italy changed substantially in the 
beginning of the nineties. The dramatic changes in the eastern European block 
had a deep impact on the role of the Communist Party in Italian politics. The 
Communist party, throughout the republican history, was the second largest party 
in the country. In spite of its size, at the national level, it was systematically 
excluded from any governmental coalition. The fall of the wall, triggered important 
changes within the party and had the effect of enfranchising it, deeply affecting the 
political balance that made Italian politics very stable in spite of the apparent frantic
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turnover of governments and parliaments15. A number of parties changed name and 
witnessed, at the national politics level, a substantial fall in vote shares over time. 
Wholly new parties emerged, first came the Lega Nord (a separatist or federalist, 
according to different years’ manifestos, party based in the north of Italy), later on 
Mr. Berlusconi created the Forza Italia party. The main left and right wing parties 
split into a radical and moderate party. Similarly the Democratic Christian party 
split into a center-left and center-right group.
If the implementation of the reform was simply picking up the effect of having 
a local election held for the first time facing the new political scenario, then we 
would be unable to tell whether the political outcomes that we observe are indeed 
generated by the postulated unbundling mechanism or whether they were a simple 
consequence of the national political changes.
We could rule out this competing explanation if we assumed that all the reshuf­
fling of political parties’ names and shares had little impact on the substantial essence 
of the political class and their policy platforms at the local level. While this pro­
vides no information on the direction of bias, we cannot dismiss this argument out 
of hand. In order to address it, we look at the general political structure and run 
some additional robustness tests using alternative specifications.
If we look at the relative share of the biggest parties in our sample, we see that
their share of seats remains unaltered before and after the reform. The largest party
secures on average 40% of the seats on the board, the second party 20%, the third
settles around 14% and the fourth party below 1% in both cases. Indexes of con­
15For background information on the topic see Kertzer (1996).
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centration like the Herfindahl Index and measures of Entropy exhibit little variation 
as well. To control for political turbulence we include as a regressor the Herfindahl 
Index index in our system of equations and we find broadly consistent results, which 
we present in Table 1.7. We are not surprised to find that the concentration index is 
highly correlated with the matching indicator. There could be an issue of simultane­
ity associated with the inclusion of this explanatory variable (due to the fact that 
the relative share of each party, which determines the index, and the matching in­
dicator could be jointly determined by shocks to the electoral preferences), however 
we think that it is an interesting result that the magnitude and the significance of 
the coefficients in the expenditures devoted to General Administration, Education 
and Social Action remain virtually unchanged.
An alternative specification might have included the number of parties in the 
council board instead of an index of concentration. The number of parties, a priori, 
could be assumed to have a negative impact on the matching indicator. Empirically 
however, the number of parties does not have an impact on the matching indicator, 
as once we include this variable instead of the concentration index we find it to be 
insignificant (the coefficient is equal to 0.077 and the associated standard error is 
0.0083).
In another attempt to distinguish our hypothesis from the political turbulence 
one, we run our empirical analysis in a subset of “stable” towns. In Italy there are 
some regions that are traditionally linked to a political party over time in a very 
persistent manner. As an example, the region of Bologna is well know as a left 
wing region, where until the end of the last century regional, provincial and town
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governments have been dominated by the left wing party. In the towns of these 
regions in correspondence with the changes in national politics we note a transition 
from Communist Party dominated into Party of the Democratic Left (which is the 
heir of the Communist Party) dominated governments.
It would be difficult to argue that these local governments have been hit by 
political turbulence and that policy platform in the administration of these towns 
changed in the early nineties. Similar patterns can be observed in other regions. 
For example, Sicilian towns changed from single-party governments ruled by the 
Democratic Christian into local governments where the largest party is by far Forza 
Italia.
These differences can be partly explained by the diverse history of Italian re­
gions. For our purposes, these features of Italian local politics are useful for the 
analysis since they allow us to test whether the political and fiscal policy changes 
are indeed a matter of adjustment to political transition. In fact, if the political tur­
bulence hypothesis is right, we should not observe changes in policies in these very 
stable environments. Results for this smaller sample are in Table 1.8 (we remain 
with 306 observations). Here we note that the matching indicator drives signifi­
cant policy changes as in the large sample in Education and Culture and Social 
Action. The matching coefficient in General Administration becomes insignificant, 
but in the last column we note that it is significant and positive for Transports and 
Communications. The responsiveness of fiscal expenditure to differentiation in three 
categories reassures us on the role of the differentiation between the executive and 
the legislative in determining policy choices.
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1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have argued that the transition from a parliamentary regime 
to a presidential one has substantial impact on fiscal policy making. We found 
significant empirical evidence that this is indeed the case. We have developed a 
multidimensional political economy model in which the institutional differences af­
fect fiscal policy via the changes induced on political outcomes. The model predicts 
that citizens in a presidentialist regime are able to influence parties and make them 
more accountable via the unbundling of issues. The institutional change* as we have 
modeled it, should generate governments that frequently show differences between 
mayors and the legislative board on non ideological issues. This change is reflected 
in the policy choice made by the elected representatives who are policy motivated.
Our empirical analysis derives from this theoretical framework. We have tested 
the hypothesis of wider differentiation between mayors and the leading parties in the 
local boards. Also, we looked for evidence that political changes (as captured by dif­
ferentiation) drive fiscal policy changes. The empirical evidence provided supports 
both predictions. In particular, there is evidence that suggests that the political 
outcomes affect the expenditure choices in the three largest categories of public in­
tervention, which on average represent 70% of the total expenditures of the local 
governments included in the sample. Overall, these results are robust to a number of 
alternative explanations which include changes in bargaining power, political turbu­
lence at the national level and political cycles due to strategic spending in electoral 
campaigns.
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These results have broader implications. The unbundling effect we have de­
scribed, at the local level, implies a gain in accountability of the incumbents, when­
ever the preferences of the majority of a party differ from those of its electorate. 
At the national level, however, we think this gain has to be weighed against other 
considerations. When it comes to national politics, we also value democratic in­
stitutions that compound the preferences of the electorate into moderate positions. 
This is due to the fact that we want to protect minorities to some extent against the 
ruling coalition decisions. We believe that in some circumstances the unbundling 
effect is a potential source of more extreme positions within parties.
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1.6 A ppendix
1.6.1 Tables
Table 1.1
, Frequencies of the differentiation proxy with respect to the
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFORM.
Old Regime Reformed
Regime
Total
Differentiation (M=0) 177 136 313
No Differentiation (M=l) 328 150 478
Total 505 286 791
Means .650 .525
Test of the equality of the mean of the matching indicator before and after the 
reform (mean(O) before the reform, mean(l) after the reform)
Ho: mean(O) - mean(l) = diff = 0
Ha:diff>0 t-statistic= 3. P-value>t= 0.0003________________________
Notes: The differentiation indicator takes value 1 if the mayor is affiliated to the 
largest party in the board. Mayor affiliation and seats composition in the 
municipal board are taken from the electoral data of the Italian Ministry of 
Internal Affairs.
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T a b l e  1.2
Su m m a r y  s t a t ist ic s  o f  t h e  f is c a l  e x p e n d it u r e s  o v e r  t im e  ( in  s h a r e s )
General Administration Summary statistics
Year Mean SD Min Max
1988 19.44224 4.360965 11.27323 35.62266
1990 20.77851 4.857959 10.946 35.63266
1991 20.35407 4.67755 10.7392 34.41671
1992 20.61181 4.988564 9.980082 36.27266
1993 21.33963 5.278681 9.612946 35.33571
1994 21.21124 5.117026 9.905996 37.09801
1995 21.32963 5.02.9167 10.33081 37.43938
1996 21.49069 5.323648 12.68208 35.79411
Local Security Summary statistics
Year Mean SD Min Max
1988 4.47461 1.002745 2.442593 6.641032
1990 4.905971 1.358549 2.527186 9.716436
1991 4.889895 1.35185 2.60466 8.6708
1992 4.806807 1.476292 2.355681 9.985227
1993 4.68237 1.417695 2.246155 9.353454
1994 4.806344 1.505265 2.43879 9.897037
1995 4.858834 1.431625 2.371065 8.94292
1996 4.832848 1.46709 2.30802 8.744858
Education and Culture Summary statistics
Year Mean SD Min Max
1988 21.37485 4.082359 14.42347 31.99191
1990 19.33106 4.28348 10.89946 30.22939
1991 19.72163 3.758207 9.982795 30.2482
1992 19.149 3.843583 9.423962 29.58521
1993 17.53591 4.115107 9.46181 28.8592
1994 17.74995 4.318766 8.533065 29.03586
1995 17.56658 4.166924 7.832327 27.10649
1996 17.67671 4.125357 8.579086 28.2791
Notes: Source: ISTAT Database.
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Table 1.2 (continued)
Summary statistics of the fiscal expenditures over time (in shares)
Social Expenditure Summary statistics
Year Mean SD Min Max
1988 34.77325 5.72757 22.88095 46.37748
1990 34.89483 6.071297 22.06063 50.92599
1991 35.47625 5.5137 25.09568 48.72419
1992 35.66672 6.12836 22.25224 50.41642
1993 34.65666 6.680425 16.60313 50.63031
1994 36.28141 6.606506 21.30435 49.83575
1995 35.88587 6.492789 20.08509 54.74463
1996 36.27346 5.999602 21.15232 50.47171
Transport and Communications Summary statistics
Year Mean SD Min Max
1988 9.029971 4.424298 3.029858 31.66083
1990 8.077723 3.941793 2.894397 32.77308
1991 8.111071 4.067031 2.950569 32.04795
1992 8.055127 4.173655 2.923625 35.30523
1993 8.088181 4.468707 1.450834 30.86178
1994 8.211238 4.783336 1.221862 33.94757
1995 8.356958 5.337189 1.411084 39.72583
1996 8.085273 4.495973 1.440053 30.30342
Notes: Source: ISTAT Databas
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Table  1.3
Correlations o f  Co n tr o ls  a n d  Ca teg o r ies  o f  e x p e n d it u r e
General Local Education & Social Transports &
Controls
Administration Security Culture Intervention Communication
Value Added -0.378 -0.353 0.393 0.298 -0.031
Demographics -0.245 -0.296 0.145 0.249 -0.058
Notes: Fiscal expenditures are expressed in shares. Source: ISTAT Database.
Value Added is measured at the province level. The information is available on a yearly base and it 
is provided by the Tagliacarne Institute. Demographics is the share of the population in a town that 
is older than 65 years. This data comes from the 1981 and 1991 Census and the missing 
information is replaced interpolated figures.
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Table  1.4
D e p e n d e n t  Variable: D iffer en tia tio n  proxy  Ma t c h = l  Lin e a r  probability  Mo d e l
Explanatory Variables Coefficients
Reform -0.108*** -0.082** 0.062
(0.035) (0.038) (0.065)
Ydu2 0.056
(0.073)
Ydu3 0 .0 2 1
(0.077)
Ydu4 0.065
(0.077)
Ydu5 -0.043
(0.078)
Ydu6 -0 .1 0 0
(0.086)
Ydu7 -.156
(0.099)
Ydu8 -.165*
(0 .1 0 1 )
Demographic -.014 - .0 1
(.009) (.0 1 )
Population -.0 0 2 ** -.0 0 2 **
(-.0 0 1 ) (.0 0 1 )
Value Added 0.196 -.173
(0.153) (.153)
Town F.E. yes yes yes
Notes: standard errors are reported in brackets. 791 Observations. *** Coefficient significant at 1% confidence, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 
10%. Ydu- are a set of year dummies, 1988 is excluded, ydu2= 1 in year 1990, ydu3=l in year 1991 and so on. Value Added is measured at the province 
level. This data is available on a yearly base and it is provided by the Tagliacarne Institute. Demographics is the share of the population in a town that is 
older than 65. This data comes from the 1981 and 1991 Census and the missing information is replaced interpolated figures. Population data, measured 
yearly, is provided by ISTAT.
Ta b l e  1.5
3SLS E s t im a t e s  o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p r o c e s s  ( d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  M a t c h = 1  i f  m a y o r  b e l o n g s  t o  b i g g e s t  p a r t y  in  t h e  b o a r d )
AND FISCAL EXPENDITURES IN SHARES.
Dependent Variables
Match General Local Security Education & Social Intervention Transports &
Administration Culture Communication
Reform -.082**
(.037)
Match -9.78* .425 11.54* -11.72* 3.47
(5.97) (1 .1 0 ) (6.17) (7.22) (3.66)
Demographic -.015 -.177** .033 -.064 -.066 2 1 3 **
(.009) (.176) (.032) (.182) (.214) (.108)
Value Added -.197 .195 .149 3.24 -3.28 -2.43*
(.115) (2.33) (.431) (2.41) (2.82) (1.42)
Population - .0 0 2 -.058* -.007** .014 -.056** Qgy***
(.0 0 1 ) (.017) (.003) (.18) (.2 1 ) (0 .0 1 1 )
Regional F.E. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: Standard errors are reported in brackets. *** Coefficient significant at 1% confidence, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 1 0 %.
Observations: 791. The instrument for the matching process is the reform dummy. The data on fiscal expenditures is expressed in shares. 
Population is measured yearly. Source: ISTAT Database. The political data come from the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs database. Value 
Added is measured at the province level. The information is available on a yearly base and it is provided by the Tagliacarne Institute. 
Demographics is the share of the population in a town that is older than 65. This data comes from the 1981 and 1991 Census and the missing 
information is replaced interpolated figures.
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T a b l e  1.6
Ro b u s t n e s s  t o  P o l it ic a l  Cy c l e : 3sls e st im a t e s  o f  t h e  p o l it ic a l  pr o c e ss  (d e p e n d e n t  v a r ia b l e  M a t c h =1 i f  m a y o r  b e l o n g s  t o  b ig g e s t
________________________________ PARTY IN THE BOARD) AND FISCAL EXPENDITURES IN SHARES._____________________________________________
Dependent Variables
Match General
Administration
Local Security Education & Culture Social
Intervention
Transports & 
Communication
Reform -.100**
(.039)
Match -9.69* 1.15 11.73** -8.19 2.89
(5.177) (.106) (5.43) (5.37) (3.10)
Antiell -.011 -.668 -.389* -1.74 .819* -.255
(.080) (1.07) (.220) (1.12) (1.11) (.642)
Antiel2 .092 1.08 -.332 -1.92* 1.599 -.050
(.076) (1.05) (0.227) (1.16) (1.14) (.663)
AntieD .058 .34 -.163 -1.44 1.613 -.159
(.078) (1.04) (.214) (1.093) (1.08) (.625)
Antiel4 .091 .91 -.162 -1.16 1.88* -.420
(0.79) (1.08) (.221) (1.13) (1.11) (.647)
Regional F.E. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: Standard errors are reported in brackets. *** Coefficient significant at 1% confidence, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%. Observations: 
791. The instrument for the matching indicator is the reform dummy.
The data on fiscal expenditures is expressed in shares. Population is measured yearly. Source: ISTAT Database. The political data comes from the Italian 
Ministry of Internal Affairs database. Antiell=1 in the year of new elections, Antiel2=l one year before elections and so on. Standard controls are 
included in the regressions as in the previous tables (demographic, value added, population), although we do not report the coefficients. Value Added is 
measured at the province level. The information is available on a yearly base and it is provided by the Tagliacame Institute. Demographics is the share of 
the population in a town that is older than 65. The data come from the 1981 and 1991 Census and the missing information is replaced interpolated figures.
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Ta b l e  1.7
Ro b u s t n e s s  t o  Ch a n g e s  in  p a r t ie s ’ c o n c e n t r a t io n : 3SLS e st im a t e s  o f  t h e  po l it ic a l  pr o c e ss  (d e p e n d e n t  v a r ia b l e  M a t c h = 1 if  m a y o r
BELONGS TO BIGGEST PARTY IN THE BOARD) AND FISCAL EXPENDITURES IN SHARES.
Dependent Variables
Match General Local Security Education & Culture Social Intervention Transports &
Administration Communication
Reform .070**
(.035)
Match -12.77 .025 13.50* -15.64* 4.83
(8.07) (1.25) (7.89) (9.73) (4.61)
Concentration 2.06*** -24.20 -1.69 -29.3 32.66 -8.30
(.211) (17.5) (2.66) (16.7) (20.6) (9.81)
Regional F.E. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: Standard errors are reported in brackets. *** Coefficient significant at 1% confidence, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%. Observations: 
791. The instrument for the matching indicator is the reform dummy.
The data on fiscal expenditures is expressed in shares. Population is measured yearly. Source: ISTAT Database. The political data comes from the Italian 
Ministry of Internal Affairs database. Concentration is the Herfindahl index of concentration of parties in the local government board. It has been 
calculated taking in account the seats share of the five largest parties. Standard controls are included in the regressions as in the previous tables 
(demographic, value added, population), although we do not report the coefficients. Value Added is measured at the province level. The information is 
available on a yearly base and it is provided by the Tagliacarne Institute. Demographics is the share of the population in a town that is older than 65. The 
data come from the 1981 and 1991 Census and the missing information is replaced interpolated figures.
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Table  1.8
Robustness to Political Turbulence: 3sls Fiscal expenditures in shares in “stable” towns.
_________________________________________________Dependent Variables_________________________________________________
Match General Local Security Education & Culture Social Intervention Transports &
Administration Communication
Reform -.123***
(.046)
Match 2.31 .443 10.52** -11.51* 9.21**
(3.81) (.897) (5.88) (6.88) 4.61
Regional F.E. yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: Standard errors are reported in brackets. *** Coefficient significant at 1% confidence, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%. 
Observations: 306. The instrument for the matching indicator is the reform dummy.
The data on fiscal expenditures is expressed in shares. Population is measured yearly. Source: ISTAT Database. The political data comes from the 
Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs database. Standard controls are included in the regressions as in the previous tables (demographic, value added, 
population), although we do not report the coefficients. Value Added is measured at the province level. The information is available on a yearly 
base and it is provided by the Tagliacarne Institute. Demographics is the share of the population in a town that is older than 65. The data come 
from the 1981 and 1991 Census and the missing information is replaced interpolated .figures. Political data source: Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Stylised Ballot Example 1.
An example of a ballot in the municipal elections before the introduction of the reform.
List A
preference for a candidate
List B
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Stylised Ballot Example2.
An English translated version of the diagrams published on the Italian government web site at the times of local elections (“A guide to 
voting”). Example of a vote for a list supporting a candidate in a list for the council board election (which implies a vote for the associated 
mayor).
Polly Jane Harvey
Name and Surname
(preference for a candidate in the Sets 
for the board elections)
(candidate mayor)
(preference for a candidate in the lists 
for the board elections)
Name and Surname
(preference for a candidate in the lists 
for the board elections)
(candidate mayor)
(preference for a candidate in the lists 
for the board elections)
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Stylised Ballot Example 3.
An English translated version of the diagrams published on the Italian government web site at the times of local elections (“A guide to 
voting”). An example of a vote for a list supporting a candidate in a list for the council board election and (split) vote for a candidate 
mayor which is not associated with the chosen list.
Nome and Sjrname
Polly Jane Harvey
(preference for e candidate in (he lists 
(or the board elections)
(candidate mayor)
Name and Sul
(canddate mayor)
(preference for a canddate In the lists 
for the board elections)
(preference tor a candidate in the lists 
for the board elections)
(preference tor a candidate in the lists 
for the board elections)
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1.6.3 T h e o ry  a p p e n d ix  
P ro o f of propositions
P roposition  1 Under Assumption 1, party U will choose a candidate that has 
ideology L and party F will choose a candidate that has ideology R
It is easy to show that L(K,m) dominates L(-K,-m). We have to check if L(k,m) 
is a better response than L(-k, m). The two non obvious conditions for this to be 
true are the following.
When the opponent is fielding (k,-m):
[(1 -  *[(7 * - 7 - K- 2 ( 7 £ - 7 : £ ) ] A «  >
m ( l K- r K -  * ( 7 - m- 7 j} A (m ) .
This is obtained by comparing the expected payoffs:
[tf[(7 * _ 7 - * _ 2 (7 ^ —7 -£ ) ]w(fc,-m) +  [1 -  ^ [ { lK~ l~ K I m M ” *.™) 
and
~ m ) +  [1 -  m )- 
While the second condition, related to the opponent fielding (-k,m), is
[ (1  _  # [ ( t* —7 - * —2 (7 ? * —7ir*)]A (k) >
{4,[(7 ^ _ 7 -^ _ 2 ( 7 5M_ 7 ^ K')] -  «f(7 _m- 7 m)}A(rn).
This is obtained rearranging the difference in expected payoffs
^ ( 7 - m - 7 m M - fc, ~ m ) +  I1 -  ^ ( 7 _ m - 7 m ) ] ^ ( - fcJ m )
and
[^ [(7 ^ _ 7 -^ _ 2 (7 5M- 7 ^ ft:)]a;(-A:,-m) +  [1 -  ^ { { lK ~1 ~K m) .
Then, it is sufficient that salience is strong enough, with A(fc) large enough with 
respect to A(m) to compensate for the changes in probability of victory.
P roo f of proposition  2  We now focus on the possible choices (k,m) and (K,m) 
for each party and the second proposition .
P roposition  2 When assumption 2 holds, each party chooses a candidate that has 
preferences aligned to the majority of the party in both dimensions, regardless of the 
preferences of the electorate.
When the opponent fields (-k,m) the expected payoff from fielding (k,m) is
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[ ^ ( 7 ^ —7  K)]u(k, m) +  [1 — ^ ( 7 ^ —7  K)]u(—k, tyi) 
which needs to be larger than
- 1 ~ K - 2 ( 7 m - 7 I m ) M ^  - m )  +  {1 -  ^ [ ( 7 ^ - 7 “ Jpr- 2 ( 7 M - 7 l M ) ] } a;( - fc»m )'
Simplifying the expression and setting the difference to be positive we obtain the 
following expression.
{*[(7K- 7 - * - 2 ( 7 £ - 7 : £ ) ]  -  tf(7*-7"*)A (fc) < ^ [{1* - 1 ~ K
Similarly, when the opponent fields L(-k,-m)
^ [ { l K ~ 7 ~ K +  i 1 -  ^ \ { l K ~ 1 ~ K ~ m ) 
is the expected payoff from presenting (k,m), while if (k,-m) is chosen we have 
[^(7 ^ - 7 ~K)]uj(k, —m ) +  [1 -  ^{p(K -^/~K)]u)(-k, -m ) .
Rearranging we have
{4>(7* _ 7- * )  _  $[(7K+ 7 -K-2(7^M -7M 7f )]}A(&) <
4 ,[(7 Ar- 7 --Rr- 2 (7 f M- 7 ^ ) ] A  (m).
When difference in probability is negative (7 ^ /  <  7 M ^ ) ^ ese conditions are always 
fulfilled, since the right hand side is not negative. The same holds when the difference 
between the moving groups is small (because they are similar in size or negligible 
with respect to the remaining of the electorate).
Proof of proposition 3 Given the assumptions, for each party choosing to field 
two lists is a weakly dominant strategy.
Both parties offer two lists Suppose both parties are fielding two lists. Would 
the majority/mayor gain by withdrawing the least preferred list? Again, we shall 
focus on the behavior of rational voters and parties. Withdrawing the least liked list 
implies a loss of 7 ^  votes that would shift in favor of the list of the opposite color 
without altering the chances to see the preferred administrative option winning.
The other party offers one list Suppose that in party U the majority prefers 
b to a, when would it be the case that the list (L, a) is offered? The interesting case 
is when the other party offers only what the majority of the party prefers. In fact, 
when the other party fields (—k ,—m), offering two lists dominates offering one, since 
—m  would have the same votes and there would be less chance to see members of 
the party elected. The loss and gains entailed are determined by the whole of the 
party electorate which has these preferences, and not by the smaller subset of these
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voters that would be able to swap ideological sides even at the cost of seeing the 
wrong ideology dominating the contest.
Let us now see what is the necessary condition to ensure that the following 
proposition holds in this case. Assume the party majority has additive utility on 
the administrative outcome according to UJ2 and according to on the number of 
foreseeable seats (namely, those deriving from rational votes). The choice between 
fielding (k,m) and (k,-m) or (k,m) alone, when the opponent is choosing to present 
only (—k, m) entails the following comparison of expected payoffs
* (7K _  +  27 l£ )w 3(*) +  [1 -  ^ (7 *  -  T K +  27=m)]w3(-fc) +  * (7 m “
7—m l ^ W  + [1 ~  ^(7m ~  7 - m W - m )  >
1K ~  l~ K)w$(k) +  [1 -  $ ( 7 *  “  7~K)]u3(~k) +  0J2{m).
Rearranging, the following must hold
{[^ (7*  ~  T K +  27lm)l “  * (7 *  ~  7 -jR:)]}A(A;) > {1 -  tf(7m -  7-m )]}A(m ).
The gain obtained by presenting a single list is a function of the distribution of 
preferences on the administrative option, and it is increasing in how little probability 
is attached to m’s victory when both administrative options are on the floor. The 
loss depends on the preferences within the opponent party for the “withdrawable” 
option, since all the m” electorate of the opponent would cast the vote for (k,-m). 
Again, if the party cares sufficiently about grabbing the seats and given that 7 ! ^  
could be non negligible, the inequality will hold.
1.6.4 D ata appendix
The data used in the analysis come from several sources. Data on fiscal expenditure 
have been provided by ISTAT  (Italian National Statistics Institute) thanks to the 
cooperation of Andrea Mancini and Enrica Caprara. This data provides informa­
tion on expenditures and revenues for 125 main cities. Public expenditure (later 
transformed by the author in order to have all data measured in real terms and per 
capita) is available disaggregated by destination (current and capital expenditures 
are reported separately): General Administration (Amministrazione generale), Ed­
ucation and Culture (Istruzione e cultura), Social Intervention (Azioni e interventi 
campo sociale), Transports and communications (Trasporti e comunicazioni), Public 
security (Sicurezza pubblica e difesa). Total Expenditure is also provided (namely 
the sum of all mentioned items plus residual). The deficit is also reported separately.
Political data (on elected mayors and composition of the local board) of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs Electoral Division have been kindly provided by An- 
tonella Fortino. We compiled the same panel of political data from several yearly 
issues (from 1988 to 1996) of the “Guida delle regioni d ’ Italia,” Roma: SISPR. 
Data on local product are drawn from the Istituto Tagliacarne series on provinces 
PIL (GDP).
Demographic data on the share of population above 65 year is reported in the 
ISTAT  Census Report of 1981 and 1991.
The left wing dummy has been built excluding the following list of affiliation 
from the left wing administrations set. In many cases I have checked on alternative
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sources of information, especially for ” Liste civiche” and unusual party codes (on the 
“Guida delle regioni d ’ Italia ” Italian Newspaper Archives and web based political 
resources).
In the robustness and check section we ran the analysis on a subsample of stable 
administration. A simple criterion to select these historically stable towns proved to 
be the choice of towns that are always ruled by left wing or right wing governments 
(from 1988-1996). We build a dummy indicator for left wing administration which 
assumed value one if the town was governed by a left wing administration. Stable 
towns displayed zero variance in this dummy.
List of Parties Classified as not-left-wing (the source of party names is the Min­
istry of Internal Affairs Electoral Division, the classification is ours):
Alleanza Nazionale
Azione Meridionale
CCD
CDL
CDU
Centro-Destra 
CENTRO 
DC 
DC D.
DC-Indipendente
Destra
Forza Italia (FI)
FI-CCD 
FI CCD 
FI CCD-CDU 
FI
FIT-PP
Legaveneta-Nord
LAARGOV
Ladins
LARGOV
Lega Nord
Legalpiemonte
LI VER
Liga Veneta
MSI-DN
Nordvene
P. Centro
Pattdemocratici
Patto Segni
PLD
PLI
Polo
Polo Buon Governo
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Polo Liberta’
PRI
Proaltoadige
PRS
Partito Sardo D’azione
PSDI
PSI
PSI
Radicale Indipendente 
UDEUR
Unione Di Centro 
Union Valdotaine 
Veneta Republica
C hapter 2
Political Fiscal Cycles Under 
A lternative Regim es
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we address the question of how political business cycles differ across 
constitutional regimes. Looking at our panel database of Italian local governments 
we explore how fiscal policy making is manipulated on the eve of elections in parlia­
mentary and presidential regimes.
The idea that policies systematically change close to elections is not a recent 
one and has found support both in cross-country and regional panel data analysis. 
In this literature, however, little attention has been paid to the effect of different 
constitutional arrangements on the presence and intensity of electoral cycles. In our 
work we show that the presence of electoral fiscal cycles detected by the empirical 
analysis in the overall sample, once allowing for a differential effect of political cycles 
across regimes, is actually driven by the governments whose head of the executive 
is directly elected. Under this form of government strongly significant dynamics 
are induced on how revenues are collected in the years preceding elections. Taxes
91
CHAPTER 2. POLITICAL FISCAL CYCLES UNDER ALTERNATIVE REGIMES92
fall, as well as the revenues generated by the provision of collective goods1, whereas 
borrowing is increasingly adopted.
The theoretical modeling of political business cycles stems from ideas that have 
been extensively discussed in the political science literature. It is the core idea in 
Riker’s (1993) book “Populism versus Liberalism” that we cannot assign very ambi­
tious tasks to our democratic institutions. Instead, we should confine our hope into 
a “minimal democracy” which allows voters to replace bad incumbents by mean of 
elections. According to this vision of what democratic institutions are meant for, the 
economic analysis should not hinge on models of spatial choice (and commitment) 
like in Downs (1957), but concentrate on the role of elections as a way to restrain 
opportunistic behavior from the politicians. This point of view has been modeled 
first in the economics literature using political agency theoretical frameworks as in 
is Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986). Models of this flavor often assume that taxes 
are correlated with greater incompetence of the incumbent or a more opportunis­
tic (rent seeking) behavior of politicians. In these analyses, voters condition their 
voting on the policies implemented to curb incumbents’ misconduct (or to select 
better incumbents). This voting behavior generates incentives to “impress” voters 
acting in their interest or in general to appear as a good performer in order to be 
reappointed.
Rogoff (1990), in an adverse selection framework with private information on in­
cumbents’ competence, shows how business cycles are a rational outcome of citizens’
desire to make politicians accountable. His model predicts that before elections pol- 
JFor which governments charge a fee.
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icy makers prefer to spend more on highly visible government services at the expense 
of investments.
In the context of principal-agent analysis, Harrington (1993) extends the previ­
ously existing literature, to analyze the distortions induced by elections. Extending 
this kind of theoretical framework to allow for yardstick competition in tax setting, 
Besley and Case (1995) show that the ability of evaluating the relative performance 
of incumbents reduces wasteful spending.
Drazen (2000) reviews the empirical evidence of the impact of political cycles 
on monetary policy in OECD countries. Other evidence on fiscal policy from data 
on local and national governments suggests that the presence of fiscal cycles is a 
widespread phenomenon. In their survey and extension of the existing empirical 
literature on US state level data, Besley and Case (2003) discussing political cycles 
and accountability argue that the existing “results leave little doubt that the electoral 
process does hold policy makers to account for the policies chosen during their 
tenure. This cements the link between economic and political outcomes in a way 
that is consistent with theories based on political agency.” Further evidence on 
tax cuts before elections is provided by Petterson-Lidbom (2002) in their study 
on Swedish municipalities. Schuknecht (2000) and Block (2002) are examples of 
cross-country analysis in developing countries. Enriching the analysis to allow for 
a differential impact of political fiscal cycles for diverse institutional environments, 
Gonzalez (2002) looks at the interaction of the occurrence of cycles and the quality of 
democratic institutions exploiting Mexican data. Finally, Shi and Svensson (2002), 
instead, use country level panel data to show how the size of the rents at stake and
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the share of uninformed voters strengthen the occurrence policy cycles. 2
The existing political economy literature indicates how the form of government 
shapes incentives in fiscal policy, changes the extent to which politicians are account­
able and the importance of incumbent career concerns. Once acknowledged these 
conclusions, we believe it is natural to address the question of how the incentives to 
generate political fiscal cycles differ under alternative regimes.
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997, 2000) provide a rationale for the role of the 
form of government on fiscal policy focusing on legislative bargaining and agenda set­
ting power. Career incentives may be stronger for the head of the executive once he 
is directly elected rather than appointed by the legislature. One explanation of these 
stronger incentives relies on the switch from individual to collective accountability 
(as in Lowry et al, 1998). Voters are in a better position to make the executive and 
the legislative accountable separately, given that they can punish or reward directly 
the head of the executive that is no longer appointed by the legislature. Alterna­
tively, career concerns, which are argued to be particularly important in the public 
sector (see, e.g. Wilson 1989) could be strengthened by the fact that the post of 
head of the executive becomes more visible and attractive once the direct election 
is introduced.
Stronger career concerns can be modeled as increased ego-boost rents for the 
incumbents or as taste for higher authority and hence stronger ability to fulfill one’s
favored policies or mission3 if in power (which, arguably, increases for a directly
2 For extensive literature reviews see Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997), Persson and Tabellini 
(2000) and the afore mentioned Drazen (2000).
3 On the concept of mission see again Wilson (1989) or a recent work by Besley and Gathak 
(2003).
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elected head of the executive). Lastly, we argued in Chapter 1 that when a multi­
plicity of policy issues is involved, presidential regimes increase accountability.
The first work that attempts to establish empirically a link between governmental 
form and electoral procedures and political fiscal cycles is Persson and Tabellini 
(2002). Using panel data on 60 democracies they look for evidence of electoral cycles 
on fiscal policy and welfare spending. They find that tax cuts before elections are a 
universal phenomenon, while fiscal adjustments (high taxes and spending cuts) after 
the election only take place in presidential democracies. Brender and Drazen (2004) 
propose an alternative interpretation of the Persson and Tabellini study by arguing 
that political cycles are very strong in new democracies but not at all significant in 
the established ones.
We investigate how the form of government impacts on electoral cycles focusing 
on a panel of Italian towns that have experienced institutional transition from a 
parliamentary to a presidential regime in the early nineties. By looking at subsequent 
elections before and after the reform for each town, we identify how electoral cycles 
impinge on fiscal policies under the two regimes. We use specific policies as left hand 
side variable and estimate by two-way fixed effects the electoral cycle dynamics on 
tax and non-tax revenues. Moreover, we control for the size of transfers received 
from higher tiers of government (which is the largest source of income for Italian 
municipalities) and look at the borrowing behavior of the incumbents.
The existence of term limits should weaken the impact of political cycles. An 
incumbent prevented from running as a candidate should have lower incentives to 
strategically manipulate policies on the eve of an election. Empirically, this is not
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a relevant concern in this paper, as term limits were only introduced by the 1993 
reform and were not affecting the elections in our sample.
Incumbents are often believed to enjoy and advantage over "new" challenging 
candidates4. If the pre and post reform period differed in the strength of the in­
cumbency advantage, this should be reflected on the relevance of political cycles, 
as a stronger incumbency should be negatively associated to strategic pre-electoral 
policy changes. Our priori is that incumbency effects should be stronger in a gov­
ernment where the leader of the executive is directly elected. Other things equal, 
this should weaken the incentives to engage in pre-electoral strategic policy mak­
ing in reformed governments compared to parliamentary governments and lower the 
visibility of political cycles in a presidential regime.
Our analysis of political cycles also provides a unique contribution by exploiting 
the time variation of the institutional setup in Italian towns. We find empirical 
support to the conclusion that political cycles differ across regimes not because of the 
type of forthcoming elections, but due to changes in the electoral law that appointed 
the incumbents. This suggests that institutional change impacts on incumbents’ 
incentives via the increased identifiability of policies (and hence accountability) of 
presidential governments. These effects strengthen the returns to an incumbent from 
policy changes and prompt stronger business cycles.
In the following section we give a brief account of the institutional reform and
the role of local government in Italy. In this section we also describe the data and
4 A large number of political science empirical analysis have measured the incumbency advantage, 
see for example Erikson (1971), Collie (1981), Garand and Gross (1984), Jacobson (1987), Payne 
(1980), Alford and Hibbing (1981), Gelman and King (1990), and Lee (2001).
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provide some descriptive statistics. The empirical specifications are described in 
Section 3. The results are outlaid in section 4. Finally, in Section 5 we discuss 
briefly the results and conclude.
2.2 Background and data
As we discussed in the introduction, the main role of local governments is to cater a
large number of services to their communities. These activities are mainly5 funded by
transfers from higher tiers of government (and in particular by the state). However,
municipalities also charge for some of the services provided and collect revenues
from other sources (like fines for violations of the highway code). Roughly one tenth
of a town income is raised in this way. To a limited extent, local government can
also levy some taxes, especially on properties. The marginal rate applied however
is tightly constrained within a certain range by the law. Only recently - i.e. in the
years not covered by our sample - the freedom to tax has been increased, at the
expense of transfers that have been reduced. Local governments can also borrow to
finance projects and running activities, however, this source of income is of a smaller
scale than the previously quoted categories.
We exploit fiscal data on the composition of revenues for 120 towns from 1986
until 1996. Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics of these revenues and Table 2.2
reports the descriptive statistics of our control variables.
From the data on elections (provided by the Ministry of Internal Affairs) we
know the calendar of all elections and the type of electoral procedures in place at
5 The figure is around 40% of the overall revenues.
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the time the incumbent was selected. One fifth of the observations correspond to 
a year immediately preceding elections. The type of incumbent can be classified in 
three ways, according to the electoral procedure that selected the local government 
and the electoral procedure that characterized the elections that incumbents will 
face. In chronological order, 28% of the cases the local government was elected and 
was about to face new elections under the old constitutional regime. The share of 
governments in place that were going to be renewed with the first round of reformed 
electoral procedures amounts to 54%. Finally, the remaining 18% is the share of 
administrations elected with the new procedure and that was facing the second 
round of elections in the presidential regime.
For a first crude look at the data,Table 2.3 reports the tests for mean statistical 
differences in policies between years that precede elections and years that do not. 
Tax revenues and borrowing display significant difference at the 5% level, namely 
taxes are lower before elections and borrowing increases.
Our intuitive prior is that the driving mechanism that creates a different role 
for political cycles under alternative regime is due to the electoral procedure that 
appoints a government. This interpretation is coherent with the career concern 
approach and as well as with models that address to what extent policy choices can 
be attributed to different actors within governments. However, we use empirical 
specifications that allow to test for the alternative assumption as well. Namely, we 
investigate the evidence that what matters most for the magnitude and presence of 
political cycles is the kind of election an incumbent is about to face. In the following 
section we describe the adopted empirical strategy.
CHAPTER 2. POLITICAL FISCAL CYCLES UNDER ALTERNATIVE REGIMES99
2.3 Empirical strategy
This study exploits data coming from a broadly common institutional setting and 
variability at the town level and over time to isolate the impact of institutional 
changes as source of policy differences. The main drawback of the database is the 
limited number of years covered. However, the richness of the institutional setup 
allows us testing specifically for alternative hypothesis on the interplay of political 
institutions with political fiscal cycles.
In all the following specifications we use as left hand variable different sources 
of revenue or the deficit incurred by the administration. For simplicity, in what 
follows will refer to left hand variables as policies. However, only taxes, non-tax 
revenues and borrowings are a direct consequence of policy choices, while the share 
of transfers depends on decisions taken at the national level. In all specifications 
we will use fixed effects at the town level and yearly time fixed effects to control 
for macro shocks that could affect all towns at once. Typically, these time fixed 
effects are introduced to control for national government policies or macroeconomic 
conditions that may affect the way local governments are run in given years.
2.3.1 Political cycles
The first specification follows the classical approach in the literature, for a given 
policy j, at time t, for town i, we estimate the following equation in order analyze 
the impact (/?) of pre-electoral years:
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Pjit = aji +  djt +  (3joPREEL +  T j^ it +  ejit (1. Unconditional on regime)
where a,i is the town fixed effect, dt is the time component in the fixed effect, 
P R E E L  is an indicator variable that takes value one in the years preceding elections 
and zero otherwise, and Z is a vector of controls.6
If political cycles matter for policy making, then we expect f3j0 to be significant. 
The conventional wisdom would also suggest that in the tax revenues equation (3j0 
should be negative and significant, i.e. taxes are cut before elections.
2.3.2 Political cycles under alternative regim es
Adopting the following specification we look for evidence on the main idea of the 
chapter, namely that the relevance of political fiscal cycles varies across regimes. 
To do so, we introduce two new indicator variables that capture the occurrence of 
elections in the following year when the incumbent was elected with the old electoral 
procedure (PREPARL) and with the reformed one (PREPRES). This allows for a 
different impact of the election on policy choices and permits to test straightfor­
wardly for the statistical difference of the two coefficients of these indicators and for
their significance individually:
6 We tried a richer specification that included dummies post and pre elections (post election 
dummies are analogous to dummies that captures the years furthest away from the election as 
the dummies we included in Chapter 1). We did not find evidence of significant dynamics in post 
electoral years.
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Pjit — aji +  djt +  P j\P  R E P  A R L  +  /3j2P R E P  R E S  +  +  ejit
(2 . Conditioning on regime)
as above, a* is the town fixed effect, dt is the time component in the fixed effect, 
and Z is a vector of controls.
In order to unbundle the election-year effect from the electoral system effect we 
include in Equation 3 a reform dummy, Ra, that takes value one in town i and 
year t if the electoral system is presidential. The inclusion of this dummy allows 
disentangling the tendency for political budget cycles in presidential regimes from 
different budgetary policy throughout presidential regimes.
Pjit =  aji +  djt +  P j \P  R E P  ARL  +  /3 j2-P  R E P  R E S  +  SjRa  +  'YjZit +  Gjit
(3. Conditioning on regime)
2.3.3 Testing for com peting explanations
The third specification is flexible enough to test for a richer interaction of the institu­
tional setting with the phenomenon of political cycles. We include a third indicator 
variable (PREINTER) that is equal to one when the incumbent has been appointed 
with the unreformed procedure and the elections to come are held with the new 
electoral law.
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Pjit =  aji~^~djt-\-{3jiP R E P  ARL+(3j2P  R E P  RES-^-j3j^P R E I N T  E  R-\-5j Rit~\—
(4. A "three way" regime)
When the coefficient on this indicator, is not significant, this suggests that 
the previous specification was not omitting an important determinant of fiscal pol­
icy insofar there was no role for a different behavior of administrations that have 
been elected in the same way, but face different elections. There are several ways 
of arguing that in principle one should allow for such differences. One of the most 
convincing arguments, perhaps, relies on the role of changes in the degree of political 
competition, which could increase with the direct election of the head of the execu­
tive. The new procedure could attract better candidates and generate the incentives 
for the incumbents to act more opportunistically to impress their constituency in 
order to win the elections again.
Political Affiliation
As a robustness check, we have estimated Equation 3 including a political dummy 
that equals one if the government is left wing. Party affiliation may correlate with 
the electoral system dummy, and at the same time have explanatory power for the 
types of fiscal policies pursued.
CHAPTER 2. POLITICAL FISCAL CYCLES UNDER ALTERNATIVE REGIMES 103
2.4 R esults
The results of the estimation of equation one are presented in Table 2.4. The coeffi­
cient of the electoral dummy for taxes (first column) is negative but insignificant. In 
the equation for non-tax revenues (second column) the coefficient is negative again 
and significant with 10% confidence. Transfers are significantly lower (third column) 
and there is no evidence of changes in borrowing behavior (fourth column). One 
interpretation of these results could be that prices are reduced for services provided 
to the community, which explains the fall in non-tax revenues, while there is no 
evidence that this reduction is compensated by more generous transfers from the 
national government.
The picture changes dramatically when we adopt the second specification. By 
looking at Table 2.5 we note how in the tax revenues equation the coefficient is 
insignificant for the electoral indicator during the old regime, while the coefficient 
is negative, larger and strongly significant for the election dummy in the reformed 
regime. The F-test for the equality of the two coefficients is also strongly significant 
(the F-test statistic is 5.77). This is also the equation that presents the best fit, 
with an R-square statistic of 79 per cent. A similar picture emerges for the non­
tax revenues equation. The coefficient on the electoral dummy in the new regime 
is negative, much larger than in the specification that aggregates the two regimes 
and it is significant at the 1 per cent level. The electoral dummy in the previous 
regime is negative but very insignificant. The difference of the two coefficients is 
also statistically very significant (F-test statistic of 6.18, significant even at the 1
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per cent level of confidence). Looking at the electoral dummy coefficients for the 
transfers equation, we see that it is negative in both regimes, but only significant in 
the presidential regime. However, the F-test for the identity of the two coefficients is 
not significant (the P-value for the F-test statistic is 0.17 ). From this information we 
infer the increase in transfers from higher levels of government does not compensate 
the fall in tax and non-tax revenues.
This evidence, on aggregate, points toward dismissing the hypothesis that re­
gional or national governments subsidize the pre-electoral tax cuts of local govern­
ments they may favor.
Interestingly, the coefficient in the borrowing regression is positive in both regimes, 
but only significant, and much bigger, for the presidential electoral dummy. The co­
efficients difference is also statistically different from zero (the F- test statistic is 
0.037). However, with back of the envelope calculations one can see that the in­
creased borrowing cannot compensate entirely for the decrease in taxes and non-tax 
revenues (and the falling transfers).
From this set of results, it emerges very clearly that pooling together two differ­
ent regimes to evaluate the importance of political cycles gave a very biased picture 
of the empirical evidence. Much stronger dynamics emerge in the richer specifica­
tion, where the evidence strongly support the conclusion that political cycles bite in 
the presidential regime, inducing lower taxes and non revenues taxes, coupled with 
higher borrowing.
Table 2.6 shows the results of the estimation of Equation 3. The reform dummy 
coefficient is always insignificant and the magnitude and significance of all coefficients
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shown in Table 2.6 are maintained.
We estimated the fourth specification to allow for more flexibility in the response 
to electoral periods both according to the electoral law that selected the incumbent 
government and the type of elections that are about to be held. As described in the 
earlier section, we introduce another dummy indicator that assumes value one only 
when in the parliamentary regime the next elections are to be held after the reform 
has been introduced. Overall, the results shown in Table 2.7 suggest that our more 
parsimonious specification was delivering an unbiased picture. Indeed, the size of 
the coefficients on the presidential electoral dummy remains about the same, and 
they all remain significant at the same level of confidence. Furthermore, the new 
electoral dummy should be significant if the behavior of an incumbent government in 
the parliamentary period changed according to the type of future elections. Instead, 
the coefficient is clearly insignificant both for tax and non-tax revenues. For these 
two equations, the F-test statistic on the hypothesis that the difference between 
the sum of the two coefficients on the parliamentary electoral dummies and the 
presidential one is null is rejected at the 5 per cent confidence level. Only in the 
borrowing equation, we note a different role for political cycle in the three groups of 
pre-electoral years, where only parliamentary governments that are facing elections 
held before the reform is implemented reduce borrowing before elections7.
Lastly, Table 2.8 shows that our main results are robust to the inclusion of 
a left wing dummy (included to control for the effect of political orientation on
policy choices and possible correlation between the reform and political orientation
7 The coefficients on the pre-electoral years dummies for the parliamentary regime are only sig­
nificant to the 10 per cent level.
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of elected governments). The left wing dummy is positively correlated with non 
tax revenues and transfers. It is very insignificant for tax revenues, and negatively 
correlated (and significant) with higher borrowing. We also explored a specification 
that added an interaction of the reform and political dummy, but found it largely 
insignificant throughout.
2.5 Concluding remarks
The results underline the importance of carefully addressing different institutional 
setup for accountability. The presence of institutional time variation in the studied 
environment provides strong evidence that fiscal cycles only appear to have a role 
under the presidential regime. Moreover, we can use the empirical evidence to tell 
apart two distinct hypothesis on what influences the opportunistic behavior of in­
cumbents. The question addressed is whether the main determinant of differences in 
cycles is due to the electoral procedure and institutional setup that appoint a gov­
ernment or the alternative assumption that the differences are due to the election 
that incumbents are about to face. We believe we have found strong support of the 
former hypothesis. This outcome is supportive of the existing literature that empha­
sizes the importance of two factors. First, the role of career concerns, which can be 
reasonably argued to be stronger in presidential regimes. Second, the enhancement 
of the accountability mechanism, which is strengthened once policy makers are more 
easily identifiable due to the separate election of the legislature and the leader of 
the executive.
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2.6 A ppendix
2.6.1 Tables
Table 2.1
Descriptive Statistics of Revenues and Deficit in shares.
Share of revenues Mean Standard Dev. Observations
Tax revenues 0 . 2 0 0.08 791
Non-tax revenues 0 . 1 0 0.06 791
Transfers 0.38 0 . 1 2 790
Borrowing 0.08 0.09 789
Deficit 0.09 0.16 111
Note: Source ISTAT.
Table 2.2
D e sc r ip t iv e  St a t ist ic s  o f  S o c io  E c o n o m ic  C o n t r o l s
Variable Mean StandardDev. Min Max Obs.
Population 167304 319117 20933 2791354 791
Age>65 0.166 0.04 0.09 0.24 791
Value added 97.58 25.76 51.39 158.11 791
Notes: Population: number o f inhabitants, measured yearly. Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs Database. 
Value Added is measured at the province level. The information is available on a yearly base and it is provided by 
the Tagliacame Institute. Age>65 is the share of the population in a town that is older than 65. This data comes from 
the 1981 and 1991 Census and the missing information is replaced interpolated figures.
T a b le  2.3
T w o - sa m p l e  m e a n  t e st s  w it h  u n e q u a l  v a r ia n c e s
Null Hypothesis mean(PREEL=0) - mean(PREEL=l) = 0
T a x  r e v e n u e s N o n - t a x  r e v e n u e s
Ha: diff > 0 Ha: diff > 0
t-statistic = 1.76 t-statistic = 1.08
P value = 0.04 P value = 0.14
T r a n s f e r s B o r r o w i n g
Ha: diff > 0 Ha: diff < 0
t-statistic = 1.5646 t-statistic = -3.2032
P value = 0.06 P value = 0.001
Notes: the indicator variable PREEL assumes value for all observation one year earlier than elections. 
Data on elections are taken from the database of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
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Table 2.4
Aggregate political cycles: the impact of pre- electoral years on changes in
SOURCES OF REVENUES. TWO-WAY FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION.
Dependent Variable
Tax Revenue Non Tax Rev. Transfers Borrowing
PREEL -0.005 -0.004 -0 . 0 1 2 0.008
[0.004] [0 .0 0 2 ]* [0.006]* -1.18
Age>65 0.732 -0.154 -4.126 3.796
[0.747] [0.479] [1.315]*** (2.79)**
Population 0 0 0 0
[0 .0 0 0 ]* [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ]** -0.23
Value added 0 0 -0 . 0 0 1 0
[0 .0 0 0 1 * [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ]* -0.58
Town F.E. yes yes yes yes
Time F.E. yes yes yes yes
Observations 791 791 790 789
R-squared 0.79 0 . 2 2 0.46 0.13
Notes: standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. PREEL is a 
dummy variable equal to one in pre-electoral years. Data on elections come from the Italian Ministry of Internal 
Affairs database. The data on fiscal revenues is expressed in shares. Population is measured yearly. Source: Ministry 
of Internal Affairs Database. Value Added is measured at the province level. The information is available on a yearly 
base and it is provided by the Tagliacame Institute. Age>65 is the share of the population in a town that is older than 
65. This data comes from the 1981 and 1991 Census and the missing information is replaced interpolated figures.
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Table 2.5
Conditional Political Cycles: the impact of pre- electoral years under
ALTERNATIVE REGIMES ON CHANGES IN SOURCES OF REVENUES. TWO-WAY FIXED EFFECTS
ESTIMATION.
Dependent Variable 
Tax Revenue Non Tax Rev. Transfers Borrowing
PREPARL 0 -0 . 0 0 1 -0.007 0 . 0 0 1
[0.004] [0.003] [0.007] [0.007]
PREPRES -0.023 -0.016 -0.03 0.034
[0.008]*** [0.005]*** [0.015]** [0.015]
Age>65 0.801 -0.108 -4.054 3.698
[0.745] [0.477] [1.315]*** [1.361]
Population 0.00000 0 0 0
[0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ]** [0 .0 0 0 ]
Value added 0.000 0 -0 . 0 0 1 0
[0 .0 0 0 ]* [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 1 * [0 . 0 0 0 1
Town F.E. yes yes yes yes
Time F.E. yes yes yes yes
Observations 791 791 790 789
R-squared 0.79 0.23 0.47 0.14
F-test: PREPARL=PREPRES 5.77** 6.18*** 1.87 3.7**
Notes: standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. PREP ARL is a 
dummy variable equal to one in pre-electoral years if the incumbent has been elected before the reform. PREPRES is 
a dummy variable equal to one in pre-electoral years if the incumbent has been elected after the reform. Data on 
elections come from the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs database. The data on fiscal revenues is expressed in 
shares. Population is measured yearly. Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs Database. Value Added is measured at 
the province level. The information is available on a yearly base and it is provided by the Tagliacame Institute. 
Age>65 is the share of the population in a town that is older than 65. This data comes from the 1981 and 1991 Census 
and the missing information is replaced interpolated figures. The F-test is on the equality of the coefficients on 
PREPARL and PREPRES.
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Table 2.6
CONDITIONAL POLITICAL C ycles: th e  im pact o f  pre- e l e c t o r a l  y e a r s  u n d e r  
ALTERNATIVE REGIMES ON CHANGES IN SOURCES OF REVENUES. TWO-WAY FIXED EFFECTS
ESTIMATION AND DIRECT REFORM EFFECT.
Dependent Variable 
Tax Revenue Non Tax Rev. Transfers Borrowing
PREPARL -0 . 0 0 1 -0 . 0 0 1 -0.005 -0.003
[0.004] [0.003] [0.008] [0.008]
PREPRES -0.023 -0.016 -0.029 0.033
r
~
i o © o 00 * * * [0.005]*** [0.015]** [0.015]
REFORM -0 . 0 0 1 -0 . 0 0 2 0.008 -0.014
[0.006] [0.004] [0 .0 1 1 ] [0 .0 1 2 ]
Age>65 0.802 -0.107 -4.057 3.698
[0.746] [0.478] [1.316]*** [1.360]
Population 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 -0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0
[0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ]** [0 .0 0 0 ]
Value added -0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 -0 . 0 0 1 0 .0 0 0
[0 .0 0 0 ]* [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ]* [0 .0 0 0 ]
Town F.E. yes yes Yes yes
Time F.E. yes yes Yes yes
Observations 791 791 790 789
R-squared 0.79 0.23 0.47 0.14
F-test: PREPARL=PREPRES 5.55** 5  7 4 *** 2 . 1 1 4.28**
Notes: standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. PREPARL is a 
dummy variable equal to one in pre-electoral years if the incumbent has been elected before the reform. PREPRES is 
a dummy variable equal to one in pre-electoral years if the incumbent has been elected after the reform. REFORM is 
a dummy that equals one when the reform has been implemented and the elections are held with the new procedure. 
Data on elections come from the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs database. The data on fiscal revenues is 
expressed in shares. Population is measured yearly. Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs Database. Value Added is 
measured at the province level. The information is available on a yearly base and it is provided by the Tagliacame 
Institute. Age>65 is the share of the population in a town that is older than 65. This data comes from the 1981 and 
1991 Census and the missing information is replaced interpolated figures. The F-test is on the equality of the 
coefficients on PREPARL and PREPRES.
Table 2.7
Robustness check: Conditional Political Cycles: the impact of pre- electoral
YEARS -ACCORDING TO THE TYPE OF INCUMBENT AND FUTURE ELECTIONS- ON CHANGES IN 
SOURCES OF REVENUES. TWO-WAY FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION.
Dependent Variable
Tax Revenue Non Tax Rev. Transfers Borrowing
PREPARL 0 . 0 1 2 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 1 1 -0.033
[0.006] [0.017] [0.018]*
PREINTER -0.017 -0.003 -0 . 0 2 0 0.039
[0 .0 1 1 ] [0.007] [0 .0 2 0 ] [0 .0 2 0 ]*
PREPRES -0.023 -0.016 -0.029 0.032
[0.008]*** [0.005]*** [0.015]** [0.015]**
REFORM -0.004 -0 . 0 0 2 0.005 -0.008
[0.007] [0.004] [0 .0 1 2 ] [0 .0 1 2 ]
Age>65 0.92 -0.093 -3.88 3.362
0.935 -0.084 -3.900 3.392
Population [0.750] [0.481] [1.325]*** [1.367]**
0.000 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000
Value added [0 .0 0 0 ]* [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ]* [0 .0 0 0 ]
- 0.000 0.000 -0 . 0 0 1 0.000
Town F.E. yes yes Yes yes
Time F.E. yes yes Yes yes
Observations 791 791 790 789
R-squared 0.79 0.23 0.47 0.14
F test Statistic 3.55** 4.85** 1.30 2.27
Notes: s.e. in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. PREPARL is a dummy 
variable equal to one in pre-electoral years if the incumbent has been elected before the reform. PREPRES is a dummy 
variable equal to one in pre-electoral years if the incumbent has been elected after the reform. PREINTER is a dummy 
equal to one when the incumbent has been elected before the reform and he is facing elections under the new procedure. 
REFORM is a dummy that equals one when the reform has been implemented and the elections are held with the new 
procedure. Data on elections come from the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs database. The data on fiscal revenues is 
expressed in shares. Population is measured yearly. Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs Database. Value Added is 
measured at the province level. The information is available on a yearly base and it is provided by the Tagliacame 
Institute. Age>65 is the share of the population in a town that is older than 65. This data comes from the 1981 and 1991 
Census and the missing information is replaced interpolated figures. The F-test null hypothesis is PREPARL + 
PREINTER = PREPRRES.
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Table 2.8
CONDITIONAL POLITICAL C ycles: th e  im pact o f  pre- e l e c t o r a l  y e a r s  u n d e r
ALTERNATIVE REGIMES ON CHANGES IN SOURCES OF REVENUES. TWO-WAY FIXED EFFECTS 
ESTIMATION AND POLITICAL AFFILIATION EFFECT.
Dependent Variable
Tax Revenue Non Tax Rev. Transfers Borrowing
PREPARL - 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004
[0.004] [0.003] [0.008] [0.008]
PREPRES -0.022 -0.015 -0.025 0.030
[0.008]*** [0.005]*** [0.015]* [0.015]**
REFORM -0.002 -0.003 0.005 -0.013
[0.006] [0.004] [0.011] [0.012]
LEFT 0.004 0.008 0.024 -0.016
[0.004] [0.003]*** [0.007]*** [0.008]**
Age>65 0.819 -0.072 -3.961 3.628
[0.746] [0.475] [1.307]*** [1.357]***
Population 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]** [0.000]
Value added - 0.000 - 0.000 -0.001 0.000
[0.000]* [0.000] [0.000]* [0.000]
Town F.E. yes yes yes yes
Time F.E. yes yes yes yes
Observations 791 791 790 789
R-squared 0.79 0.24 0.47 0.14
F-test: PREPARL=PREPRES 5.35** 5.19** 1.74 3.94*
Notes: standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. PREPARL is a 
dummy variable equal to one in pre-electoral years if the incumbent has been elected before the reform. PREPRES is 
a dummy variable equal to one in pre-electoral years if the incumbent has been elected after the reform. REFORM is 
a dummy that equals one when the reform has been implemented and the elections are held with the new procedure. 
Data on elections come from the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs database. The data on fiscal revenues is 
expressed in shares. Population is measured yearly. Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs Database. Value Added is 
measured at the province level. The information is available on a yearly base and it is provided by the Tagliacame 
Institute. Age>65 is the share of the population in a town that is older than 65. This data comes from the 1981 and 
1991 Census and the missing information is replaced interpolated figures. The F-test is on the equality of the 
coefficients on PREPARL and PREPRES.
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Data appendix
Data Appendix
The data used in the analysis come from several sources.
Data on fiscal expenditure have been provided by Andrea Mancini and Enrica 
Caprara at ISTAT  (Italian National Statistics Institute). This data provides infor­
mation on revenues for 125 main cities. The categories of interest for this study 
are: Tax Revenues, Non-Tax Revenues, Transfers and Borrowing. From this source 
we also have yearly deficit series for all towns. All data have been transformed into 
real series and normalized by total revenues, so that all figures used in the study are 
expressed in shares.
Political data (on elected mayors and composition of the local board) of the Min­
istry of Internal Affairs Electoral Division have been kindly provided by Antonella 
Fortino.
• PREPARL is a dummy variable equal to one in pre-electoral years if the in­
cumbent has been elected before the reform.
• PREPRES is a dummy variable equal to one in pre-electoral years if the in­
cumbent has been elected after the reform.
• PREINTER is a dummy equal to one when the incumbent has been elected 
before the reform and he is facing elections under the new procedure.
From this database we also use the variable Population, namely the number of 
inhabitants in each town every year. Population is measured yearly.
Data on local product are drawn from the Istituto Tagliacame series on provinces 
Value Added (Valore Aggiunto).Value Added is measured at the province level and 
is available on a yearly base
Age>65 is the share of the population in a town that is older than 65. This 
data comes from the 1981 and 1991 Census and the missing information is replaced 
interpolated figures.
C hapter 3
R epresentation and  
Institu tional Change
3.1 Introduction
Political economy can be broadly defined as the economists’ effort to understand 
the impact, or the interaction, of politics on economics by mean of formal economic 
analysis. Modern democracies however display an array of different institutional se­
tups classified by political scientists in a taxonomy according to core constitutional 
features: the electoral law in place, the structure of the government, the balance of 
power and so on. By comparing different democracies or, more rarely, by analyz­
ing institutional changes (as in the previous chapters), economists have addressed 
a number of policy questions: how institutions shape fiscal and monetary policy, 
how important are constitutions to determine the level of growth, of corruption, of 
electoral turnout and so on. This chapter focuses on the key question of understand­
ing the impact of changing electoral laws and government structure on the type of 
politicians elected.
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In this study we identify the impact of changing the constitution on the compo­
sition of the political class by exploiting the Italian local governments 1993 natural 
experiment. The reform, described earlier in this thesis, strengthened the role and 
the prestige of the executive and its leader. We study how the change in composition 
of the political class, looking at skills and occupational choice, before and after the 
introduction of the reform compares across the executive and legislative branch of 
the government. This allows us to rule out the hypothesis that the massive increase 
in the number of graduate and senior professionals in these governments depends on 
policies and events that were changing over times other than the transition from a 
parliamentary to a presidential system. In our empirical estimates we find, indeed, 
that the intake of politicians with higher education and outside opportunity costs 
was not a common development for both the legislative and the executive power. It 
was the reformed local governments’ executive that became a catalyst for the change 
in the municipal political class.
Most of the existing literature maps institutions into policy outcomes, but rarely 
the question of how institutions may affect the selection of a political class is ad­
dressed explicitly. More frequently we find models of how better institutions can 
curb opportunistic behavior, or allow citizens to recognize in a pool of heterogenous 
incumbents who were the honest and competent ones. We do, however, observe clear 
evidence that changes in the identity of policy makers imply changes in policy choices 
as in Pande (2003) and Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004). Both papers analyze the 
impact of changes on the composition of the electoral class due to mandated repre­
sentation in India and find an effect in policies implemented. Another strand of the
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literature, namely the studies on congressional careers such as Fiorina’s papers on 
professionalization or more recently, and following a structural approach, Diermeier 
et al (2002), focus on the processes of self-selection due to career motivation. In 
particular, Fiorina analyzed how the profile of members of the US congress changed 
overtime and the links between professionalism of politics and political affiliation. 
A basic argument underlines the conclusions of Fiorina’s studies, richer people with 
remunerative career prospects outside the government are reluctant to leave their 
posts to compete in elections because of a higher opportunity cost. Our findings, 
which we will discuss in greater detail below, are at odd with this conclusion. We 
argue that the reform increased the appeal of sitting in the executive of Italian local 
government and this changed dramatically the composition of the municipal political 
class by attracting a large number of high outside option/opportunity cost citizens.
Diermeier et al (2002) find that being a congress man increases wages after 
leaving office. The quality of the career prospect after a political career has a clear 
impact on the decision to come become candidates. However, if politicians are 
heterogeneous in term of ability and willingness to serve the voters interest, the 
final effect of the existence of an effect on post congressional occupations’ wages can 
have a positive or negative impact on voters welfare, depending on the circumstances 
that link politician types to their post congress rewards.
Issues on the type and quality of elected representatives are analyzed in more 
depth in the recent literature that focuses on the impact of politicians’ wages on 
their performance (from a pure moral hazard point of view) and on selection effects 
affecting the pool of possible candidates in the presence of politicians heterogeneity.
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In the political science literature, Squire (1992) finds that legislative profession­
alization led to an increase in legislative diversity. He observed a correlation between 
professionalization and a larger array of people running for the election and more 
representation of minorities. Reversing the perspective on the subject, Sollars (1994) 
studies the determinants of legislative pay. His study provides an insight on the wide 
diversity across states in the pay of the legislators within the Unites States.
Among recent political economy papers, Coate (1999) finds a relationship be­
tween pay and performance as measured in terms of quantity of legislation passed. 
In his analysis Coate does not find evidence that pay enhances performance in terms 
of economic growth, as one may expect if higher pays implied that better candidates 
(in terms of competence or motivation) participated in elections.
Messner and Polborn (2001), focusing on selection issues, provide a mode in 
which rising wages allows to achieve better performance. This contrast the findings 
of Poutvarra and Takalo (2003), who show that the value of holding office has non 
monotonic relationship with candidate quality.
The paper by Caselli and Morelli (2004), suggestively titled Bad Politicians, 
describes the incentives for competent and dishonest individuals to run for elections. 
One of their main conclusions is that the biggest incentive to seek political office 
may reside with those least fit (from a citizens welfare perspective) to run in the 
political arena. However, in their framework, increasing the reward to hold political 
offices provides a tool to balance perverse incentive and to increase the quality of 
the political class.
Finally, Besley (2003) combines moral hazard and adverse selection in analyzing
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the effect of paying politicians better on performance. Abstracting from ex ante 
and ex post selection, higher wages reduce the severeness of moral hazard issues in 
a context where political agents are disciplined by the elections1. However, wages 
have an impact also on the decision to participate to political life and on the ability 
of the political process to evaluate the incumbents performance. This is analyzed 
in a model where some politicians have policy preferences aligned to those of the 
voters (these “congruent” politicians will consequently implement these policies), 
while some “dissonant” politicians obtain rents from not implementing the voters’ 
preferred policy. The author finds that paying higher wages improves the pool 
of politicians by ensuring that there are more of the good guys. The intuition 
relies on the fact that the rents earned by dissonant politicians make political life 
more appealing than for the other group of politicians. However, the latter group 
stays longer in office and raising wages balances the effect of private rents. In this 
framework, a link is then established between wages and politicians characteristics.
In the literature on politics and politicians there is also an noteworthy tradition 
that appeals to the public motivation theme2 and contrasts the view of narrowly 
defined self interest advocated by the Chicago and Virginia schools. If in the context 
of the previously described analysis we allowed for benevolence (namely that the 
agents derive direct utility by helping voters) this would increase the number of
good politicians in the political class. Indeed, as noted in Besley (2003) if public
1 Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) made seminal contributions on the role election as disci­
plining mechanism.
2 The motivation theme is not just a feature of older analysis of the political and public admin­
istration careers. As an example Besley and Gathak (2004) study intrinsically motivated agents, 
and the interplay of intrinsic motivations (missions) and monetary rewards in career choices.
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motivation provided stronger motivation than the rents earned by the dissonant 
politicians deviating from the voters, then we should advocate for amateur politicians 
and low wages.
Our work departs from the discussion on politicians compensation in terms of 
wages. We exploit a natural experiment to understand how a change in the type of 
institutions in which politicians serve affects characteristics of the pool of politicians 
elected.
Since the reformed institutional asset implies that withholding support to the ex­
ecutive becomes very costly for the legislative board (as it would be followed by the 
removal of the incumbents and new election must be held to elect a new government 
for the town), a post in the executive becomes more appealing. In stable govern­
ments, that complete the legislature, elected representatives have more chances to 
implement electoral programme supported by a stable majority (as opposed to the 
empirical evidence of frequent reshuffling of majorities before the reform).3 The 
reform could also have an impact on ego rents, as it increased the political visibility 
of the mayor, which is directly elected and individually accountable, and its team 
(as it literally translates from a frequently used terminology in Italian “la squadra 
del sindaco”). Additionally, there could be an improvement also on the political 
career prospect. After 1993 we observe more and more frequently that some mayors
became prime political actors in the national political arena at a later stage.
3 Of course, the members of the legislative can also benefit from belonging to more stable govern­
ments that are able to complete the legislatures. We have argued extensively on this section why 
the executive incumbents profile should change, the relative impact and exact size of the changes 
induced by the reform on the political class in the legislative and executive porwer are addressed 
empirically in the econometric section of the paper.
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There are, hence, two major forces that increase the willingness of good politi­
cians to participate in the political life. The institutional change allows policy driven 
politicians to implement their policies more effectively. The selection issue is a strong 
driver of changes in the composition of the political class due to changes in the pool 
of representatives in the executive. After the elections, furthermore, citizens are in 
a better position to recognize and reward good politicians. Given the individually 
accountability of the leader of the executive for his (and his team) performance while 
in office, the political process allows for a better disciplining function of the election.
3.1.1 Empirical im plications
We argue that the introduction of the direct election of the head of the executive 
enhanced the value to be in office in the reformed executive power. Our identifying 
hypothesis is that the reform impact on education qualification and professional pro­
file of the elected officials affects primarily, if not exclusively, the executive power. 
This hypothesis is tested exploiting the natural experiment provided by the intro­
duction of the new electoral law.
The ability to make a precise prediction on where we expect to see the impact of 
the reform allows us to discard the possibility that the increase in quality empirically 
observed is just a cohort effect or that it is linked to an unobserved evolution of the 
political class unrelated to the reform in question. Our findings are particularly 
intriguing because in the absence of higher monetary rewards, we observe that a 
much larger proportion of “high outside opportunity cost” individuals joins the 
elected pool. This is consistent with some form of benevolence or public service
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motivation of the candidates (who arguably intrinsically value the possibility of 
implementing their preferred policies) and, on the monitoring side, the enhancement 
of the ability of the electors of rewarding or punishing according to the performance 
observed.
The selection of “better” candidates following institutional change, however, is 
not simply generated by the improvement in the pool of candidates. In the previous 
discussion we have abstracted from issues that could prevent translating a better 
pool of candidates in a better pool of incumbents. Such factors could be voters’ in­
ability to coordinate their votes to support higher quality candidates or party elites’ 
incentives (contrasting voters’ preferences) not to field some candidates types. Em­
pirically, we cannot directly take into account these other factors due to constrained 
data availability.
Using a unique database of almost 450 thousand elected representatives we test 
our identifying assumption, namely the prediction that the reform should improve 
the quality of the executive (leaving the quality of the legislative branch unaltered4) 
with respect to the education achievements of the members of the government and 
their professional characteristics. These characteristics are used as our empirical 
proxy to estimate changes in the quality of the political class.
Indeed, the empirical results are quite striking. The transition from parliamen­
tarism to presidentialism led to a massive increase in the number of graduate and
4 There are reasons to argue that the incumbents sitting in the legislative branch could be of 
even lower quality (this would be the case if e.g. the stock of high quality politicians was fix) or 
that the legislative should also improve marginally the quality of its members (this could be the 
case if there were some spillover effects for the enhanced quality of the government action and an 
incomplete separability of the relative merits of the two powers within the government). However, 
in both cases, the prediction would be that the reform should have a much stronger impact on the 
quality of the executive relative to the legislative power.
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senior professionals in the Italian local governments as a result of the changes in 
politicians qualifications and professional profile in the executive, which was the 
main target of the Italian electoral reform.
In addition to the analysis on education and professional profiles, we also provide 
a preliminary analysis of the impact of the reform on women’s representation in 
political life in Italian towns.
If a self-selection effect similar to the selection mechanisms described above ap­
plied to women’s decision to engage in the political arena, we then would expect 
to find increased women representation after the reform. If we were to develop the 
analysis from the claim that active participation in political life has higher costs 
for Italian women than for Italian men5, then it would follow that the higher value 
attached to holding a post in local governments after the reform should offset these 
higher costs to participation and increase the observed number of women represen­
tatives. It is far from obvious, however, that the very low women’s representation 
scores in Italy can be mostly attributable to self-selection issues. Italy consistently 
ranks at the bottom of European countries ranking in terms of the share of female 
incumbents (the most recent data published by Eurispes in 2004 show the following 
shares: nine per cent in the national parliament, fifteen per cent in the towns gov­
ernments, while if we focus on the executive the numbers are below five per cent in 
the national, local and regional governments).
This section of the empirical analysis is a preliminary investigation on the matter.
5 This could be due, for example, to the burden imposed on women by the need of taking care 
of the offsprings or other members of the family where alternatives (nurseries, baby sitters, carers 
etc.) are not available or affordable.
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The results we obtain show that the reform has increased overall women’s political 
representation in local governments. However, while in larger town women have 
been increasing their presence in the executive more than in the legislative after the 
reform, when we include in the sample all the towns with less than five thousands 
inhabitants, the result is reversed, and the higher increase in women participation 
takes place in the legislative. Future research will focus on understanding the nature 
of these empirical regularities and will investigate further the importance of consti­
tutional design and the interplay of constitutions with other socioeconomic factors 
in regard to political representation and gender issues.
3.2 D ata and empirical strategy
Our empirical analysis is based on a very large panel data set on elected representa­
tives in Italian municipal governments. This data provides information on the date 
and place of election of all incumbents in all Italian towns from 1989 to the end 
of 2001. Most importantly, the database also includes detailed information on the 
degree qualification and profession, as well as other demographic information (that 
includes the date of birth and gender of the elected representatives). With these 
data we construct an index of educational achievement and a four way occupational 
classification. The educational index has four categories constructed from the Ital­
ian education system: elementary (schooling up to age 10), medium (schooling up 
to age 13), high school (schooling up to age 18-19) and university (graduate and 
postgraduate titles). With respect to the politicians’ careers outside politics, we
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have created a four way taxonomy of professional occupation. The first is made of 
figures such as directors, CEO, professionals, academics and so on. The second is 
mainly composed of workers with administrative functions, bureaucrats. A third 
one is labelled under services, while the last category is a residual one obtained by 
grouping workers of different sectors. A detailed list of all groups is available in the 
data appendix.
In 2000 a decree modified the local governments officials’ compensation, which 
did not change during the nineties. The monthly wage of mayors changes according 
to the size of the town and whether or not it is a head of province or region mu­
nicipality. The pay of the other members of the executive are a share (that ranges 
between .15 and .75 according to the town size) of the mayor’s compensation. The 
members of the legislature receive a fix amount of money for each presence in the 
council board (the so called token). However, the statute of a town can allow for the 
payment of a monthly wage in lieu of the session tokens. Table 3.21 in this chapter 
appendix shows how wages vary according to municipal size.
3.2.1 D escriptive statistics
Aggregate political class changes in local governments
The change before and after the reform in educational achievement of the elected 
is evident from a look at the raw data reported in Tables 3.1-3.3. We show here 
the change in share of each degree qualification before and after the reform. These 
percentage changes have been calculated by subtracting the share of a certain degree 
qualification in the pre-reform sample from the share of that degree qualification in
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the post-reform sample. Straightforward comparisons in the number of politicians 
holding a certain degree are not informative, given the larger number of observations 
after the reform.
By first looking at the aggregate data (not distinguishing between legislative and 
executive) in the whole sample, we note small variations of one or two percentage 
point extra of representatives both in the high school and university degree categories 
respectively. However, if we focus on the sample of towns with more than 5000 
inhabitants changes emerge very clearly: there is a sharp increase in the number of 
graduates while intermediate levels of education fall. The rationale of looking at 
different samples according to municipality size is twofold. On one hand, before the 
reform, elections in towns with less than 5000 inhabitants were characterized by 
procedures that differed from those applied in larger towns (as the Italian political 
scientist Gianfranco Pasquino noted smaller towns already applied a majoritarian 
system). Hence the effect of the reform should be stronger in larger municipalities. 
On the other hand we argue that the prestige and status associated with holding a 
post in the executive increases with the size of the municipality.
The 15000 inhabitants threshold is designed to capture some potential hetero­
geneity across towns due to the details of the 1993 electoral law. As we mentioned 
in Chapter 1, the new reform established that in municipalities of more than 15000 
inhabitants if no candidate secured the majority of votes in the first round, the 
election would be resolved by runoffs between the two most voted candidates.
Narrowing down progressively the sample by excluding smaller towns this pat­
tern becomes increasingly striking. By focusing the sample of cities with 50000
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inhabitants or more we detect a 7% fall in the number of those with a high school 
title, whereas the number of graduate increases by 15%.
Simple correlations, reported in Table 3.2, of the education measure with the 
size of the town and age display a positive sign. On aggregate women representative 
have lower level of education and, as one may expect, education is on average higher 
in larger towns.
The descriptive statistics on occupation also display visible dynamics. As we 
observe in Table 3.3, the number senior profiles and professionals (Category 1) 
expands by a two digit figure while the number of those employed with bureaucratic 
or administrative functions (Category 2) and in "services" fall sharply6.
C hanges in th e  legislative and  executive b ranches
Changes in education  The descriptive statistics of educational achievement for 
the legislative branch of the government and the executive are reported in Table 3.4. 
The figures reported suggest clearly that the increase in the number of graduates is 
a phenomenon largely driven by changes taking place in the executive (for example 
the increase is 4-17% for towns with 15000 inhabitants or more). As we narrow the 
sample to towns with more than 5000 inhabitants, we observe how the number of 
graduates actually decreases in the legislative branch. Overall there is consistent 
evidence across samples of a decrease in the highest and lowest levels of education 
in the legislature, whereas the number of elected members with a high school title
increases. In the executive however, the only category which is (dramatically) scaled
6 A detailed list of all occupational categories is available in the data appendix. Other categories 
omitted in these descriptive tables display changes of the order of less than 1%.
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up is the graduates’ one, a change balanced by a discrete fall in the number of 
representatives with lower levels of education.
Changes in professional com position When looking at changes in professional 
composition, paralleling the evidence just described for education, there is clearly 
a different pattern emerging in the two government branches. We witness a major 
intake in Category 1 (Professionals) and a sharp fall in Category 2 (Administratives). 
This change has also been observed in sociological analysis of the impact of the 
reform on the political class, Bettin-Lattes and Magnier (1995) note in their survey 
paper that the “area of recruitment, traditionally centered on public bureaucracy, 
changes with the inrush of new social categories”. While the sign of this substitution 
across categories is the same in the executive and legislative, its magnitude in the 
executive is, according to different sampling, three or four times the legislature’s one 
(see Table 3.5).
These occupational categories are quite coarse, by looking at changes in details it 
emerges that the fastest increasing category in the executive is the one of university 
professors, followed by the number of professional accountants. In larger cities we 
observe an increase in the number of CEO’s and owner-entrepreneurs as well.
3.2.2 The em pirical strategy
We are constrained by data availability to focus only on the sample of elected repre­
sentatives. A richer research agenda would have been followed had the information 
been available for candidates as well as elected politicians. Ideally one would include
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in the analysis the pool of candidates to observe how the change in electoral insti­
tutions alters the characteristics of candidates fielded. We would have then been 
able to complement this analysis with the study we are implementing here, to disen­
tangle this effect from the final outcome observed, namely the composition in terms 
of education and skills of the elected. This final outcome is jointly determined by 
changes in the pool of candidates with certain characteristics and the demand for 
such candidates (or ability to coordinate) displayed by voters in the elections.
The purpose of the chapter is to identify the impact of institutional change on 
the type of elected politicians. The identifying assumption is that the change is 
driven mainly by the effect of the reform on the executive power. We have tested 
this hypothesis by running a separate set of estimates for the education measure and 
for occupational indicators. We have also explored the impact of the constitutional 
changes on women’s political participation. To overcome computational constraints, 
we have followed different specifications for the education regressions. We have also 
focused on smaller samples to run the empirical analysis for the most cumbersome 
estimates. In what follows we describe, in separate sections for educational and 
professional dependent variables, the empirical strategy adopted and the results 
obtained. Our main results are provided by linear specification in panel fixed effect 
analysis (town and time effects) and clustered standard errors.
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3.3 Empirical evidence on education
The estimates in this section follow two different approaches. First we have inves­
tigated outcomes using as dependent variable our four-levels index of education. 
Then, guided by the first set results obtained, to obtain computationally feasible 
further estimates including fixed effects even in large samples, we have created an 
education dummy which takes value one when the elected representative has a uni­
versity degree and zero otherwise. Using this indicator as dependent variable has 
allowed us to run logit and probit regressions on panel data with town effects at 
the town level on the whole sample. In what follows we present and discuss our 
empirical estimates on the impact of the electoral reforms on educational outcomes.
The results we report for all linear specifications have been estimated by clus­
tering the standard errors at the town level. This has been done in order to take 
in account potential heteroskedasticity across different towns. While the robust 
standard errors are larger than the standard errors without clustering, the point 
estimates of the coefficients are in many cases identical (some differences show in 
the second and third decimal place) to those estimated without clustering and that 
the level of significance is generally unaffected. We also find negligible differences 
in the coefficients estimated in non linear estimations (that do not take account of 
the panel structure of the dataset) with clustered standard errors. This allows us to 
suggest that the non clustered estimation (namely the probit and logit panel analy­
sis) we provide as an appendix of this study are also estimating quite efficiently our 
coefficients of interest.
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3.3.1 R esults using an educational index
We anticipate and summarize now the core results of this section. By running 
several different specifications (including ordered logit and ordered probit estimates), 
we observe that the coefficient on the reform dummy alone is positive and very 
significant in all regressions. Once we include the interaction term with the executive 
dummy, we detect a much stronger effect for the executive than the legislative on 
the increase of education levels. Narrowing down the sample to bigger cities and, the 
coefficient on the interaction increases dramatically, while the impact of the reform 
alone is either insignificant or even negative in some specifications that allow for the 
inclusion of town fixed effects.
The results for the whole sample are presented in Tables 3.6 and 3.7. The first 
two columns in Table 3.6 show the difference in education between the legislature 
and the executive before (Column 1) and after the reform (Column 2). We use as a 
dependent variable the educational index EDU (which takes value 0 for elementary 
(at school until 10 years), 1 for medium (at school until 13 years), 2 for high school 
(at school until 18-19 years) and 3 for university (graduate and postgraduate titles). 
The results are obtained by estimating the following specification for individual j  
elected in town i at time t with linear fixed effects panel regression:
EDUjn = cx.i-\- ft E X  EC  jit +  'yZn +  e ^ ,  (1)
where E X  EC  jit is the executive dummy, Za is the town population used as 
control, oti is a town fixed effect, aimed at capturing heterogeneity in taste for
CHAPTER 3. REPRESENTATION AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 131
education or availability of educated people at town level, and eja is the error 
component orthogonal to other regressors. The coefficient on the executive dummy is 
positive, significant a the 1% level, and much larger after the reform. This empirical 
evidence indicates clearly that, on average, there is a bigger gap in education among 
government branches after the reform.
We then proceed to estimate the two main equation of interest which include the 
reform and interaction indicators, namely:
EDUjn — on +  (3 ^ RE FO R M  jit +  /?2 E X  EC  jit +  'yZit e.jn (2)
and
EDUju = cx.i +  P iR E  FORM jn  +  @2 E X  E C  jit +  (3$ IN T E R ja  +  'yZa +  ejit, (3)
where R E F O R M  is an indicator dummy equal to one when the reform has 
taken place, IN T E R  is the product of the reform and executive dummy, hence only 
positive and equal to one for a representative elected after the reform and who is part 
of the executive, E X  EC  jit is the executive dummy, Zit is the town population, a* is 
a town fixed effect, and ejit is the error component orthogonal to other regressors. 
In equation two, the reform coefficient estimated without the interaction term is 
positive and significant at the 1% confidence level, however once we introduce the 
interaction (results in the last column of Table 3.6), its magnitude decreases (from 
0.184 to 0.152) and the interaction coefficient, equally significant, is positive (0.149).
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This implies that the effect of the reform on education is particularly stronger for 
the executive.
Interestingly, these results are robust to the inclusion of time effects. Table 3.7 
shows the results of the estimation of Equation 3 once yearly time dummies have 
been included. The magnitude of the interaction coefficient only decreases from 0.149 
to 0.145. Table 3.7 only shows the results for all Italian towns. The magnitude of 
the interaction coefficients increases when we focus on smaller samples by focusing 
on larger towns and cities.7
The dependent variable in the above estimated specifications is a categorical 
variable. Hence we have estimated equations 2 and 3 with ordered logit and ordered 
probit estimates. The results, which are shown and commented in appendix of 
this chapter, confirm the pattern observed in linear specifications and suggest very 
strongly that in larger towns the reform only increased educational levels in the 
executive. In the appendix we also show the results obtained in samples where 
smaller towns have been excluded.
Explaining the determinants of the “town fixed effect” taste for educated 
politicians
In this section we attempt to shed some light on the determinants of the towns fixed 
effect taste for highly educated politicians. In the absence of available data at the
town level, we have used ISTAT 2001 data on all the Italian Provinces8. The data
7The results are not shown, but can be provided upon request. The coefficient of the interaction 
is equal to 0.219 for towns with more than 5000 inhabitants, to 0.308 for towns with more than 
15000 inhabitants and to 0.281 in towns with more than 50000 inhabitants.
8 This information is not available on a yearly basis, hence it cannot be used directly as a control 
in estimating equations 1-3.
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available include information on various characteristics: geography9, demography, 
and socioeconomic variables. We report in Table 3.8 the results of the estimation 
of the town fixed effects on population, share of students in elementary schools 
relative to total population and share of students in high schools, unemployment, 
value added, value added arising from financial services, the share of plains on to­
tal surface, the share of mountains, the number of houses/flats. We ran a simple 
OLS regression using as right hand side variable the saved fixed effects from the 
estimation of equation 3. From this analysis, we find that the size of a province, its 
economic prosperity and the number of students in high school education relative to 
total population have a positive impact on the fixed effect taste for highly educated 
politicians. Other specifications yielded similar results but with an overall lower 
fitness (as captured by the adjusted R-square).
3.3.2 R esults on university education
In the light of this evidence, we have adopted a different strategy to be able to control 
for fixed effects in the whole sample even when we adopt non linear estimation of 
the impact of the reform on the compositions in term of education of the elected 
representatives. In particular, we want to investigate further the joint phenomenon 
of a substantial increase of number of graduates in the executive is associated with 
a fall or a negligible effect of the reform on the share of graduates in the legislative.
To do so we use an indicator dummy that takes the value one only for incumbents
9 Geographical variables are historically correlated in Italy with a different evolution of the local 
economies and industrial specialization.
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with a university degree. In what follows we outlay and discuss our specifications 
and findings.
We have estimated on the whole panel the following specification using linear 
probability model with fixed effects at the town level as well as probit and logit 
analysis, the latter including fixed effects.
GRAD jn  =  a,i +  ^R E F O R M ju  +  /?2 E X  E C  jit +  (3-^ 1 N T  ER jn  +  'yZn +  ejit- (4)
For individual j  elected in town i at time t , GRAD  is an indicator variable that 
assumes value one for graduate elected representatives, while all other variables are 
defined as in the previous specifications. In some specifications we also add as an 
additional control the town total population as a measure of size. In all cases, 
the estimated coefficient on the reform dummy when included alone is positive and 
significant, see Tables 3.9. 10 However, when we also include the interaction dummy 
then the interaction term is much larger than the effect captured by the reform 
dummy alone and the reform dummy is negative and significant. With reference 
to significance of the reform coefficient in all specifications we note that the results 
are more significant now that we account properly for the panel structure of the 
database. The diverging path between the legislative, which is slightly deteriorating 
in terms of education, and the executive, where we observe a massive intake of 
graduates is pictured clearly by the estimates. We show in appendix the results for
on university education estimated in the sample of lager towns only.
10Tables 3.12 and 3.13 show results estimated with logit and probit estimation.
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These results are robust to the inclusion of time effects. Table 3.10 shows the 
results of the estimation of Equation 4 once yearly time dummies have been in­
cluded, the coefficients of the executive and interaction dummies remain virtually 
unchanged, while the reform coefficient is larger, positive and always significant once 
the yearly time effects have been included in the specification.
P olitica l affiliation
We have performed a preliminary exploration of this issue in a sample of roughly 
280000 observations where the classification of governments as right or left wing did 
not involve an excessive amount of discretion in interpreting the available data on 
party affiliation. The results show that the inclusion of a political dummy for left 
wing affiliation does not affect the significance and magnitude of the coefficients es­
timated without the political dummy. However, findings also show that the political 
affiliation dummy is negative (this holds across samples of cities of different size). 
An interaction between the political dummy and the reform dummy is included in 
an alternative specification. This interaction term is always positive and significant 
and it offsets completely the negative impact of the political dummy in reformed 
government. This suggests that the gap in education between elected politicians 
of different affiliation narrows (or disappears entirely in the overall sample) after 
the reform is introduced. Table 3.11 presents these results. A richer specification 
shown in this table also allows for interactions between the executive and the po­
litical dummy and a triple interaction between the reform dummy, the executive 
dummy and the political dummy. The latter interaction term is very significant and
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positive for towns of all sizes and in the sample of towns with 5000 inhabitants or 
more. This finding can be interpreted as evidence that the number of graduates 
in the executive after the reform is introduced increases particularly for left wing 
representatives. This is not emerging, however, in the restricted sample of towns 
with 15000 inhabitants or more.
3.4 Empirical evidence on occupation
In this section we turn to the analysis of the impact of the institutional change on the 
professional profile of elected representatives. We have estimated a multinomial logit 
using as a dependent variable our occupation variable Pk,ke{  1 ,2,4), (occupations 
have been classified as follows CategorylrProfessionals, Category2:Administratives,a 
residual Category3, and Category4:Services). Where computationally feasible, for 
the smaller sample of bigger cities we have also included town fixed effects.
We have, as in the previous specification, included an indicator dummy for the 
reform, a dummy variable for the executive and an interaction variable of the reform 
and executive dummies. Hence, we estimate for each occupational category k,
Pkjit =  P k i R E F O R M k j i t  +  Pk2E X EC kj i t  +  P k $ IN T E R k j i t  +  If k^kit +  e kjit, (5)
where j  denotes individuals, i towns and t time. Standard errors have been 
clustered at the town level to account for potential heteroskedasticity.
In Table 3.14 we report the results for the whole sample. In the first three
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columns are displayed the results of a simple specification that includes only the 
reform dummy and controls. The estimated coefficients confirm the positive impact 
in the number of professional and executives (positive and significant coefficient for 
Category 1), and the fall in the number of bureaucrats and workers in the services 
sector, already visible in simple descriptive statistics presented in an earlier section.
Once the executive and the interaction dummies are also included, we see how the 
impact of the reform on the number of professionals is much bigger in the executive. 
This effect is captured by the interaction dummy which is very significant and of a 
much larger magnitude. Furthermore, when we add population as a right hand side 
variable the coefficient on the reform dummy becomes negative. In the appendix we 
show results on the sensitiveness of the analysis with respect to the size of the town 
and town fixed effects. Additional results obtained by estimating the impact of the 
reform on the share of a certain occupation in the overall sample11 confirm that the 
number of professional increased more visibly in the executive than in the legislature 
(the interaction dummy in the professional equation is positive and significant).
Table 3.15 shows the estimation results once time effects have been included in 
the analysis. Again, we find evidence that the number of professionals is increas­
ing particularly in the executive of Italian governments. This effect is stronger in 
larger towns, as documented by the significance and magnitude of the interaction 
coefficient. The reform impacts positively on the number of professionals only in the 
overall sample. Once we focus on larger town the reform coefficient is either negative
and significant or very insignificant (and positive). The dynamics of change pre and
11 These results were obtained by linear panel estimation with town fixed effects and robust 
standard errors.
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post reform for other occupations are somewhat more sensitive to the sample and 
town size.
To assess the robustness of these results we have investigated the importance of 
political affiliation in this context. It may be that right wing candidates and incum­
bents are politicians generally associated with a higher status and more remunerative 
careers (or vice versa, i.e. that left wing politicians on average are associated with 
better professions). If that was the case, the impact of the reform might capture the 
fact that more right wing candidates (for the sake of this example) secured a seat 
after the elections and our analysis of the impact of the electoral change might be 
affected due to this correlation between political affiliation and professional profile. 
We have performed a preliminary exploration of this issue in a sample of roughly 
280000 observations where the classification of governments as right or left wing did 
not involve an excessive amount of discretion in interpreting the available data on 
party affiliation. When a dummy for left wing politicians is included in equation 5 
we find that its coefficient is insignificant for the administratives and professionals 
categories, whereas it is significant to the 5 per cent level and positive (0.048) in the 
services category when time effects are included. More importantly, perhaps, the 
significance and magnitude of the coefficients for the reform and executive dummy 
and their interaction decrease marginally once we include the political dummy. This 
is also the case when the political dummy is included also as an interaction with the 
reform dummy. The estimated coefficients for the political dummies are sensitive to 
the inclusion of the interacted term and to towns and sample size. These results are 
shown Table 3.16 (no time effects) and Table 3.17 (including time fixed effects).
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3.5 W omen’s representation
This section investigates the evidence on female participation to political life, which 
in Italy is notoriously very low. We have estimated on the whole panel the following 
specification using linear probability model with fixed effects.
Fjit = cn~\~ P iR E  FO R M  jit +  /?2 E X E C  jit +  fl^I N T  ER jn  -f- 'yZn +  ejn- (4)
As in previous specification we have included an interaction term between the 
reform and the executive dummy. The results presented in Table 3.18 show that in 
all samples the reform has increased the presence of women in Italian local govern­
ments. However, if we take a closer look at the distribution of this larger female 
participation to political life across the executive and the legislative branches, we 
see that a different pattern emerges when we focus on a smaller sample by excluding 
towns with less than 5000 inhabitants. In the entire sample, the increase in women’s 
numbers in the legislature is higher than in the executive. The opposite holds for 
bigger towns, and the gap widens as we restrict the sample of local governments to 
bigger towns. This result does not have an obvious interpretation and we are un­
aware of any discussion on the issue in the sociology of politics and political science 
literatures. One tentative explanation could rely on the fact in larger towns not 
fielding female candidates in the executive team is politically more costly than in 
smaller village. However, the lack of available information on the pool of candidates 
make this type of conjecture particularly weak and we are not assisted by any type 
of anecdotal evidence on the topic.
CHAPTER 3. REPRESENTATION AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 140
Very preliminary results on the importance of political affiliations indicate a pos­
itive correlation between women’s representations and a left wing dummy. Once 
an interaction between political affiliation and the reform is introduced, we observe 
that the coefficient on the interaction term is much smaller than the coefficient on 
the direct effect of the political dummy, and only significant to the 1 0  per cent level 
once time effects are included (without time effects the coefficient is insignificant). 
These results are shown in the appendix (Table 3.38).
3.5.1 R obustness checks
We have investigated the possibility that increased participation in political life 
at the local level could be simply explained by a time trend (even if no such trend 
emerges in the national political arena). The results obtained by estimating equation 
four including time fixed effect are almost identical to the estimated coefficients 
without including time fixed effects, as we can see from Table 3.19, the estimates 
differ only in the third decimal place in the overall sample. Similarly, though the 
coefficient on the reform dummy becomes larger, the same pattern emerges in the 
estimates that focus on the sample of towns with more than 5000 inhabitants.
We have also estimated equation four using panel logit analysis with two-way 
fixed effects (town and year level). The results shown in Table 3.19, confirm the 
same pattern in signs and significance. By looking at the last two columns, we 
find further evidence that a clear strengthening of female presence in the executive 
emerges as the sample narrows to bigger cities.
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3.5.2 Explaining th e  tow ns fixed effect on w om en’s participation
As we did previously for the results on education, in this section we attempt at 
providing an explanation for the town fixed effects on women participation. We ran 
several specification using as left hand side variable the fixed effects emerging from 
equation 4 and as regressors information taken from the 2001 ISTAT database on 
Italian provinces.
Table 3.20 shows the results, overall the regressions display a lower goodness of 
fit, but the effects are similar to those found in analyzing educational fixed effects. 
The goodness of fit improves, however, when we focus on larger towns. As for the 
analysis on education, the province size in terms of population has a positive sign. 
Value added and the number of students enrolled in high school are also positively 
correlated with larger numbers of female politicians. Above 5000 inhabitants, the 
unemployment coefficient becomes negative. The average size of the family variable, 
that may be expected to be negatively correlated with women’s participation to 
political life a priori (assuming that having a larger family reduces the time available 
for politics), has a negative and significant coefficient. This evidence is suggestive, 
however it is maybe worth reminding the data shortcomings. We are using province 
level data to investigate the outcome of individual decisions and voters preferences at 
the town level. This preliminary evidence does not assist in interpreting the results 
discussed in the earlier sections, namely that women participation in smaller town is 
concentrated in the legislative, while in all municipalities with more than 5000 the 
large increase in women elected takes place in the executive.
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3.6 Conclusions
By looking at the composition of local Italian government in all Italian towns for 
over a decade we find strong evidence of the impact of institutional change on the 
characteristics of the political class. A reform that has stabilized local government 
and increased the appeal of executive posts has generated a strong intake of graduate 
representatives in governmental ranks. Moreover, the empirical results suggest that 
political career concern of professionals, professors and CEOs have been balanced 
by the increased attractiveness of the possibility of leading a town government, and 
attracted bigger numbers of such professional figures in local governments. Both the 
professional, and even more clearly, the educational change in politicians profiles are 
largely attributable to a strong renewal of the political class in local government ex­
ecutives. Women participation to political life has also increased, mainly by electing 
more women in the executive (for towns with more than 5000 inhabitants).
Constitutional engineering, on the bases of these results, seems an effective way 
to attract more educated citizens into office, even when their outside career op­
portunities are high and joining the governments rank would distract the elected 
representatives attention from a remunerative occupation. This evidence is drawn 
from local government politics, should arguably carry through a fortiori for national 
politics (on the basis of the conjecture that a post in the national government is 
more attractive than a seat in a town government). Our evidence then, contrasts 
the “Fiorina type wisdom” based on an opportunity cost argument, according to 
which “professional and proprietors may be reluctant to give up their more secure
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and more lucrative primary occupation” (Fiorina, 1999, p.974). A better explanation 
of our results would be highly assisted by new data on earnings which would allow 
to test directly the theoretical predictions of some of the models discussed in the 
introduction.
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3 . 7  A p p e n d i x
3 .7 .1  T a b le s
Table 3.1
Changes in education after the reform by degree qualification and
TOWN SIZE
Samples ByPopula tion
Education Category All Above 5000 Above 15000 Above 50000 Above 100000
Elementary -1.7% -0.5% -1% No change No change
Intermediate -1.1% -4% -3% -5% -4%
High School +1% -4% -7% -7% -7%
University +2% 7% +10% +11% +11%
Obs. before the reform 160886 ' 64812 25533 7279 3117
Obs. after the reform 283643 113272 48595 14032 5638
Notes: Source Minister of Internal Affairs. These differences have been calculated by subtracting the 
share of a certain degree qualification in the pre-reform sample from the share of the same degree in 
the post-reform sample. The education index has four categories, which have been constructed from 
the Italian education system: elementary (school up to age 10), intermediate (school up to age 13), 
high school (school up to age 18-19) and university (graduate and postgraduate degrees). 
Population is the town population, measured yearly.
Table 3.2
Education Correlations With Gender And Town Size
Simple Correlations With Towns Size And Gender Of Elected Representatives
Population Gender
Education .091 -.095
Observations 444529 444529
Notes: Source Minister of Internal Affairs. Gender is 1= Female, 0= Male. Population is the town 
population, measured yearly. The education index has four categories, which have been constructed 
from the Italian education system: elementary (school up to age 10), intermediate (school up to age 
13), high school (school up to age 18-19) and university (graduate and postgraduate degrees). 
Population is the town population, measured yearly.
Table 3.3
C h a n g e s  In  P r o f e s s io n  a f t e r  t h e  r e f o r m  b y  o c c u p a t io n a l  c a t e g o r y  a n d  T o w n
s iz e
SAMPLES BY POPULA TION
Occupational Category 
Professionals 
Administratives 
Not working 
Services
All
+6%
-7%
+5%
-4%
Above 5000 
+10% 
-7% 
+3% 
-5%
Above 15000 
+10% 
-7%
No change 
-5%
Above 50000 
+13% 
-10% 
-3.5% 
-3%
Above
100000
+13% 
-4% 
No change 
-9%
Obs. before the reform 
Obs. after the reform
160886
283643
64812
113272
25533
48595
7279
14032
3117
5638
Notes: Source Minister of Internal Affairs. These differences have been calculated by subtracting the 
share of a certain occupational category in the pre-reform sample from the share of the same 
occupational group in the post-reform sample. The first occupational category is made of figures
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such as directors, CEO, professionals, academics and so on. The second category is mainly 
composed of workers with administrative functions, bureaucrats. A third category groups non 
workers, while the last category groups workers in services. Other categories omitted here display 
changes of the order of less than 1%. Population is the town population, measured yearly.
Table 3.4
Changes In Education -  By Government Sector, degree qualification
AND TOWN SIZE
SAMPLES BY POPULA TION
Education Category All Above 5000
Legislative Executive Legislative Executive
Elementary -8% -6% -3% -3%
Intermediate +1% -5% ~ -7%
High School + 7% +3% + 5% -2%
University 0% +9% -1% +13%
Obs. before the reform 125306 35578 46945 17867
Obs. after the reform 222911 60732 85967 27305
Education Category Above 15000 Above 50000
Legislative Executive Legislative Executive
Elementary -2% -3% -1% -1%
Intermediate . -1% -8% -6%
High School + 5% -6% + 4% -11%
University -2% +17% -3% +18%
Obs. before the reform 18874 6659 5276 2003
Obs. after the reform 36991 11604 11071 2961
Education Category Above 10000
Legislative Executive
Elementary ~ —
Intermediate ~ -5%
High School + 3% -9%
University -3% +14%
Obs. before the reform 2234 883
Obs. after the reform 4440 1199
Notes: Source Minister of Internal Affairs. These differences have been calculated by subtracting the 
share of a certain degree qualification in the pre-reform sample from the share of the same degree in 
the post-reform sample. The education index has four categories, which have been constructed from 
the Italian education system: elementary (school up to age 10), intermediate (school up to age 13), 
high school (school up to age 18-19) and university (graduate and postgraduate degrees). 
Population is the town population, measured yearly.
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Table 3.5
Changes In Occupation In -  By Government Sector, occupational
CATEGORY AND TOWN SIZE
SAMPLES BY POPULATION
Occupational Category All Above 5000
Legislative Executive Legislative Executive
Professionals +3% +9% +3% +12%
Administratives -4% -5% -6% -9%
Not working -6% +5% +5% +4%
Services -1% -3% -3% -4%
Obs. before the reform 125306 35578 46945 17867
Obs. after the reform 222911 60732 85967 27305
Samples by population
Occupational Category Above 15000 Above 50000
Legislative Executive Legislative Executive
Professionals +4% +16% +5% +18%
Administratives -8% -14% -8% -15%
Not working +5% +4% +4% +1%
Services -3% -4% -4% -3%
Obs. before the reform 18874 6659 5276 2003
Obs. after the reform 36991 11604 11071 2961
Samples by population
Occupational Category Above 100000
Legislative Executive
Professionals +4% +15%
Administratives -6% -16%
Not working +4% +2%
Services -4% -2%
Obs. before the reform 2234 883
Obs. after the reform 4440 1199
Notes: Source Minister of Internal Affairs. These differences have been calculated by subtracting 
the share of a certain occupational category in the pre-reform sample from the share of the same 
occupational group in the post-reform sample. The first occupational category is made of figures 
such as directors, CEO, professionals, academics and so on. The second category is mainly 
composed of workers with administrative functions, bureaucrats. A third category groups non 
workers, while the last category groups workers in services. A detailed list of all groups is 
available in the data appendix. Other categories omitted here display changes of the order of less 
than 1%. Population is the town population, measured yearly.
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T a b l e  3 .6
Th e  d e t e r m in a n t s s  o f e d u c a t io n
Dependent variable: education index* - Linear panel estimates- Whole sample
Reform
Executive
Interaction
Population
Before the reform After the reform
Samples
Whole sample Whole sample Whole sample
0.09
[0.006]***
0.259
[0.004]***
0.184
[0.003]***
0.200
[0.003]***
0.152
[0.004]***
0.104
[0.006]***
0.149
[0.007]***
0.152
[0.004]***
0.104
[0.006]***
0.149
[0.007]***
-8.421
[18.660]
Town fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects No No No No No
Observations 160884 283643 444527 444527 444527
Number of Towns 8090 8164 8522 8522 8522
NOTES: 1 The education index has four categories, which have been constructed from the Italian education system: elementary=l (school up to age 10), 
intermediate=2 (school up to age 13), high school =3 (school up to age 18-19) and university=4 (graduate and postgraduate degrees). Estimation method: 
linear panel estimation. Robust standard errors, clustered at the town level, are reported in brackets.
*** Coefficients significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. Population is the log of town population, measured yearly. See the Data 
appendix for the construction and sources of the variables. The data are for all Italian towns and the time span covered is from 1989-2002. Reform is a dummy 
that captures all politicians elected with the new electoral law, Executive is a dummy that takes value one if the politicians is part of the executive, Interaction 
is a dummy that captures the interaction between the reform and executive variables.
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T a b l e  3 .7
T h e  d e t e r m in a n t s s  of e d u c a t io n
Dependent variable: education index* - Linear panel estimates-  Whole sample
Samples
Whole sample Whole sample Whole sample
Reform 0.177 0.211 0.167
[0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.009]***
Executive 0.202 0.108
[0.003]*** [0.005]***
Interaction 0.145
[0.0061***
Town fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 444527 444527 444527
Number of Towns 8522 8522 8522
NOTES: * The education index has four categories, which have been constructed from the Italian education system: elementary=l (school up to age 10), 
intermediate=2 (school up to age 13), high school =3 (school up to age 18-19) and university=4 (graduate and postgraduate degrees). Estimation method: 
linear panel estimation. Robust standard errors, clustered at the town level, are reported in brackets.
*** Coefficients significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. Population is the log of town population, measured yearly. See the Data 
appendix for the construction and sources of the variables. The data are for all Italian towns and the time span covered is from 1989-2002. Reform is a dummy 
that captures all politicians elected with the new electoral law, Executive is a dummy that takes value one if the politicians is part of the executive, Interaction 
is a dummy that captures the interaction between the reform and executive variables.
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Ta b l e  3 .8
E x p l a in in g  t o w n  f ix e d  e ffe c ts  o n  t h e  p o l it ic ia n s  ’ l e v e l  o f  e d u c a t io n *
S am ples b y  p o p u la tio n Whole sample Above 5000 Above 1500 Above 1500 Above 5000
Population 0.0020 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0000
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
High school education 1.4500 0.8811 1.8808 2.3372 1.4950
[0.107]*** [0.111]*** [0.1382]*** [0.1345]*** [0.158]***
Unemployment -0.0025 -0.0057 -0.0072 -0.0059 -0.0052
[0.0001]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0002]*** [0.0002]*** [0.0002]***
Value added 0.0110 0.0140 0.0150 0.0150 0.0140
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Plains -0.0737 -0.0301 -0.0104 -0.0323 -0.0649
[0.0027]*** [0.0032]*** [0.0045]** [0.0042]*** [0.0056]***
Mountains -0.0517 -0.1406 -0.1671 -0.1929 -0.2165
[0.0046]*** [0.0046]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.007]***
Value of exports -0.0030 -0.0070 -0.0060
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Number of houses -0.0003 -0.0027 -0.0081 -0.0079 -0.0077
[0.0000]*** [0.0000]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0002]***
Financial sector value added -0.1380 -0.1920 -0.1950 -0.1850 -0.2000
[0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.006]***
Household size 0.0312 0.0148 0.0577 0.0686 0.0287
[0.0050]*** [0.0054]*** [0.0069]*** [0.0069]*** [0.0079]***
Observations 256658 93627 35767 35767 22662
R-squared 0.31 0.27 0.34 0.33 0.24
NOTES: ^Dependent variable: town fixed effect obtained by estimating equation 3. Standard errors are reported in brackets. *** Coefficients significant at the 1% level, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. Estimation method: OLS. See the Data appendix for the construction and sources of the variables. Regressors measured at the province 
level in 2001. Population is total population in the province. High school education is the share of students in high school. Unemployment is the rate of unemployment in the 
province. Value added measures value added at the province level. Plains is the share of plains over the total province surface. Mountains is the share of mountains over the 
total province surface. Financial sector value added is the financial services component in Value Added. Household size measures the average family size in the province.
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T a b le  3.9
P o l it ic ia n s ’ U n iv e r s it y  E d u c a t io n
Dependent variable: university education dummy* - Linear panel estimates—  Whole sample
Reform 0.02 0.021 -0.002 -0.002
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.002] [0.001]***
Executive 0.083 0.018 0.018
[0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]***
Interaction 0.102 0.102
[0.004]*** [0.004]***
Town population -25.814
[9.411]***
Town fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects No No No No
Observations 444529 444529 444529 444529
Number of Towns 8522 8522 8522 8522
NOTES: 1 The university education dummy equals one when the incumbent is a graduate. Estimation method: linear panel estimation.
Robust standard errors, clustered at the town level, are reported in brackets. *** Coefficients significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 
1%. Population is the log of town population, measured yearly. See the Data appendix for the construction and sources of the variables. The data are for all 
Italian towns and the span covered is from 1989-2002. Reform is a dummy that captures all politicians elected with the new electoral law, Executive is a 
dummy that takes value one if the politicians is part of the executive, Interaction is a dummy that captures the interaction between the reform and executive 
variables.
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T a b l e  3 .1 0
Po l it ic ia n s ’ U n iv e r s it y  E d u c a t io n
Dependent variable: university education dummy* - Linear panel estimates—  Whole sample
Reform 0.042 0.056 0.026 0.026
[0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]***
Executive 0.085 0.020 0.020
[0.001]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]***
Interaction 0.100 0.100
[0.003]*** [0.003]***
Town population -25.814
[9.411]***
Town fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 444529 444529 444529 444529
Number of Towns 8522 8522 8522 8522
NOTES: t The university education dummy equals one when the incumbent is a graduate. Estimation method: linear panel estimation.
Robust standard errors, clustered at the town level, are reported in brackets. *** Coefficients significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. Population 
is the log of town population, measured yearly. See the Data appendix for the construction and sources of die variables. The data are for all Italian towns and the span covered 
is from 1989-2002. Reform is a dummy that captures all politicians elected with the new electoral law, Executive is a dummy that takes value one if the politicians is part of 
the executive, Interaction is a dummy that captures the interaction between the reform and executive variables.
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Ta b l e  3 .11
P o l it ic ia n s ’ U n iv e r s it y  E d u c a t io n  a n d  P o lit ic a l  A f f il ia t io n
Dependent variable: university education dummy* - Linear panel estimation -
Reform -0.007 -0.007 -0.014 -0.012 -0.024 -0.033 -0.029 -0.038 -0.045 -0.043
[0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.006]*** [0.007]***
Executive 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.018 -0.001 -0.001 0.006 -0.014 -0.014 -0.007
[0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.007]* [0.007]** [0.010]
Interaction 0.102 0.105 0.105 0.094 0.125 0.125 0.104 0.195 0.195 0.183
[0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.010]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.017]***
Left -0.007 -0.014 -0.011 -0.008 -0.017 -0.013 -0.025 -0.033 -0.029
[0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.006]*** [0.007]***
Left ♦Reform 0.014 0.009 0.017 0.010 0.014 0.009
[0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.006]* [0.008]* [0.009]
Left*Exec. -0.014 -0.016 -0.014
[0.005]*** [0.008]* [0.014]
Left*Exec*Ref 0.022 0.038 0.022
[0.008]*** [0.013]*** [0.023]
Town fixed
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 336171 281222 281222 281222 129814 129814 129814 56316 56316 56316
Towns 8450 8325 8325 8325 2259 2259 2259 651 651 651
NOTES:1 The university education dummy equals one when the incumbent is a graduate. Estimation method: panel logit estimation. Standard errors are reported in brackets. 
♦♦♦Coefficients significant at the 1% level, ♦♦ significant at 5%, ♦ significant at 1%. Population is the town population, measured yearly. See the Data appendix for the 
construction and sources of the variables. The data are for all Italian towns and the time span covered is from 1989-2002. Reform is a dummy that captures all politicians 
elected with the new electoral law, Executive is a dummy that takes value one if the politicians is part of the executive, Interaction is a dummy that captures the interaction 
between the reform and executive variables. Left is a dummy that equals one for politicians of the left. Left ♦Reform , Left*Exec and Left*Exec*Ref are interactions of the 
above defined variables.
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T a b le  3 .1 2
P o l it ic ia n s ’ U n iv e r s it y  E d u c a t io n
Dependent variable: university education dummy* - Panel logit estimation - Whole sample
Reform 0.124 0.134 -0.011 -0.011
[0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.009] [0.009]***
Executive 0.474 0.111 0.111
[0.009]*** [0.015]*** [0.015]***
Interaction 0.554 0.554
[0.018]*** [0.018]***
Town population -0.013
[0.010]
Town fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 432190 432190 432190 432190
Number of Towns 8155 8155 8155 8155
NOTES: 1 The university education dummy equals one when the incumbent is a graduate. Estimation method: panel logit estimation. Standard errors are reported in brackets. 
♦♦♦Coefficients significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. Population is the town population, measured yearly. See the Data appendix for the 
construction and sources of the variables. The data are for all Italian towns and the time span covered is from 1989-2002. Reform is a dummy that captures all politicians 
elected with the new electoral law, Executive is a dummy that takes value one if the politicians is part of the executive, Interaction is a dummy that captures the interaction 
between the reform and executive variables.
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T a b le  3 .13
P o l it ic ia n s ’ U n iv e r s it y  E d u c a t io n
Dependent variable: university education dummy? - Panel probit estimation - Whole sample
Reform 0.074 0.076 -0.001 -0.001
[0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005] [0.005]
Executive 0.288 0.085 0.086
[0.005]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]***
Interaction 0.312 0.311
[0.011]*** [0.011]***
Town population 0
[0.000]***
Observations 444529 444529 444529 444527
Number of Towns 8522 8522 8522 8522
NOTES: * The university education dummy equals one when the incumbent is a graduate. Estimation method: panel probit estimation.
Standard errors are reported in brackets. *** Coefficients significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. Population is the town population, 
measured yearly. See the Data appendix for the construction and sources of the variables. The data are for all Italian towns and the time span covered is from 1989-2002. 
Reform is a dummy that captures all politicians elected with the new electoral law, Executive is a dummy that takes value one if  the politicians is part of the executive, 
Interaction is a dummy that captures the interaction between the reform and executive variables.
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Table 3.14 
Changes in Occupations -  All Towns
Multinomial logit analysis onoccupational categories -  Whole sample
Prof. Admin. Services Prof. Admin.
Dependent Variables* 
Services Prof. Admin. Services Prof Admin. Services
Reform 0.076
[0.010]***
-0.216
[0.010]***
-0.565
[0.022]***
-0.080
[0.010]***
-0.212
[0.010]***
-0.565
[0.022]***
0.022
[0.009]**
-0.216
[0.009]***
-0.509
[0.016]***
-0.009
[0.009]
-0.238
[0.009]***
-0.526
[0.016]***
Interaction 0.249
[0.021]***
0.040
[0.021]**
-0.292
[0.039]***
0.353
[0.021]***
0.118
[0.020]***
-0.228
[0.039]***
Executive 0.635
[0.010]***
0.527
[0.010]***
0.156
[0.021]***
0.469
[0.017]***
0.499
[0.016]***
0.285
[0.028]***
0.338
[0.017]***
0.399
[0.016]***
0.203
[0.028]***
Town Pop 0.424
[0.006]***
0.311
[0.005]***
0.253
[0.010]***
Time fixed 
effects No No No No No No No No No No No No
Obs. 442187 442187 442187 442187 442187 442187 442187 442187 442187 442187 442187 442187
NOTES. Dependent variable: Cat 1 = professionals, Cat 2 = administrative, Cat 3 [omitted] = other sectors, Cat 4 = services. Estimation method: multinomial logit. 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the town level, are reported in brackets. *** Coefficients significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. 
Population is the log of town population, measured yearly. See the Data appendix for the construction and sources of the variables. The data are for all Italian towns and 
the time span covered is from 1989-2002. Reform is a dummy that captures all politicians elected with the new electoral law, Executive is a dummy that takes value one if 
the politicians is part of the executive, Interaction is a dummy that captures the interaction between the reform and executive variables.
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Table 3.15 
Changes in Occupations -  All Towns
Multinomial logit analysis on occupational categories - Various samples
Dependent Variables*
Prof. Admin. Services Prof. Admin. Services Prof. Admin. Services
Reform 0.102 -0.044 -0.026 -0.018 -0.331 -0.025 0.103 -0.237 -0.295
[0.029]*** [0.029] [0.062] [0.010]*** [0.075]*** [0.138]* [0.124] [0.139]* [0.264]
Interaction 0.354 0.083 -0.325 0.540 0.091 -0.001 0.677 0.152 -0.449
[0.021]*** [0.020]*** [0.040]*** [0.056]*** [0.057] [0.100] [0.119]*** [0.124] [0.210]**
Executive 0.340 0.433 0.297 0.296 0.492 0.290 0.332 0.568 0.354
[0.017]*** [0.016]*** [0.029]*** [0.044]*** [0.044]*** [0.073]*** [0.093]*** [0.093]*** [0.158]**
Town Pop 0.421 0.311 0.252 0.323 0.315 0.257 0.174 0.227 0.302
[0.006]*** [0.005]*** [0.009]*** [0.2831*** [0.025]*** [0.046]*** [0.043]*** [0.046]*** [0.079]***
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 442187 442187 442187 73561 73561 73561 21133 21133 21133
NOTES: 1 Dependent variable: Cat 1 = professionals, Cat 2 = administrative, Cat 3 [omitted] = other sectors, Cat 4 = services. Estimation method: multinomial logit. 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the town level, are reported in brackets. *** Coefficients significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. 
Population is the log of town population, measured yearly. See the Data appendix for the construction and sources of the variables. The data are for all Italian towns and 
the time span covered is from 1989-2002. Reform is a dummy that captures all politicians elected with the new electoral law, Executive is a dummy that takes value one if 
the politicians is part of the executive, Interaction is a dummy that captures the interaction between the reform and executive variables.
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T a b le  3 .1 6
C h a n g e s  in  O c c u p a t io n s  a n d  P o l it ic a l  A f f il ia t io n
Multinomial logit analysis on occupational categories -  Various samples
Whole sample Above 5000 inhabitants.
Dependent Variables Dependent Variablest Dependent Variablest Dependent Variables
Prof. Admin. Services Prof. Admin. Services Prof. Admin. Services Prof. Admin. Services
Reform 0.061 -0.25 -0.516 0.085 -0.258 -0.432 -0.239 -0.595 -0.913 -0.253 -0.662 -0.786
[0.016]*** [0.016]*** [0.028]*** [0.021]*** [0.020]*** [0.035]*** [0.032]*** [0.033]*** [0.065]*** [0.042]*** [0.042]*** [0.081]***
Interaction 0.272 0.119 -0.332 0.273 0.118 -0.326 0.561 0.267 -0.026 0.561 0.265 -0.016
[0.031]*** [0.031]*** [0.054]*** [0.031]*** [0.031]*** [0.054]*** [0.077]*** [0.082]*** [0.146] [0.077]*** [0.082]*** [0.147]
Executive 0.43 0.471 0.264 0.43 0.471 0.264 0.274 0.442 0.182 0.274 0.439 0.186
[0.019]*** [0.018]*** [0.030]*** [0.019]*** [0.018]*** [0.030]*** [0.045]*** [0.045]*** [0.072]** [0.045]*** [0.045]*** [0.072]**
Town Pop 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Left 0.013 -0.015 0.036 0.04 -0.021 0.104 . -0.091 -0.068 -0.003 -0.109 -0.138 0.09
[0.013] [0.013] [0.021]* [0.018]** [0.017] [0.027]*** [0.031]*** [0.030]** [0.048] [0.040]*** [0.041]*** [0.065]
Left* Reform -0.05 0.017 -0.168 0.026 0.127 -0.237
[0.023]** [0.022] [0.040]*** [0.051] [0.051]** [0.089]***
Time f.e. No No No No No No No No No No No No
Obs 280014 280014 280014 280014 280014 56006 56006 56006 56006 56006 56006
standard errors, clustered at the town level, are reported in brackets. *** Coefficients significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. Population is the 
town population, measured yearly. See the Data appendix for the construction and sources of the variables. The data are for all Italian towns and the time span covered is from 
1989-2002. Reform is a dummy that captures all politicians elected with the new electoral law, Executive is a dummy that takes value one if the politicians is part of the 
executive, Interaction is a dummy that captures the interaction between the reform and executive variables. Left is a dummy that equals one for politicians of the left. 
Left*Reform is an interaction of the above defined variables.
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T a b le  3 .1 7
C h a n g e s  in  O c c u p a t io n s  a n d  P o lit ic a l  A ff il ia t io n
Multinomial logit analysis on occupational categories -  Various samples
Whole sample
Dependent Variables* Dependent Variables 
Prof. Admin. Services Prof. Admin. Services
Above 5000 inhabitants.
Dependent Variables* Dependent Variables*
Prof. Admin. Services Prof. Admin. Services
Reform 0.219 0.024 0.116 0.238 0.018 0.2 -0.138 -0.394 -0.133 -0.152 -0.456 0.002
[0.039]*** [0.036] [0.068]* [0.041]*** [0.038] [0.071]*** [0.082]* [0.083]*** [0.153] [0.086]* [0.086]*** [0.157]
Interaction 0.27 0.083 -0.434 0.271 0.082 -0.428 0.56 0.224 -0.132 0.56 0.222 -0.123
[0.031]*** [0.031]*** [0.055]*** [0.031]*** [0.031]*** [0.055]*** [0.077]*** [0.082]*** [0.147] [0.077]*** [0.082]*** [0.148]
Executive 0.435 0.506 0.36 0.435 0.506 0.361 0.28 0.48 0.281 0.279 0.476 0.287
[0.019]*** [0.018]*** [0.031]*** [0.019]*** [0.018]*** [0.031]*** [0.045]*** [0.045]*** [0.075]*** [0.045]*** [0.045]*** [0.075]***
Town Pop 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Left 0.017 -0.008 0.049 0.041 -0.013 0.126 -0.092 -0.062 0.017 -0.109 -0.129 0.125
[0.013] [0.013] [0.021]** [0.018]** [0.017] [0.027]*** [0.031]*** [0.030]** [0.048] [0.041]*** [0.041]*** [0.065]*
Left* Reform -0.044 0.013 -0.191 0.026 0.122 -0.269
[0.023]* [0.022] [0.041]*** [0.051] [0.052]** [0.089]***
Tim e f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 280014 280014 280014 280014 280014 280014 56006 56006 56006 56006 56006 56006
NOTES:1 Dependent variable: Cat 1 = professionals, Cat 2 = administrative, Cat 3 [omitted] = other sectors, Cat 4 = services. Estimation method: multinomial logit. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at the town level, are reported in brackets. *** Coefficients significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. Population is town 
population, measured yearly. See the Data appendix for the construction and sources of the variables. The data are for all Italian towns and the time span covered is from 
1989-2002. Reform is a dummy that captures all politicians elected with the new electoral law, Executive is a dummy that takes value one if  the politicians is part of the 
executive, Interaction is a dummy that captures the interaction between the reform and executive variables. Left is a dummy that equals one for politicians of the left. 
Left* Reform is an interaction of the above defined variables.
159
T a b le  3.18 
W o m en ’s  r e p r e s e n ta t io n *
__________________________________________________ Samples by population_______________________________________________________
Whole sample___________________ Above 5000 inhabitants_______________ Above 15000 inhabitants______________ Above 50000 inhabitants.
Reform 0.08 0.079 0.085 0.055 0.055 0.049 0.042 0.042 0.031 0.024 0.025 0.012
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]**
Executive -0.028 -0.011 -0.004 -0.018 0.011 -0.017 0.016 -0.015
[0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.008]*
Interaction -0.027 0.022 0.043 0.049
[0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.006]*** [0.010]***
Population 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Towns effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of towns 8522 8522 8522 2263 2263 2263 652 652 652 139 139 139
Observations 444527 444527 444527 178084 178084 178084 74128 74128 74128 21311 21311 21311
NOTES: *The dependent variable is a dummy =1 for women and =0 for men. Estimation method: linear panel estimation. Standard errors are reported in brackets. *** 
Coefficients significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. See the Data appendix for the construction and sources of the variables. The data are for 
all Italian towns, and the time span covered is from 1989-2002. Reform is a dummy that captures all politicians elected with the new electoral law, Executive is a dummy 
that takes value one if the politicians is part of the executive, Interaction is a dummy that captures the interaction between the reform and executive variables. Population 
is the town population, measured yearly.
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Table 3.19 
Women’s representation*
Linear panel estimation Logit panel estimation
Whole sample Above 5000 Whole sample Above 5000 Above 15000 Above 50000
inhabitants. inhabitants. inhabitants inhabitants.
Reform 0.087 0.059 0.785 0.565 0.353 0.133
[0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.033]*** [0.049]*** [0.077]*** [0.136]
Executive -0.012 -0.019 -0.221 -0.328 -0.335 -0.264
[0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.024]*** [0.036]*** [0.059]*** [0.100]
Interaction -0.026 0.024 -0.072 0.375 0.578 0.606
[0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.027]*** [0.041]*** [0.067]*** [0.117]
Towns effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 444527 178084 439600 177283 73921 21311
N. of towns 8522 2263 8367 2248 649 139
NOTES: *The dependent variable is a dummy =1 for women and =0 for men. Estimation method: linear panel estimation in columns 2-3 and logit estimation in 
columns 4-7. Standard errors are reported in brackets. *** Coefficients significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. See the Data appendix 
for the construction and sources of the variables. The data are for all Italian towns, and the time span covered is from 1989-2002. Reform is a dummy that captures 
all politicians elected with the new electoral law, Executive is a dummy that takes value one if the politicians is part of the executive, Interaction is a dummy that 
captures the interaction between the reform and executive variables. Population is the town population, measured yearly.
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T a b l e  3 .2 0
E x p l a in in g  t o w n  f ix e d  e f f e c t s  o n  w o m e n ’s  r e p r e s e n t a t io n !
Samples by population
Whole Above Above Above Above Above
sample 5000 1500 1500 50000
Population 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
High school education 1.268 1.754 1.9963 2.009 1.782 1.907
[0.023]*** [0.031]*** [0.043]*** [0.042]*** [0.051]*** [0.061]***
Unemployment 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0004
[0.000]
***oooo
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000] [0.000]***
Value added 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.0050 0.005 0.005
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Plains 0.0169 0.0240 0.0302 0.0297 0.0313 0.0321
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]***
Mountains -0.020 -0.038 -0.019 -0.020 -0.012 -0.007
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]***
Value of exports -0.0010 -0.0010 0.0000
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]
Number of houses -0.013 -0.251 -0.449 -0.446 0.854 0.853
[0.000]*** [0.007]*** [0.031]*** [0.031]*** [0.070]*** [0.095]***
Financial sector value -0.0980 -0.0950 -0.0830 -0.0830 -0.0920 -0.0960
added
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]***
Household size -0.076 -0.067 -0.060 -0.060 -0.070 -0.073
[0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]***
Observations 256658 93627 35767 35767 22662 16164
R-squared 0.07 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.19 0.20
NOTES: ^Dependent variable: town fixed effect obtained by estimating equation 4 (impact of the reform 
on women participation to political life). Method of estimation: OLS. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. *** Coefficients significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. See the 
Data appendix for the construction and sources of the variables. The data are for all Italian towns, unless 
otherwise specified. The regressors are measured at the province level in 2001. Population is total 
population in the province. High school education is the share of students in high school relative to total 
province population. Unemployment is the rate of unemployment in the province. Value added measures 
value added at the province level. Plains is the share of plains over the total province surface. Mountains 
is the share of mountains over the total province surface. Financial sector value added is the financial 
services component in Value Added. Household size measures the average family size in the province.
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Table 3.21 
Politicians’ Wages and Session Tokens
Mayor
Executive 
Vice Mayor Executive
Legislature 
Session Token
Town Size 
(inhabitants) (€) (€) (€) (€)
up to1000 1290 194 129 17
1001-3000 1445 289 217 18
3001-5000 2168 434 325 18
5001-10000 2787 1394 1254 18
10001-30000 3097 1703 1394 22
30001-50000 3458 1902 1556 36
50001-100000 4130 3097 2478 36
100001-250000 5007 3755 3004 36
250001-500000 5781 4336 3758 59
more than 500000 7795 5846 5066 103
Wages and tokens as of dl. N .l 19,4-4-2000. Extra bonuses are paid in metropolitan areas (Turin, 
Milan, Venice, Genoa, Bologna, Florence, Roma, Bari, and Naples) and in towns that are head of a 
province or region.
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3.7.3 A dditional results: educational index
N on linear specifications and sensitiveness analysis w ith  respect to  tow ns  
population
Our dependent variable, the educational index, is a categorical variable, hence we 
have proceeded to estimate the same specifications (equations 2 and 3), without fixed 
effects using the ordered logit and ordered probit estimates. Table 3.22 reports the 
estimated coefficients. The pattern is paralleling clearly the linear estimations, the 
effect of the reform is significant and positive, but much stronger for the executive.
Table 3.23 shows the linear estimates of equations 1-3 in the sample of towns 
which have 15000 inhabitants or more. Once the interaction is included, the reform 
coefficient is insignificantly different from zero, while the interaction is positive, very 
significant and bigger than in the whole sample (0.309).
The results from estimating equations 2-3 non linearly by ordered logit and probit 
methodology (Table 3.24) show that the reform coefficient is insignificant and small. 
The interaction coefficient roughly increases by 30 per cent with respect to the 
whole sample suggesting that the effect is stronger once we exclude from the sample 
very small towns. We have also run ordered logit estimates with town fixed effects 
in this sample and obtained a reform coefficient, reported in Table 3.14, which is 
insignificantly different from zero. Similarly, for ordered probit estimates with town 
random effects, the reform coefficient remains insignificant, while the interaction is 
again strongly significant and positive. In contrast to the results obtained for the 
whole sample, there is no increase in education due to the reform in the legislative 
branch. One explanation of this set of results could be that in bigger towns the level 
of education in the political class was higher than in smaller towns, hence the reform 
has had no visible impact on this government branch. The executive instead, once 
made more powerful by the new rules, has been the only pole of attraction for the 
new intake of representatives with higher education. We present in table 3.25 some 
non linear estimates with fixed effects.
The results for the smaller sample of 50000 inhabitants or more are presented in 
Tables 3.26-3.28. For brevity we comment the outcomes of ordered logit analysis 
with fixed effects only. The reform coefficient is negative and positive once the 
interaction term is included. This suggest that for larger towns, there is actually a 
positive and stronger “boost” in education for the executive while the legislature is 
actually worsening the educational score. One interpretation of these result is that 
the differential impact of the reform is particularly visible in larger towns because 
of the higher status attached being in office. For these posts, there is more fierce 
competition to gain a more influential seat in the executive, and this is resulting in a 
strong increase in the profile of elected representatives in these governments. In part 
this increased education in the executive could be generated by a flow of educated 
politicians from the legislative to the more appealing (after the reform) executive 
seats.
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3.7.4 A dditional results: university education
In estimating the effect of the reform on representatives’ university education, even 
stronger results emerge from the estimates drown from smaller samples of larger 
towns. The results are shown in tables 3.29-3.34. The pattern in terms of signs 
and significance is the same as in the whole sample, however the magnitude of the 
coefficients is much larger, in particular for the interaction term. Again we note 
the reform has a positive impact on the executive educational levels and a negative 
impact on the legislature ones, as our identifying assumption maintains.
3.7.5 A dditional results: occupation
In this section we discuss the results obtained from the sensitiveness analysis with 
respect to towns population and town fixed effects.
In Table 3.35 and 3.36, narrowing down the sample first to towns with more than 
15000 inhabitants and then more than 50000, we confirm the results of the whole 
sample.
The reform dummy alone is negative and significant for all the three categories, 
however once including the interaction we see a departing path for the executive 
and legislative after the reform. In Table 3.35, for Category 1, there is a substantial 
increase in the executive and a fall in the legislative. The number of administratives 
falls in the legislature and remains virtually unchanged in the executive. For the 
last category there is a decrease in both government’s branches.
In Table 3.36 the estimates show the same effect on Category 1, namely we note 
indeed a sharp increase of professionals in the executive and a fall elsewhere.
We can summarize this evidence by arguing on the basis of strongly significant 
estimates that the intake of directors, university professors, professionals and senior 
executives is a feature extremely evident in the executive branch of the govern­
ment. Moreover, focusing on towns with 15000 inhabitants and more, we see how 
there is less and less of such figures elected in the legislative board, marking a clear 
differentiation in terms of professional composition of the two governmental powers.
In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity of Italian cities, we have included 
fixed effects at the town level, ai, and estimated the following specification in the 
sample of bigger cities (above 50000):
Pkjit — ai +  +  (3k2E X E C  +  P O I N T E R  +  7 kZa -I- ekjit  (6)
As in the previous specification, the reform coefficients are all negative (see Table 
3.37) when the interaction is not included. However, the interaction term is strongly 
significant, much larger and of opposite sign for the first category. Which confirms 
the trends observed in previous specifications. Similarly for the results in the other 
professional categories, the path observed in the estimates is analogous to the result 
without fixed effects. Again, these results provide supportive evidence that the post 
reform self selection of better politicians is more powerful in bigger cities.
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3 .7 .6  A d d i t i o n a l  r e s u l t s  t a b l e s
T ab le  3.22
The determinantss of education -O rdered Probit Analysis
Dependent variable: education index* - Non linear estimation- Whole sample
Ordered logit estimates Ordered probit estimates
Reform 0.359 0.367 0.297 0.221 0.225 0.183
[0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.008]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.005]***
Interaction 0.321 0.195
[0.006]*** [0.009]***
Executive 0.472 0.267 0.273 0.151
[0.008]*** [0.013]*** [0.005]*** [0.007]***
Population 0.413 0.406 0.407 0.242 0.238 0.239
[0.0051*** [0.0051*** [0.0051*** ro.0031*** [0.0031*** [0.0031***
Observations 444527 444527 444527 444527 444527 444527
NOTES: *The education index has four categories, which have been constructed lfom the 
Italian education system: elementary=l (school up to age 10), intermediate=2 (school up 
to age 13), high school =3 (school up to age 18-19) and university=4 (graduate and 
postgraduate degrees). Estimation method: ordered logit in columns 2-4 and ordered 
probit in columns 5-7. Robust standard errors, clustered at the town level, are reported in 
brackets. *** Coefficients significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, * significant 
at 1%. Population is the log of town population, measured yearly. See the Data appendix 
for the construction and sources of the variables. The data are for all Italian towns and the 
time span covered is from 1989-2002. Reform is a dummy that captures all politicians 
elected with the new electoral law, Executive is a dummy that takes value one if the 
politicians is part of the executive, Interaction is a dummy that captures the interaction 
between the reform and executive variables.
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Table 3.23
The Determinants Of Politicians’ Education -  Towns with more than 15000
INHABITANTS
Dependent variable: education index* - Linear panel estimates— towns of15000 inhabitants or more
Reform 0.089 0.095 0.016 0.016
[0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]***
Executive 0.241 0.042 0.042
[0.007]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]
Interaction 0.309
[0.016]***
0.309
[0.014]***
Population -0.003
[3.1*10A5]
Town fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 74128 74128 74128 74128
Number o f  Towns 652 652 652 652
Italian education system: elementary=l (school up to age 10), intermediate=2 (school up to age 
13), high school =3 (school up to age 18-19) and university=4 (graduate and postgraduate 
degrees). Estimation method: linear panel estimation.
Robust standard errors, clustered at the town level, are reported in brackets. *** Coefficients 
significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. Population is the log of 
town population, measured yearly. See the Data appendix for the construction and sources of 
the variables. The data are for all Italian towns with more than 15000 inhabitants and the time 
span covered is from 1989-2002. Reform is a dummy that captures all politicians elected with 
the new electoral law, Executive is a dummy that takes value one if the politicians is part of the 
executive, Interaction is a dummy that captures the interaction between the reform and 
executive variables.
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Table 3.24
The Determinants Of Politicians’ Education -  Towns with more than 15000
INHABITANTS
Dependent variable: education indexf - Non linear estimation -Towns of15000 inhabitants or more
Ordered logit estimates______________ Ordered probit estimates
Reform 0.17 0.187 0.011 0.001 0.118 0.131 0.018
[0.021]*** [0.021]*** [0.023] [0.022] [0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.013]
Executive 0.585 0.134 0.117 0.372 0.081
[0.019]*** [0.032]*** [0.032]*** [0.011]*** [0.019]***
Interaction 0.709 0.777 0.467
[0.041]*** [0.041]*** [0.024]***
Population 0.357 0.212 0.212 0.217
[0.007]*** [0.015]*** [0.015]*** [0.015]***
Observations 74128 74128 74128 74128 74128 74128 74128
NOTES: * The education index has four categories, which have been constructed from the 
Italian education system: elementary=l (school up to age 10), intermediate=2 (school up to age 
13), high school =3 (school up to age 18-19) and university=4 (graduate and postgraduate 
degrees). Estimation method: ordered logit in columns 2-5 and ordered probit in columns 6-8. 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the town level, are reported in brackets. *** Coefficients 
significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. Population is the log of 
town population, measured yearly. See the Data appendix for the construction and sources of 
the variables. The data are for all Italian towns with more than 15000 inhabitants and the time 
span covered is from 1989-2002. Reform is a dummy that captures all politicians elected with 
the new electoral law, Executive is a dummy that takes value one if the politicians is part of the 
executive, Interaction is a dummy that captures the interaction between the reform and 
executive variables.
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T a b l e  3.25
T h e  D e t e r m i n a n t s  Of P o l i t i c i a n s ’ E d u c a t i o n  -  T o w n s  w it h  m o r e  t h a n  15000
In h a b i t a n t s
Dependent variable: education index* - Non linear estimation -Towns of15000 inhabitants or more
Ordered logit estimates with individual Town fixed effects
Ordered probit 
estimates with 
random Town fixed
effects
Reform 0.181 -0.198 -0.013 0.011
[0.015]*** [0.015] [0.0175] [0.010]
Executive 0.617 0.071 0.056
[0.017]*** [0.028]*** [0.016]***
Interaction 0.856
[0.035]***
0.503
[0.020]***
Population 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
[0.0001 ro.oooi [0.0001 [0.000]***
Town fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 74128 74128 74128 74128
NOTES: * The education index has four categories, which have been constructed from the 
Italian education system: elementary=l (school up to age 10), intermediate=2 (school up to age 
13), high school =3 (school up to age 18-19) and university=4 (graduate and postgraduate 
degrees). Estimation method: ordered logit in columns 2-4 and ordered probit in columns 5. 
Standard errors are reporter in brackets. *** Coefficients significant at the 1% level, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 1 %. Population is the town population, measured yearly. See 
the Data appendix for the construction and sources of the variables. The data are for all Italian 
towns with more than 15000 inhabitants and the time span covered is from 1989-2002. Reform 
is a dummy that captures all politicians elected with the new electoral law, Executive is a 
dummy that takes value one if the politicians is part of the executive, Interaction is a dummy 
that captures the interaction between the reform and executive variables.
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T a b l e  3 .2 6
T h e  D e t e r m i n a n t s  O f P o l i t i c i a n s ’ E d u c a t i o n  -  T o w n s  w it h  m o r e  t h a n  5 0 0 0 0
In h a b i t a n t s
Dependent variable: education index* - Linear panel estimates— towns of50000 inhabitants or more
__________________________________ Samples__________________________________
Before the reform After the reform Whole sample Whole sample
0.062 -0.009
[0.014]*** [0.016]
0.038 0.318 0.211 0.036
[0.023]* [0.016]*** [0.012]*** [0.022]**
0.282
 [0.028]***
Town fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7279 14032 21311 21311
Number o f  Towns__________135 136 139_______________ 139______
NOTES: * The education index has four categories, which have been constructed from the 
Italian education system: elementary=l (school up to age 10), intermediate=2 (school up to age 
13), high school =3 (school up to age 18-19) and university=4 (graduate and postgraduate 
degrees). Estimation method: linear panel estimation.
Robust standard errors, clustered at the town level, are reported in brackets. *** Coefficients 
significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. Population is the log of 
town population, measured yearly. See the Data appendix for the construction and sources of 
the variables. The data are for all Italian towns with more than 50000 inhabitants and the span 
covered is from 1989-2002. Reform is a dummy that captures all politicians elected with the 
new electoral law, Executive is a dummy that takes value one if the politicians is part of the 
executive, Interaction is a dummy that captures the interaction between the reform and 
executive variables.
Reform
Executive
Interaction
1 7 0
T a b l e  3 .2 7
T h e  D e t e r m i n a n t s  O f  P o l i t i c i a n s ’ E d u c a t i o n  -  T o w n s  w it h  m o r e  t h a n  5 0 0 0 0
In h a b i t a n t s
Dependent variable: education index* - Non linear estimation —Towns of50000 inhabitants or more
Ordered logit estimates__________________ Ordered probit estimates
Reform 0.140 -0.062 0.101 -0.018
[0.041]*** [0.044] [0.024]*** [0.026]
Executive 0.573 0.585 0.074 0.352 0.363 0.063
[0.037]*** [0.037]*** [0.061] [0.022]*** [0.022]*** [0.037]=
Interaction 0.857 0.509
[0.083]*** [0.049]’
Town population 0.203 0.206 0.208 0.131 0.132 0.133
[0.036]*** [0.037]*** [0.037]*** [0.021]*** [0.022]*** [0.022]=
Observations 21311 21311 21311 21311 21311 21311
NOTES: i The education index has four categories, which have been constructed from the 
Italian education system: elementary=l (school up to age 10), intermediate=2 (school up to age 
13), high school =3 (school up to age 18-19) and university=4 (graduate and postgraduate 
degrees). Estimation method: ordered logit in columns 2-4 and ordered probit in columns 5-7. 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the town level, are reported in brackets. *** Coefficients 
significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. Population is the log of 
town population, measured yearly. See the Data appendix for the construction and sources of 
the variables. The data are for all Italian towns with more than 50000 inhabitants and the time 
span covered is from 1989-2002. Reform is a dummy that captures all politicians elected with 
the new electoral law, Executive is a dummy that takes value one if the politicians is part of the 
executive, Interaction is a dummy that captures the interaction between the reform and 
executive variables.
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T a b l e  3 .2 8
T h e  D e t e r m i n a n t s  O f  P o l i t ic i a n s ’ E d u c a t io n  -  T o w n s  w it h  m o r e  t h a n  5 0 0 0 0
In h a b i t a n t s
Dependent variable: education indexf - Non linear estimation -Towns of50000 inhabitants or more
Ordered logit estimates with individual Town fixed Ordered probit estimates with 
effects random Town fixed effects
Reform -0.069 -0.069 0.07 0.1 -0.025
[0.033]*** [0.033]** [0.017]*** [0.017]*** [0.020]
Executive 0.06 0.06 0.367 0.053
[0.052] [0.052] [0.020]*** [0.030]=
Interaction 0.908 0.908 0.533
Town
population
[0.068]*** [0.068]***
0.000
[0.000]
[0.040]=
Town fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 21311 21311 21311 21311 21311
NOTES: * The education index has four categories, which have been constructed from the 
Italian education system: elementary=l (school up to age 10), intermediated (school up to age
13), high school =3 (school up to age 18-19) and university=4 (graduate and postgraduate 
degrees). Estimation method: ordered logit in columns 2-3 and ordered probit in columns 4-6. 
Standard errors are reporter in brackets. *** Coefficients significant at the 1% level, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. Population is the town population, measured yearly. See 
the Data appendix for the construction and sources of the variables. The data are for all Italian 
towns with more than 50000 inhabitants and the time span covered is from 1989-2002. Reform 
is a dummy that captures all politicians elected with the new electoral law, Executive is a 
dummy that takes value one if the politicians is part of the executive, Interaction is a dummy 
that captures the interaction between the reform and executive variables.
1 7 2
T a b l e  3 .2 9
P o l i t i c i a n s ’ U n i v e r s i t y  E d u c a t i o n
T o w n s  w it h  M o r e  t h a n  1 5 0 0 0  i n h a b i t a n t s
Dependent variable: university education dummy f  Linear panel - Towns of15000 inhabitants or more
Reform 0.021 0.024 -0.029 -0.029
[0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.005]***
Executive 0.134 -0.002 -0.002
[0.005]*** [0.009] [0.008]
Interaction 0.21 0.21
[0.010]*** [0.010]***
Town population 0.001
[3.28*10A41
Town fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 74128 74128 74128 74128
Number o f Towns 652 652 652 652
NOTES: * The university education dummy is equals one when the incumbent is a graduate. 
Estimation method: linear panel estimation.
Robust standard errors, clustered at the town level, are reported in brackets. *** Coefficients 
significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. Population is the log of 
town population, measured yearly. See the Data appendix for the construction and sources of 
the variables. The data are for all Italian towns with more than 15000 and the span covered is 
from 1989-2002. Reform is a dummy that captures all politicians elected with the new electoral 
law, Executive is a dummy that takes value one if the politicians is part of the executive, 
Interaction is a dummy that captures the interaction between the reform and executive variables.
1 7 3
T a b l e  3 .3 0
P o l i t i c i a n s ’ U n i v e r s it y  E d u c a t i o n
T o w n s  w it h  M o r e  t h a n  1 5 0 0 0  i n h a b i t a n t s
Dependent variable: university education dummy* - Panel logit estimation - Towns of15000 inhabitants or more
Reform
Executive
Interaction
0.094
[0.017]***
0.109
[0.017]***
0.577
[0.018]***
-0.132
[0.019]***
-0.01
[0.030]
0.91
[0.038]***
Town fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 74126 74126 74126
Number o f Towns 651 651 651
NOTES: * The university education dummy is equals one when the incumbent is a graduate. 
Estimation method: panel logit estimation. Standard errors are reporter in brackets. *** 
Coefficients significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. Population is 
the town population, measured yearly. See the Data appendix for the construction and sources 
of the variables. The data are for all Italian towns with more than 15000 inhabitants and the time 
span covered is from 1989-2002. Reform is a dummy that captures all politicians elected with 
the new electoral law, Executive is a dummy that takes value one if the politicians is part of the 
executive, Interaction is a dummy that captures the interaction between the reform and 
executive variables.
1 7 4
T a b l e  3 .3 1
P o l i t ic i a n s ’ U n i v e r s i t y  E d u c a t i o n
T o w n s  w it h  M o r e  t h a n  1 5 0 0 0  i n h a b i t a n t s
Dependent variable: university education dummy* - Panel probit estimation - Towns of15000 inhabitants or more
Reform 0.057 0.065 -0.079 -0.079
[0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]***
Executive 0.357 0 0
- [0.011]*** [0.019] [0.019]
Interaction 0.553 0.553
[0.023]*** [0.023]***
Town population 0
[0.000]***
Observations 74128 74128 74128 74128
Number o f  Towns 652 652 652 652
NOTES: * The university education dummy is equals one when the incumbent is a graduate. 
Estimation method: panel probit estimation. Standard errors are reporter in brackets. *** 
Coefficients significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. Population is 
the town population, measured yearly. See the Data appendix for the construction and sources 
of the variables. The data are for all Italian towns with more than 15000 inhabitants and the time 
span covered is from 1989-2002. Reform is a dummy that captures all politicians elected with 
the new electoral law, Executive is a dummy that takes value one if the politicians is part of the 
executive, Interaction is a dummy that captures the interaction between the reform and 
executive variables.
1 7 5
T a b l e  3 .3 2
P o l i t i c i a n s ’ U n i v e r s i t y  E d u c a t i o n
in  T o w n s  w it h  M o r e  t h a n  5 0 0 0 0  i n h a b i t a n t s
Dependent variable: university education dummy f  Linear panel estimation - towns of50000 inhabitants or more
Reform 0.016
[0.007]**
Executive 
Interaction 
Town population
0.025
[0.007]***
0.136
[0.008]***
-0.028
[0.008]***
0.005
[0.013]
0.211
[0.016]***
-0.029
[0.008]***
0.005
[0.013]
0.211
[0.016]***
0
[0.000]
Town fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Town fixed effects
Observations 21311 21311 21311 21311
Number o f Towns 139 139 139 139
NOTES: * The university education dummy is equals one when the incumbent is a graduate. 
Estimation method: linear panel estimation.
Robust standard errors, clustered at the town level, are reported in brackets. *** Coefficients 
significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. Population is the log of 
town population, measured yearly. See the Data appendix for the construction and sources of 
the variables. The data are for all Italian towns with more than 50000 inhabitants and the span 
covered is from 1989-2002. Reform is a dummy that captures all politicians elected with the 
new electoral law, Executive is a dummy that takes value one if the politicians is part of the 
executive, Interaction is a dummy that captures the interaction between the reform and 
executive variables.
1 7 6
T a b l e  3 .3 3
P o l i t i c i a n s ’ U n i v e r s i t y  E d u c a t io n
T o w n s  w it h  M o r e  t h a n  5 0 0 0 0  in h a b i t a n t s
Dependent variable: university education dummy/ Panel logit estimation- towns of50000 inhabitants or more
Reform 0.066 0.105 -0.117
[0.030]** [0.031]*** [0.035]***
Executive 0.57 0.02
[0.034]*** [0.054]
Interaction 0.91
[0.070]***
Town fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 21311 21311 21311
Number of Towns 139 139 139
NOTES: * The university education dummy is equals one when the incumbent is a graduate.
Estimation method: panel logit estimation. Standard errors are reporter in brackets. ***
Coefficients significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. Population is
the town population, measured yearly. See the Data appendix for the construction and sources
of the variables. The data are for all Italian towns with more than 50000 inhabitants and the time 
span covered is from 1989-2002. Reform is a dummy that captures all politicians elected with 
the new electoral law, Executive is a dummy that takes value one if the politicians is part of the 
executive, Interaction is a dummy that captures the interaction between the reform and 
executive variables.
1 7 7
T a b l e  3 .3 4
P o l i t ic i a n s ’ U n i v e r s i t y  E d u c a t i o n
T o w n s  w it h  M o r e  t h a n  5 0 0 0 0  i n h a b i t a n t s
Dependent variable: university education dummy* Panel probit estimation - towns of50000 inhabitants or more
Reform 0.04 0.065 -0.073 -0.074
[0.019]** [0.019]*** [0.022]*** [0.022]***
Executive 0.354 0.014 0.013
[0.021]*** [0.034] [0.034]
Interaction 0.560 0.561
[0.043]*** [0.043]***
Town population 0
[0.0001***
Observations 21311 21311 21311 21311
Number of Towns 139 139 139 139
NOTES: * The university education dummy is equals one when the incumbent is a graduate. 
Estimation method: panel probit estimation. Standard errors are reporter in brackets. *** 
Coefficients significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. Population is 
the town population, measured yearly. See the Data appendix for the construction and sources 
of the variables. The data are for all Italian towns with more than 50000 inhabitants and the time 
span covered is from 1989-2002. Reform is a dummy that captures all politicians elected with 
the new electoral law, Executive is a dummy that takes value one if the politicians is part of the 
executive, Interaction is a dummy that captures the interaction between the reform and 
executive variables.
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Table 3.35
Changes in Occupations -  Towns With More Than 15000 Inhabitants
Multinomial logit analysis on occupational categories -  towns of15000 inhabitants or more
Prof. Admin. Services Prof. Admin.
Dependent Variables* 
Services Prof. Admin. Services Prof. Admin. Services
Reform -0.084
[0.028]***
-0.551
[0.027]***
-0.91
[0.062]***
-0.071
[0.029]***
-0.541
[0.027]***
-0.905
[0.062]***
-0.185
[0.031]***
-0.543
[0.030]***
-0.911
[0.064]***
-0.203
[0.031]***
-0.561
[0.031]***
-0.926
[0.063]***
Interaction 0.491
[0.056]***
0.084
[0.057]
0.063
[0.098]
0.541
[0.056]***
0.132
[0.057]**
0.103
[0.099]
Executive 
Town Pop.
0.648
[0.026]***
0.538
[0.029]***
0.276
[0.052]***
0.308
[0.044]***
0.464
[0.044]***
0.198
[0.071]***
0.295
[0.044]***
0.324
[0.0271***
0.452
[0.044]***
0.316
[0.0251***
0.187
[0.071]***
0.259
[0.0471***
Obs. 73561 73561 73561 73561 73561 73561 73561 73561 73561 73561 73561 73561
NOTES: * Dependent variable: Cat 1 = professionals, Cat 2 = administrative, Cat 3 [omitted] = other sectors, Cat 4 = services. Estimation method: 
multinomial logit. Robust standard errors, clustered at the town level, are reported in brackets. *** Coefficients significant at the 1% level, ** significant 
at 5%, * significant at 1%. Population is the log of town population, measured yearly. See the Data appendix for the construction and sources of the 
variables. The data are for all Italian towns with more than 15000 inhabitants and the time span covered is from 1989-2002. Reform is a dummy that 
captures all politicians elected with the new electoral law, Executive is a dummy that takes value one if the politicians is part of the executive, Interaction 
is a dummy that captures the interaction between the reform and executive variables.
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T a b l e  3 .3 6
C h a n g e s  in  O c c u p a t i o n s  -  T o w n s  W it h  M o r e  T h a n  5 0 0 0 0  In h a b i t a n t s
Multinomial logit analysis on occupational categories -  towns of 50000 inhabitants or more
Prof. Admin. Services Prof. Admin.
Dependent Variables* 
Services Prof. Admin. Services Prof. Admin. Services
Reform -0.13
[0.055]***
-0.598
[0.054]***
-0.962
[0.128]***
-0.088
[0.056]***
-0.563
[0.055]***
-0.933
[0.095]***
-0.229
[0.060]***
-0.577
[0.060]***
-1.037
[0.133]***
-0.222
[0.059]***
-0.568
[0.060]***
-1.024
[0.130]***
Interaction 0.679
[0.118]***
0.203
[0.122]*
0.569
[0.202]***
0.682
[0.119]***
0.207
[0.122]*
0.574
[0.202]***
Executive 
Town Pop.
0.772
[0.049]***
0.671
[0.054]***
0.567
[0.095]***
0.324
[0.093]***
0.519
[0.092]***
0.229
[0.150]
0.323
[0.093]***
0.177
[0.0431***
0.518
[0.092]***
0.226
[0.046]***
0.228
[0.150]
0.313
[0.0781***
Obs. 21133 21133 21133 21133 21133 21133 21133 21133 21133 21133 21133 21133
NOTES: * Dependent variable: Cat 1 = professionals, Cat 2 = administrative, Cat 3 [omitted] = other sectors, Cat 4 = services. Estimation method: 
multinomial logit. Robust standard errors, clustered at the town level, are reported in brackets. *** Coefficients significant at the 1% level, ** significant 
at 5%, * significant at 1%. Population is the log of town population, measured yearly. See the Data appendix for the construction and sources of the 
variables. The data are for all Italian towns with more than 50000 inhabitants and the time span covered is from 1989-2002. Reform is a dummy that 
captures all politicians elected with the new electoral law, Executive is a dummy that takes value one if the politicians is part of the executive, Interaction 
is a dummy that captures the interaction between the reform and executive variables.
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T a b l e  3 .3 7
C h a n g e s  i n  O c c u p a t i o n s  -  T o w n s  W it h  M o r e  T h a n  5 0 0 0 0  In h a b i t a n t s
Multinomial logit analysis on occupational categories -  towns of50000 inhabitants or more
Dependent Variables*
Prof. Admin. Services Prof. Admin. Services Prof. Admin. Services Prof. Admin. Services
Reform -0.143 -0.638 -0.932 -0.102 -0.604 -0.902 -0.26 -0.626 -0.994 -0.26 -0.626 -0.994
[0.045]*** [0.046]*** [0.075]*** [0.046]*** [0.046]*** [0.075]*** [0.051]*** [0.051]*** [0.085]*** [0.051]*** [0.051]*** [0.085]***
Interaction 0.753 0.246 0.525 0.753 0.246 0.525
[0.113]*** [0.114]** [0.179]*** [0.113]*** [0.114]** [0.179]***
Executive 0.763 0.656 0.598 0.266 0.475 0.270 0.266 0.475 0.270
[0.054]*** [0.056]*** [0.089]** [0.090]*** [0.088]*** [0.130]** [0.090]*** [0.088]*** [0.130]**
Town Pop. 0 0 0
[0.0001 [0.0001** [0.0001***
Town fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Obs. 21133 21133 21133 21133 21133 21133 21133 21133 21133 21133 21133 21133
NOTES: i Dependent variable: Cat 1 = professionals, Cat 2 = administrative, Cat 3 [omitted] = other sectors, Cat 4 = services. Estimation method: 
multinomial logit. Standard errors are reported in brackets. *** Coefficients significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. 
Population is the town population, measured yearly. See the Data appendix for the construction and sources of the variables. The data are for all Italian 
towns with more than 50000 inhabitants and the time span covered is from 1989-2002. Reform is a dummy that captures all politicians elected with the 
new electoral law, Executive is a dummy that takes value one if the politicians is part of the executive, Interaction is a dummy that captures the interaction 
between the reform and executive variables.
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Table 3.38
Women’s Representation and political affiliation
All Towns
Reform 0.078 0.076 0.078 0.076 0.074 0.075
[0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]***
Interaction -0.044 -0.045 -0.051 -0.043 -0.043 -0.049
[0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.005]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.005]***
Executive -0.011 -0.011 -0.007 -0.011 -0.011 -0.008
[0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]***
Population 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Left 0.023 0.021 0.023 0.023 0.021 0.023
[0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]***
Left*Reform 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.002
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003]* [0.003]
Left*Exec -0.008 -0.008
[0.004]* [0.004]*
Left*Reform*Exec 0.013 0.013
[0.006]** [0.006]**
Towns effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time f.e. No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 281221 281221 281221 281221 281221 281221
NOTES: *The dependent variable is a dummy =1 for women and =0 for men. Estimation method: linear panel estimation. Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***
Coefficients significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%. See the Data appendix for the construction and sources of the variables. Data are for all Italian 
towns, and the time span covered is from 1989-2002. Reform is a dummy that captures all politicians elected with the new electoral law, Executive is a dummy that takes value 
one if the politicians is part of the executive, Interaction is a dummy that captures the interaction between the reform and executive variables. Population is the town population, 
measured yearly. Left is a dummy that equals one for politicians of the left. Left* Reform , Left*Exec and Left*Exec*Ref are interactions of the above defined variables.
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